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FOREWORD

One of the hallmarks of the two Bush administrations’ foreign
and defense policies has been a growing rapprochement with
India. Indeed, in June 2005 the U.S. Government signed a defense
agreement with that country. In part, this rapprochement is driven
by and coincides with India’s increasingly visible role as a major
Asian power. This book-length monograph seeks to illuminate
India’s rising power and capabilities with regard to the key regions
on its periphery: the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia.
The author, Dr. Stephen Blank, also considers the major issues
pertaining to India’s bilateral defense agenda with the United States.
By revealing the dimensions of India’s growing capabilities and
interests, he also provides a strategic rationale for the development
of the partnership to date and for its further evolution.
Numerous analyses of current global trends point to the rise of
India as a major transformation in world politics. This work underscores India’s importance and provides a basis for understanding
why its relationship to the United States is and will become ever
more critical.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Indo-American relations increasingly comprise expanded
strategic and economic ties. India’s government, led by Prime
Minister Mamonhan Singh, has stated its intention to intensify
these ties with America. Clearly the Bush administration agrees. For
example, President Bush has indicated his intention to sustain the
gains achieved since 2001 as a priority.
Prime Minister Singh has invited the President to India. President
Bush has indicated his intention to go there, leading Indian analysts
to expect that, “What we are going to see is a consolidation of IndoU.S. ties on a range of strategic issues. We may see a greater emphasis
on economic ones as well.”
The Bush administration is prepared to make a major offer of arms
sales to India. This deal has many repercussions across the entire
range of Indo-American relationships and of India’s relationships
with a host of important foreign governments like Russia, China,
Pakistan, and Israel. Undoubtedly, a reinforcement of the economic
foundations of bilateral amity would be desirable for many reasons.
This book-length monograph seeks to illuminate India’s rising
power and capabilities with regard to the key regions on its
periphery: the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and South East Asia. The
author also considers the major issues pertaining to India’s bilateral
defense agenda with the United States. By revealing the dimensions
of India’s growing capabilities and interests, he provides a strategic
rationale developing the U.S.-India partnership further.

vii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Since 1997, the Clinton and Bush administrations have searched
for ways to initiate and sustain a lasting improvement in IndoAmerican relations.1 India has reciprocated this search today, even
though it changed governments in its 2004 elections—replacing
the A.B. Vajpayee administration and the coalition led by the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) with the Congress Party-led coalition,
many of whose members are rather more opposed to U.S. policies.
Both sides now proclaim that their relations are better than ever.2
Indeed, in 1998, soon after India’s nuclear tests forced the Clinton
administration to impose congressionally-mandated sanctions upon
India, Prime Minister Vajpayee proclaimed the two states to be
natural allies.3 Since then, their mutual rapprochement has led to the
lifting of these sanctions and the start of meaningful economic and
technological cooperation, with the distinct possibility of expanded
bilateral military cooperation.4 These steps reﬂect America’s gradual
reorientation of its policies towards India and show that IndoAmerican relations increasingly comprise expanded strategic and
economic ties.
India’s government, led by Prime Minister Mamonhan Singh,
similarly has stated its intention to intensify both strategic and
economic ties with America.5 Therefore, today there are grounds for
optimism concerning the future development of this relationship.
Due to these trends, Indian elites believe and have told Americans
that great possibilities are in store for a relationship that they now
deem to be “irreversible.” Indeed, during 2003, if not since then,
American and Indian ofﬁcials discussed a possible “Asian NATO
(North Atlantic Treaty Organization)” although the content of
these discussions and of India’s signiﬁcance for them has not been
made public.6 Thus G. V. C. Naidu’s recent study of Indian policy
in Southeast Asia, an important region for both Washington and
New Delhi, states that, “Whether with regard to the U.S., Japan,
or Southeast Asia, policymakers appear to be convinced that an
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enduring bilateral relationship cannot be built unless underpinned
by strategic ties.”7
Clearly the Bush administration agrees. For example, President
Bush has indicated his intention to sustain the gains achieved since
2001 as a priority of his next term.8 Indian observers were also
pleased by President Bush’s re-election since they expressed some
concern about a possible Kerry presidency, given his comments
about outsourcing jobs to India and the past record of some of Senator
Kerry’s foreign policy advisors. Indeed, Prime Minister Singh lost no
time in congratulating President Bush and inviting him to India as
soon as he can come.9 President Bush recently reiterated his intention
to go to India, leading Indian analysts to expect that, “What we are
going to see is a consolidation of Indo-U.S. ties on a range of strategic
issues. We may see a greater emphasis on economic ones as well.”10
This emphasis on economic issues appears to be in tune with the
administration’s thinking and, as we shall see below, with much
expert opinion as well. More recently it has also become clear that the
Bush administration is prepared to make a major offer of arms sales
to India. This deal (the details and speciﬁc ramiﬁcations of which are
discussed below) has many repercussions across the entire range of
Indo-American relationships and of India’s relationships with a host
of important foreign governments like Russia, China, Pakistan, and
Israel.11 Undoubtedly, a reinforcement of the economic foundations
of bilateral amity would be desirable for many reasons.
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CHAPTER 2
BUREAUCRATIC CHALLENGES TO PARTNERSHIP
One reason for reinforcing U.S.-Indian ties is the persisting and
troubling reality that this strategic partnership remains a precarious
one that has yet to reach its full strategic potential. Indeed, several
observers fear that this relationship is presently treading water.12
Others point to continuing Indian suspicions that Washington places
a higher priority upon working with Pakistan than it does with India.
So, for example, distinguished Indian commentator C. Raja Mohan
recently wrote that,
Washington’s decision, for whatever reason, to discreetly handle the
Abdul Qadeer Khan affair—the so-called father of the Pakistani bomb
whose extensive network of nuclear proliferation was unveiled earlier
this year—conﬁrms New Delhi’s assessment that Washington will allow
Islamabad to get away with anything.13

Such suspicions unfortunately are congenital, given the zero-sum
nature of Indo-Pakistani relations. Nor does the gap in perceptions
among American ofﬁcials, who see Pakistan’s support in the war
on terrorism as being crucial, while India is an informal ally that
provides important but indirect support to this war, make it easier to
enhance the very real strategic partnership that exists between New
Delhi and Washington.14
Likewise, both India’s and Pakistan’s readiness to insist that
Washington support one of them at the other’s expense inserts a
“hyphen into the relationship” despite the professed statements of
all three governments in this triangle that they want a relationship
that is based on an independent calculation of interests, capabilities,
etc. Thus Indo-Pakistani frictions dog many, if not all, of the issues
on the Indo-American agenda and, when added to the perception
of Pakistan’s criticality for the war on terrorism, the ensuing
“hyphenization” of U.S. policy retards the full progress of partnership
with India.15 Hence, one reason for the new offer on arms sales
appears to be an attempt to remove India’s unhappiness about recent
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disclosures of impending arms sales to Pakistan of almost $1 Billion
made up of tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW)
anti-tank missiles; Phalanx shipborne guns; and P-3C Orion longrange maritime patrol strike aircraft. F-16 planes that were ordered
earlier and withheld due to sanctions evidently will also be released
to Pakistan as well.16
Nevertheless, U.S. concessions to Pakistan that are not balanced
or appear not to be balanced by due regard for Indian interests,
sensitivities, and perceptions inevitably will cause bitterness in New
Delhi. Announcing Pakistan’s status as a non-NATO ally, making it
eligible for weapons like the F-16 that India cannot get, and doing
so immediately after Secretary Powell left India without telling it
what was happening caused an explosion earlier in 2004. Indeed, it
ﬂew in the face of the recommendations of the Council on Foreign
Relations’ Task Force on South Asia that recommended giving India
the status of a friendly country for purposes of negotiating export
licenses on defense technology.17 Moreover, this explosion was
entirely foreseeable, and thus the failure to anticipate it suggested
a neglect of, or lack of concern for, India or was seen as such. So, as
long as Indian policymakers see the same facts we do, they will not
accept that their interests are not to be taken into account. Indeed,
taking India’s interests into account and not taking it for granted is
what this partnership must be about on a day-to-day basis.
Bureaucratic failures are also distressingly common. Pentagon
ofﬁcials involved with Indian affairs confess that they lack strategic
guidance as to the long-range strategic purpose of this expanding
relationship, and this hesitancy invariably translates into policy on
the ground and allocation of resources for purposes of policymaking
as conducted by Department of Defense (DoD) personnel.18 As
a result, despite expanding bilateral military cooperation that
includes a growing number of combined exercises involving all the
services of both states’ armed forces and which are moving from
tactical cooperation to operational cooperation entailing larger
units and standardization of operational procedures among them,
those involved in planning and coordinating them ﬁnd it difﬁcult to
discern a strategic rationale for this relationship or those exercises
besides the sheer fact of their existence.19 Consequently, bilateral
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military cooperation drives the bilateral relationship but does so
in the absence of a sufﬁciently robust economic or political and
strategic dimension. Not surprisingly, this perception conﬁrms the
notion that the bilateral relationship is treading water or stagnating
at a plateau.20
Fundamental differences of approach to India between and within
the relevant cabinet departments of the U.S. Government: State,
Energy, Commerce, and Defense, as well as within the Congress,
clearly obstruct this relationship’s full development.21 The Democratic
Party and the State Department tend to view India through the lens
of nonproliferation priorities, whereas the administration and the
Pentagon see India as part of the most dynamic strategic region in
the world, i.e., Asia, and as an economic and strategic partner of
the United States. Without determining whether either outlook is
justiﬁed or correct, it is clear that State Department ofﬁcials have
obstructed arms sales to India because they still are aggrieved over
its nuclearization in 1998 and cherish the idea that India can be kept
from being formally declared a nuclear power state by punishing
it through the withholding of conventional arms and military
technologies, including perhaps nuclear related ones. DoD, on the
other hand, strongly favors moving to expanded defense relations
with India which encompass not just the 17 combined exercises that
occurred with the Indian armed forces in 2003 but also relief from
existing sanctions, expanded technology and weapons sales, and
discussions with India on missile defense.
The State Department’s stress on nonproliferation and desire to
arraign India for its nuclearization in 1998 is an immense source of
frustration to Indians, especially as they view technology transfer
and the ending of sanctions and other obstructions to military sales
as touchstones of the seriousness and genuineness of the bilateral
relationship. Furthermore, it aligns Washington with China’s
opposition to according India formal status as a nuclear power,
clearly a sign that Beijing still seeks to conﬁne India to a lower, purely
regional, status as an Asian player while it reaps the beneﬁts and
status of being a recognized nuclear power.22 From India’s standpoint,
such a ranking is intolerable, both politically and psychologically. At
the same time, neither does the State Department’s stance preclude
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India’s nuclearization or the development of its weapons arsenal,
since there are others who will gladly produce whatever Washington
denies. As C. Raja Mohan observes,
The administration must also consider that a technology-denial regime
against India makes little sense because it ignores recent technological
developments in India; disregards New Delhi’s emerging capability
to export sensitive technologies, even while it remains outside the
international architecture constructed to manage WMD [weapons of mass
destruction] proliferation; and belies U.S. proclamations of a strategic
partnership with New Delhi.23

Ultimately, the withholding of recognition of India as a nuclear
power also allows Pakistan to escape constraints on its nuclear
programs. Thus it represents a policy of feeling virtuous rather than
doing the right thing strategically, since there is no evidence that
withholding that status has stopped other powers from proliferating;
quite the opposite. Therefore, Indian elites, be they important
correspondents and observers like C. Raja Mohan or former military
personnel like an admiral whom Juli MacDonald interviewed in
her published study of Indo-American strategic perceptions, all
speak bluntly about the consequences of the State Department’s and
general bureaucratic obstruction here.24 C. Raja Mohan writes that,
Where arms control is concerned, the nonproliferation establishment in
Washington has not been willing to match the intellectual boldness of the
Bush administration. Many ofﬁcials at the political level in Washington
recognize that India could be a partner in managing the new challenges
that arise from the proliferation of WMD. Caught up in the old verities,
by contrast, the American arms-control bureaucracy continues to see
India as part of the problem rather than as part of the solution. Unless
there is some fresh thinking about India in the American arms-control
community, talk of a new relationship between the two countries will
likely remain on paper.25

Similarly, a retired brigadier told MacDonald that,
Until the United States changes its approach to nonproliferation, its
policies will be seen as a threat to India’s security interests. Current U.S.
policy is intended to deny India technologies. Moreover, not only does
the U.S. Government deny India technologies, it actively blocks other
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countries from selling India technologies (e.g., Israel). For Indians, this is
a direct affront to their security interests.26

While India’s actual nuclear capability has apparently been a key
factor in inﬂuencing the Bush administration’s overall approach to
it, the strong pockets of opposition to military sales to India within
Congress and the Executive Branch bureaucracy clearly are regarded
by Indians as a major obstacle to any genuine strategic cooperation.
Another problem relates to India’s placement within the
combatant commands of U.S. forces. Bureaucratic hurdles that place
India in U.S. Paciﬁc Command’s (PACOM) Area of Responsibility
(AOR) and the rest of South Asia and Central Asia in U.S. Central
Command’s (CENTCOM) AOR appear to Indian leaders and elites
to create their own sense of disjunction in American policy. Thus
Arun Sahgal, the ﬁrst director of India’s Ofﬁce of Net Assessment
in India’s Joint Staff, writes that Indian policymakers and elites are
particularly dismayed by the strategic rationale of dealing with
PACOM when India’s central concerns lie in CENTCOM.27
Moreover, increasingly visible structural faults in the institutions
responsible for planning U.S. strategy and policy, regardless of
which party leads the government, impede the formulation and
implementation of a coherent national security strategy (NSS) in
general or toward any country in particular. The failure to impart
strategic guidance concerning an increasingly critical relationship to
key Pentagon ofﬁces in and of itself betrays a policy failure. Worse
yet, some prominent past American policymakers disdain the very
idea of a strategic approach to world affairs.
Warren Christopher once declared that the United States did not
have an overall strategy and, moreover, was not going to get one
during his tenure as Secretary of State (1993-97). He had learned
as a lawyer, he said proudly, that it was best to handle issues caseby-case as they arose. National Security Advisor Samuel R. Berger
(1997-2001) has said the same thing, doubting whether anything as
grand as “grand strategy” ever really existed.28
More recently, General Anthony Zinni (USMC Ret), the
Commander of CENTCOM in 1997-2000 wrote that,
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The Washington bureaucracy was too disjointed to make the vision
of all the strategies, from the President’s to the CINC’s [Combatant
Commanders in Chief of major U.S. commands like CENTCOM] a
reality. There was no single authority in the bureaucracy to coordinate
the signiﬁcant programs we CINCs designed. The uncoordinated
funding, policy decisions, authority, assigned geography, and many
other issues separated State, Defense, Congress, the National Security
Council, and other government agencies, and made it difﬁcult to pull
complex engagement plans together. To further complicate matters, the
CINCs don’t control their own resources. Their budgets come out of the
service budgets, and these are controlled by the Service Chiefs (who are
also double-hatted as the Joint Chiefs), who understandably don’t want
to give up their resources to the CINCs. The Service Chiefs have minimal
interest in, and little insight into, engagement programs. They’re trying
to run their services, and that job’s hard enough without other burdens.
Their purpose and function is to train, organize, and equip forces for the
CINCS, but what they actually want to do is provide these forces where,
when, and how they see best. In other words, CINCS are demanding
forces and resources for purposes that the Service Chiefs may not support.
Thus the CINC is an impediment—and even a threat—and the rising
power of the CINCs reduces the powers of the Service Chiefs. It’s a zerosum game. Looking at the problem from the other side, the CINCs see the
Service Chiefs as standing in the way of what they desperately need; and
they are frustrated by the chiefs’ inability to fully cooperate with them or
support their strategies. The CINCs want to see their money identiﬁed
and set aside in a speciﬁc budget line, so they know what they have. For
all kinds of reasons, the Department of Defense is reluctant to do this.
The result is a constant friction between the CINCs and Washington.29

It is unlikely that U.S. policy toward India has escaped these
pervasive dysfunctionalities in policymaking.30 And these problems
come with costs. For example, at least one assessment observes that
due to the perception that Washington will not rein in Pakistan,
“Indian leaders are skeptical about U.S. counterterrorism objectives
and have dropped references to a ‘strategic’ relationship in which
the United States and India would work together to keep peace
in the Indian Ocean littoral area.”31 Although for every proposed
alternative to the current system, there is a good counterargument,
because whatever line of structural and policy reform we take imposes
costs and forecloses other options, the current system imposes
signiﬁcant costs upon U.S. policy. It perplexes Indians who want this
partnership to grow and expand, creating opportunities for friction
and mistrust to erode it. The structural problems cited here (as well
8

as their opposite numbers in India) also lead to a situation where
policy emerges in an ad hoc, incremental, uncoordinated manner that
appears to foreign observers as being essentially incoherent, if not
inchoate. Meanwhile, our bureaucratic obstructions make it difﬁcult
for us to respond to India’s agenda. Similar problems may affect
India’s ability to respond to our agenda, if it can discern that agenda.
Thus both sides fail to harvest the maximum possible gains from a
truly strategic partnership, leaving the door open to an erosion or
reversal of recent trends, as there are many skeptics concerning this
relationship in both countries.32
Therefore, the question posed here is stark in its simplicity. On
what basis can an enduring and solid strategic partnership with
India be built and sustained, and what should be its parameters?
In other words, this monograph strives to present a compelling
strategic rationale for that partnership which is otherwise apparently
still lacking, at least in Washington. While India and America are the
two largest democracies in the world, that is not enough to justify or
sustain a genuine strategic partnership. Neither does an expanding
bilateral military relationship sufﬁce to do so in the absence of a
strong political and economic dimension to the relationship. For
example, the two states’ past relations until the 1990s were not very
friendly at all.33 Moreover, their foreign policy values and approaches
are by no means identical. Therefore sharp disputes can still arise,
even on important issues, e.g., Iraq.34 As Prime Minister Singh
recently admitted, invocations of shared democracy or democratic
values alone are not enough to provide a foundation for the bilateral
relationship, let alone sustain it.35 While those expressions of shared
values are necessary, always appear as reasons for close relations, and
can buttress a partnership based on shared and common interests,
they cannot substitute for them.36
Accordingly, the argument presented here is that a basis for
enduring security cooperation and partnership must be found, ﬁrst,
in the recognition of shared tangible interests, particularly shared
regional interests in key areas of Asia: South Asia, Central Asia,
Southeast Asia, and to some degree, even the Gulf. These are the key
regions in which India sees itself as a power of rising inﬂuence and
capability beyond South Asia. Such an argument must also take into

9

account India’s rising value as a strategic partner to the United States
in Asia. Its economy is expected to grow 6.5 percent in 2004 and has
averaged 8 percent annual growth in recent years.37 It possesses the
world’s third largest Air Force and fourth largest Army, both of which
are of high quality as attested to by Americans who work with them.
Their Navy is also an important player with growing capabilities and
ambitions.38 Similarly, the Indian Army is moving toward network
centric warfare as is the U.S. Army, and on several key points its new
military doctrine appears to parallel American visions of the nature
of future war.39 India also has convergent strategic interests with the
United States. These go beyond defeating terrorism, which is a rising
threat all along India’s peripheries, to encompass the safety of the
Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) and energy security throughout
the Indian Ocean, opposition to nuclear proliferation, and a rising
concern despite improving relations with China’s rising power. Both
governments are also meeting to discuss threats to stability in South
Asia: Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Bhutan. They
seek a freer world trading system and an equitable and permanent
peace in the Middle East.40 As former Under Secretary of State
Richard Armitage told the Indian newspaper, The Hindu,
India is soon to be the largest country in the world in terms of population,
you have a key geo-strategic location; a large growing middle class; a
multiethnic, multireligious society; and a democracy. These are the type
of societies that should, we believe, stand as a beacon to the world. We
are the same—just a several thousand miles away—a multireligious,
multiethnic democracy. To the extent we can both be anchors of stability
in our various regions, we raise the level of achievement of mankind and
lower the possibilities of conﬂict.41

Armitage similarly emphasized that for this partnership to
ﬂourish, it must be based on both sides’ common needs and interests,
and not just be a partnership or kind of alliance against a third
party. Consequently, the Bush administration understands that this
partnership must have a positive agenda to move forward and pay
dividends for both sides.42 At the same time, however, Armitage’s
rationale for the new partnership heavily emphasizes the idealistic,
even moralizing, tendency so visible in the Bush administration’s
national security policies.43
10

Given India’s rising capability in economics and military affairs
that increasingly enables it to affect outcomes and inﬂuence trends in
these three regions, virtually all of India’s foreign and defense policy
elite demands recognition of India’s interests throughout Asia and
a similar acknowledgement of its stature as a key player there. For
example, India’s new Army doctrine states that,
The Indian Ocean region . . . assumes strategic signiﬁcance due to the
high volume of Indian international trade transiting through . . . By
virtue of her size and strategic location in the Indian Ocean region, India
is expected to play her rightful role to ensure peace and stability in it.44

Equally important, India has reached a stage where it has strategic
autonomy. It can make partnerships with whomever it pleases, as its
recent agreement for strategic partnership with the European Union
(EU) shows.45 Indeed, analysts have recently discerned a RussoAmerican rivalry for inﬂuence upon India over a host of issues:
India’s application for a seat on the Security Council, weapons sales
and technology transfer to India, and trade and investment issues.46
Similarly, India’s Ambassador to Moscow Kanwal Sibal has stated that
India wants to invest in Russian oil ﬁelds and move beyond importing
Russian military technology and equipment to participating in joint
studies and development of new technologies. And India successfully
gained much of what it wanted at the December 3-4, 2004, summit
with Russian President Vladimir Putin.47 These rivalries, and India’s
ability to exploit them, illustrate its growing clout and inﬂuence in
both regional and global affairs. Major players are already making
such deals with India, underscoring the fact that India is already, and
will become even more, the predominant regional power throughout
the Indian Ocean. Therefore, it will be able to conduct its security
policy as it sees ﬁt, with whomever it deems appropriate. There is
nothing we can do to stop this from happening, though we could
delay it if we chose and thus incur enormous Indian resentment.
Nonetheless, that would be a fruitless policy as the whole effort to
impose sanctions indicates. Indeed, that policy would be against our
own best interests as it could lead India to form a bloc for global
multipolarity with Russia and China, i.e., to realize former Russian
Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov’s fundamentally anti-American
vision of a strategic triangle.48 The same holds true for civilian and
11

military technology transfer as well as arms sales.49 At the same
time, because the regions of critical Indian interests are those where
American power runs up against its limits, as we have learned from
bitter experience in Vietnam and now again in Iraq, both states have
vital interests in these areas that they cannot realize unilaterally.
Therefore, they need help to realize those interests from like-minded
governments who share those interests and who can do something
positive towards those ends. From our standpoint, India certainly
meets that requirement concerning the Gulf, Central, South, and
Southeast Asia.
American experts and ofﬁcials acknowledge that,
India is in the middle of a lengthy process of moving from the status of a
defensive sub-regional middle power, without a clear security strategy,
to that of a more offensive-minded major power, with nuclear weapons,
with interests to defend in Southeast Asia and the Middle East [we may
also add Central Asia—author] and with China as a competitor.50

Moreover, it is increasingly obvious to security professionals
that our own and India’s positions in Central Asia, and in the South
Asian subcontinent, are interconnected geographically. For example,
Sir John Thomson, a former British High Commissioner to India, has
written that,
The geographical deﬁnition of South Asia has expanded. If we had any
doubt before, September 11 [2001] has made it clear that we have to take
into account Afghanistan and its neighbors: Iran to the west; all the former
Soviet republics to the north; and China to the east. The geographical
context for South Asia may be even wider. We in the West say—sincerely,
I believe—that we are not against Islam, but many Muslims do not believe
it. So, to a greater or lesser extent, our relations with Arab countries can
be connected with our South Asian policies. And this potential extension
of our area of concern is being reinforced, unfortunately, by the spiraling
disaster in Israel-Palestine.51

Similarly, Celeste Wallander of Washington’s Center for Strategic
and International Studies, observes that,
When terrorism vaulted to the top of the U.S. priority list, many very
important issues seemed to disappear from view. They are coming back,
and are likely to affect U.S. policy and options in the region. The IndiaPakistan relationship is one important issue that has not gone away, and
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which has the potential to signiﬁcantly alter the working status quo of the
U.S. Central Asian presence. If war between Pakistan and India makes
South Asia a zone of conﬂict, a U.S. presence in Central Asia becomes
all the more important. . . . A U.S. stake in India and South Asia is likely
to reinforce the trend toward long-term importance of strategic and
economic interests for the United States in Central Asia, by extending the
reach and scope of interests beyond narrow counterterrorism and energy
development.52

These insights show how American and Indian interests are
tied inextricably to both states’ pursuit of important and even vital
interests in more distant theaters, and thus they also underscore the
strategic rationale for Indo-American strategic partnership. Stated
bluntly, we need Indian support throughout much of Asia, as much
if not more than India needs our support. We need tangible Indian
support because our strategic interests and objectives are global,
while the military and other means at our disposal to pursue them
are not keeping pace, creating a gap between ends and means in
our overall NSS. Even the Pentagon’s new basing proposals, which
envision differing kinds of “operating sites” primarily focusing on
Asian issues do not go far enough to overcome this gap.
Even more worrisome, American force posture remains
dangerously thin in the arc—many thousands of miles long—
between Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean and Okinawa and Guam
in the Paciﬁc. Although there is hope of securing a basing agreement
with Canberra for a site or sites in northern Australia, the multiple
national security threats in the Asia-Paciﬁc region–-from the
potential destabilization of Pakistan or Indonesia by radical Islam
to Chinese military aggression against Taiwan—argue for a more
robust deployment of American land forces in the region.53
Key policymakers and analysts, who were instrumental in forging
the better ties with India after 2001, clearly think along the same lines.
Even before September 11, they advanced these arguments in the
expert literature and in policy circles. Before he came to India, former
Ambassador Robert Blackwill argued that America and its Asian
allies—Australia, South Korea, and Japan—should “collaborate to
promote strategic stability in South Asia and to give greater weight
to India’s role in Asia and in international institutions.”54
Ashley Tellis, who served as Blackwill’s deputy in New Delhi in
2001-03, argues that, not only is there a broad strategic convergence
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of Indo-American aims, there also is a clear hierarchy or division of
labor between them concerning the regional priorities each one will
face in Asia. Thus, India certainly will dominate South Asia by virtue
of its economic and military superiority that translate into geopolitical
primacy there. It will be able to dominate its immediate periphery, the
smaller states of the region, and inﬂuence outcomes to some degree
in more outlying, but still relatively near, areas like Southeast Asia,
Central Asia, and perhaps even the Persian Gulf. Undoubtedly it will
have something like a veto power over South Asian developments.
At the same time, in those Asian areas of critical signiﬁcance to vital
U.S. interests that would warrant the commitment of U.S. resources,
including force on a unilateral basis if necessary, India will “remain a
peripheral actor.” But as its capabilities grow, so will its inﬂuence even
if it is limited. And that inﬂuence can help advance shared bilateral
interests if relations with New Delhi are adroitly managed. These
areas and issues include the security of the Persian Gulf; freedom
of navigation in Southeast Asian waters; protection of Taiwan; and
the global, i.e., non-Kashmiri, war on terrorism.55 In these areas, he
writes, the enormous disparity in power capabilities and resources
between Washington and New Delhi will be so stark as to render
Indian preferences entirely irrelevant.56 Yet,
In such issue areas, however, Indian power could be dramatically
magniﬁed if it were to be applied in concert with that of the United
States. In such circumstances, Indian resources could help to ease U.S.
operational burdens, provide the United States with those beneﬁts arising
from more robust international solidarity, and, in the process, actually
enhance Indian power in a multiplicity of ways.57

Cooperation in those regions would redound substantially to both
states’ beneﬁt as we are seeing in India’s signiﬁcant assistance to the
United States in the global war on terrorism (GWOT).
Finally, Tellis even more tellingly observed that,
Indian power will be most relevant in those geographic and issue-areas
lying in the “interstices” of Asian geopolitics. The term interstice is loosely
used here to denote those geographic, political, or ideational issues lying
along the fracture lines separating the continent’s most powerful and
signiﬁcant geostrategic problems. In those areas, great power interests
are neither obvious nor vital. Consequently, their incentives to enforce
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certain preferred outcomes unilaterally are poor. In such circumstances,
rising powers like India can make a difference because their substantial
though still not dominant, capabilities can swing the balance in favor
of one coalition or another, depending on the actors, issues, and
circumstances concerned. Thus, for example, in geographic areas like
Central Asia, Afghanistan [after the end of hostilities—author—Tellis’
argument predated September 11], and the island states in the Indian
Ocean, and in issue-areas like terrorism, narcotics, and the environment,
Indian resources and commitments could make a signiﬁcant difference to
the ﬁnal outcomes obtained.58

Tellis postulates three reasons why this form of the relationship
will not only beneﬁt India but also the United States. First, Indian
power will be felt most directly in areas where the United States
has few vital interests and, consequently, the possibility of friction
between the United States and India is minimized. Second, both in
the interstices of and in the core of Asian and global geopolitics, U.S.
and Indian interests have gradually converged and, with the ending
of the Cold War, the structural distortions that bedeviled U.S.-Indian
relations have almost entirely disappeared. Third, on many issues of
great importance to the United States—the balance of power in Asia,
the security of sea lanes in the Indian Ocean, WMD proliferation,
terrorism, narcotics trafﬁcking, and the rise of religious and secular
extremism—Indian interests invariably dovetail with those of the
United States and, as a result, are likely to evoke active Indian
support.59
Despite the compelling strategic arguments for Indo-American
strategic partnership based on these hard strategic realities, too
much of recent U.S.-India relations shows a focus instead on issues
of nuclear testing, nonproliferation, arms control, and efforts to
induce India to place its nuclear weapons program under some form
of international and U.S. regulation, if not control.60 Despite the vital
importance of preventing South Asian rivalries from “going critical,”
that focus works against enduring partnership with India and
concentrates relations and governmental attention on those issues
which most divide Washington from New Delhi. As Polly Nayak of
the Clinton administration observed, “In late 1997, the White House
had decided to make India the lynchpin of its South Asia policy and
to replace its nonproliferation focus which the Indians hated, with a
multifaceted approach in which they were sure the Indians would
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welcome under any government.”61
Therefore, even with the best will in the world, a focus on those
issues impedes the formation of an enduring strategic partnership
and multiplies opportunities for bilateral discord. Under those
circumstances, success in building a lasting partnership then
comes to depend on the good will, personal strength, and vision
of politicians in both countries who must override key lobbies that
oppose their vision to achieve any part of it. Partnership under those
circumstances becomes inherently precarious and fragile, subject to
revision, if not erosion, at the ﬁrst sign of a domestic crisis in either
capital or a dispute between the governments.62
A focus on common interests and activities based on shared
perceptions of regional interests and issues that arises out of a
comprehensive and ongoing strategic dialogue would strengthen
the domestic proponents and lobbies who support partnership
and build good will based on common experiences when difﬁcult
issues arise. Given the GWOT’s long-term character, it might also
be possible to broaden both Washington’s and Delhi’s engagement
with Islamabad so that the really difﬁcult issues in the Indo-Pakistani
relationship might be dealt with after successful discussion of less
neuralgic and therefore potentially commonly perceived questions.
For these reasons, this monograph focuses on the key regions where
India intends to display its capabilities, power, and defense of its
interests beyond the South Asian subcontinent to include Central
Asia, the Gulf, and Southeast Asia, and the issues of arms sales and
defense technology transfer between the United States, its allies
(particularly Israel), and India. While the author does not slight the
importance of nuclear issues in this relationship, they have been
covered exhaustively in the extensive literature on proliferation and
nuclear issues in South Asia.
India’s Perspectives.
Neither is this a purely American perspective. In 2001, as Indian
ofﬁcials began to respond to the Bush administration’s ﬁrst initiatives
on the way to partnership, they stated then that they had a deﬁnite
agenda for bilateral cooperation. Already in April 2001, when the
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administration made its ﬁrst overtures to New Delhi, highly-placed
Indian sources told the Indian media what those principles and goals
were and the premises of their talks with the U.S. Government. The
four principles upon which these talks were premised were:
• “India saw itself as a key player which had a rightful place in
inﬂuencing the global system.”
• Though it was keen on developing a positive and equal
relationship with Washington, New Delhi would not
compromise upon sovereignty. It was not seeking “alliance”
but rather a durable “partnership where security cooperation
played a prominent role.”
• India wanted Washington to recognize that Indian strategic
interests extended well beyond South Asia to encompass
what it now calls an extended strategic neighborhood from
the Suez Canal to the Strait of Malacca, an area encompassing
the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, South and Central Asia,
and Southeast Asia. “In other words, the U.S., while fulﬁlling
its global obligations, should factor in India’s aspirations and
autonomy in this zone.”63
• While desiring greater military-technological cooperation
and transfers from Washington, India wanted Washington
to understand that it would continue to procure most of its
hardware from Russia (if for no other reason than that the
Indian military depended and still depends overwhelmingly
on such arms sales and technology transfer), supplemented
by procurements from Eastern Europe. This pattern of
procurements also was intended to diversify India’s options
so that it did not become excessively vulnerable to any one
power or to future U.S. sanctions. Indeed, past U.S. restrictions
on transfers to India rankled greatly among India’s elite and
fostered a perception of the United States as an unreliable
supplier. However, India in 2001 was willing to assure the
Bush administration that the weapons thus obtained would
not be used in ways harmful to U.S. interests. Thus an implicit,
if not explicit, point here was India’s strong desire for an end
to sanctions and for regular technology transfer and weapons
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sales by America to India. Finally, another implicit principle in
this outline is India’s preference for a multipolar world, rather
than a bipolar or unipolar one.64 And India’s ambivalence
about unipolarity evidently continues.65
Indian ofﬁcials also stated then that they had a deﬁnite agenda for
bilateral cooperation. It included cooperation on counterterrorism,
i.e., improved intelligence-sharing in Afghanistan, Tibet, and the
South China Sea. India also hoped to beneﬁt from advances in U.S.
satellite technology and imagery. Both sides also wished to explore
possibilities of expanded cooperation in military aviation. And India
strove to adopt a fresh viewpoint on issues like Kashmir, Pakistan,
and the nuclear question to dispel the impression that Kashmir could
be a nuclear ﬂashpoint. Indian ofﬁcials argued that mere possession
of nuclear weapons did not necessarily threaten nuclear war. Rather,
poor domestic governance and political instability, as well as undue
external dependence, could encourage the use of nuclear weapons.
Therefore, the way to ensure that Kashmir or other issues do not
provoke a nuclear clash is for Pakistan to become a well-governed,
prospering, and democratic state. 66 Indian ofﬁcials said that,
India and the U.S., in fact, had a common agenda in encouraging
democracy and economic well-being in Pakistan. A moderate democratic
Islamic state was necessary and could emerge in Pakistan, if Islamabad,
in its self-interest, reined in terrorism. India was also not averse to
Pakistan’s positive economic contribution to the South Asian Association
of Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Cooperation in the SAARC could also
become a channel for reviving an economic relationship.67

Evidently this agenda was largely, if not wholly, acceptable to
Washington, for the Bush administration has steadily expanded the
sphere of cooperation with India since then. Indeed, in August 2001
the administration announced that it was beginning to lift sanctions
imposed in 1998 for India’s nuclear testing, thereby clearing the way
for greater military planning, joint operations, and eventual sharing
of weapons technology.68 It also indicated its decision to reinstate the
Defense Planning Group (DPG) with India that would discuss issues
of bilateral concern regarding Asian security and future bilateral
military cooperation. By then the ﬁrst bilateral military exercise,
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a table-top peacekeeping operation, had occurred and would be
followed by a joint search and rescue operation. The Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry Shelton (USA) had already
visited India in July 2001. The administration also revealed that it
had been sending encouraging signals to India since the start of
its term, including treating India as an ally for brieﬁng purposes
regarding President Bush’s May 1, 2001 speech on missile defense.69
And this perception clearly betokened further cooperation on that
issue. What is particularly striking is that U.S. ofﬁcials’ activities and
statements by then revealed to Indian leaders that Washington was
“acknowledging that India is a country poised to take its place on
the world stage.”70 Since then, it has become clearer as well that a
major Indian objective is to secure U.S. support for an Indian seat at
the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Realization of this goal
would certainly show U.S. support for India’s enhanced status and
standing in world affairs.71
At that time U.S. ofﬁcials also were willing to share their
perception of common interests, which almost certainly included
countering China though they were, and are, scrupulous not to say
so. Instead, as Under Secretary of State Richard Armitage said, “For
us to have a sustainable relationship with India, it must be based
in and on India and not be a relationship which we try to develop
with India to face a third country.”72 Ofﬁcials also revealed how they
perceived common interests before September 11.
American ofﬁcials say Washington and New Delhi share a
particular interest in ensuring free navigation through the Indian
Ocean. An increasing proportion of Persian Gulf oil passes along
those sea lanes, as does much of India’s trade, which has soared
since it began to reform its socialist economy. Military cooperation
with India could also help enhance U.S. military readiness by
offering training in the Indian Ocean. American forces have no
facilities for training between the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia,
defense ofﬁcials said. U.S. ofﬁcials also are careful to say that their
aspiration for closer ties with New Delhi does not represent a snub
of Pakistan, an American ally during the Cold War and a longtime
rival of India.73
The idea that India should be both a force for democracy and
possess an expanded strategic vision of its role in Asia fully com19

ported with eminent foreign observers like Australia’s Paul Dibb’s
strongly worded recommendations to that effect and to the
administration’s policymakers’ growing understanding of the
importance of India in the overall Asian context. For example, former
Secretary of State Colin Powell told Congress in January 2001 at his
conﬁrmation hearings that, “India has the potential to keep the peace
in the vast Indian Ocean and its periphery.”74 Similarly, Armitage
has stated subsequently that one reason for reorienting U.S. policy in
2001, even before September 11, was the perceived necessity to have a
relationship with India that was not a “hyphenated one” if a coherent
policy against the looming terrorist threat was to take effect.75
Since then this relationship has progressed to the point where the
Pentagon is discussing or has discussed with India the possibility of
what has popularly been called an Asian NATO that would include
India, even though the formal membership and obligations of the
parties have not been disclosed.76 Since it is not clear what the parties
mean by the term an Asian NATO, even when they concede that such
discussions have occurred, it is probably more precise to say that
Washington and New Delhi are contemplating an ever expanding
strategic partnership, not a formal alliance.
Moreover, there is good reason to believe that, in its fundamentals,
strategic partnership but not formal alliance remains the bedrock of
India’s national security or grand strategy. Even when Vajpayee said
that the two states are “natural allies,” he consistently still ruled out
a formal military alliance and instead meant the term “allies” in a
more ﬁgurative sense, i.e., something akin to a strategic partnership,
a term whose deﬁnition is intrinsically malleable. But while the
exact nature and dimensions of this relationship are ﬂexible, its
direction evidently is ﬁxed. High-ranking Indian ofﬁcials believe
that continuing improvement in the relationship is “irreversible”
and would have remained so even if Senator Kerry had been elected
President.77 Leading Indian political ﬁgures, analysts, and foreign
observers publicly claim a growing convergence of strategic interests
and values with the United States and some Indian observers openly
advocate an alliance or call for an Asian NATO, even though they
do not deﬁne that term with any precision.78 Both sides also believe
that strengthening that relationship would add substantially to
stability throughout Asia, from the Middle East to Southeast Asia.
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In particular, they believe that this relationship could provide major
security beneﬁts to both sides in the Persian Gulf, South, Central,
and Southeast Asia, i.e., all the land masses adjacent to or relatively
close to the Indian Ocean.
More recently, Prime Minister Singh publicly outlined India’s
interests in this partnership in a speech to the Council on Foreign
Relations in New York. He stressed India’s economic development,
enduring democracy, and the connection between the Indian
diaspora in America as factors abetting bilateral ties and partnership
as the basis for the two states’ engagement.79 But beyond that speech,
Indian policymakers under both the Vajpayee and now the Singh
governments share an expansive view of India’s interests and rising
capabilities. And its interests and capabilities increasingly overlap
with those of the United States in key areas like the Gulf and Central
Asia, especially Afghanistan, and Southeast Asia.
India’s Regional and Naval Ambitions.
As we have seen, the Bush administration’s initial overtures to
India led to a recasting of the relationship, to include India’s regional
agenda in Asia. By accepting that agenda, the administration
admitted and accepted that India had signiﬁcant and legitimate
Asian interests that coincided with U.S. interests throughout Asia.
This admission represented the achievement of one of the April
2001 goals postulated by India, which has long craved recognition
as much more than a major South Asian power and been greatly
frustrated by its failure to achieve it. Major policy decisions like the
decision to go nuclear in 1998 can be attributed to this consuming
desire to be seen as a great power.80 The new Army doctrine cited
above expresses the same outlook. But the most telling examples
of Indian ambitions can be found in other recent policy statements.
In late 2003, signifying its self-perception as a rising Asian power,
Vajpayee’s government opted for a 20-year program to become a
world power whose inﬂuence is felt across the Indian Ocean, the
Arabian Gulf, and all of Asia.81
Vajpayee directed planners to craft defense strategies that extend
beyond South Asia and transcend past sub-regional mindsets. He
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claimed that India’s expanded security perspectives require fresh
thinking about projecting power and inﬂuence, as well as security
in all these directions. India will seek more defense cooperation
with states in the Gulf, Southeast, and Central Asia, presumably
going beyond intelligence-sharing about terrorist activities. This
cooperation will proceed to more bilateral exchanges and exercises
and greater sharing of defense advice with friendly nations. In this
context, strategic partnership with Washington is essential because
Russia’s ties with India are tempered by Moscow’s dependence on
the West, particularly America. Absent partnership with America,
this situation would severely constrain Indian options since it could
no longer hide behind Russia if it clashed with America.82
While India formally eschews offensive military projections to
intervene unilaterally in other countries, it formally announced its
air base in Tajikistan, and hopes to undertake the following military
programs through 2013:
• Improve military logistics in Iran, Tajikistan, Kazakstan, and
Uzbekistan.
• Increase military interaction with Malaysia, Indonesia,
Singapore, Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam.
• Increase naval interaction with South Africa, other African
states, Iran, Oman, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and
other Gulf nations.
• Extend infrastructure, logistic, and material support to
Myanmar to contain Chinese activities there.83
Beyond those policies, all the Indian military services are
undertaking a major military buildup of conventional weapons, ways
of delivering nuclear weapons, and defenses against nuclear missiles
by improving communication and surveillance systems. Although all
the services will be built up, India’s commitments to missile defenses
and to constructing naval warships to make India’s presence in the
Indian Ocean “a force to be reckoned with” and thus one capable of
force and power projection if necessary are particularly noteworthy.
Indeed, India’s naval plans bespeak a very expansive agenda that
requires cooperation with Washington.84
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The pattern of Indian naval acquisitions reveals the expansive
goals India has charted for itself, to include countering both Pakistan
and China. Fulﬁlling this program would truly make India a naval
force to be reckoned within the Indian Ocean. On October 14, 2003,
Navy Chief Admiral Singh said that,
Fulﬁlling India’s dream to have a full-ﬂedged blue-water Navy would
need at least three aircraft carriers, 20 more frigates, 20 more destroyers
with helicopters, and large numbers of missile corvettes and antisubmarine warfare corvettes.85

India’s new naval acquisition program as of 2003 entails spending
$20 billion to buy aircraft carriers, submarines, frigates, maritime
surveillance aircraft, and other ships and gear. The 10 principal
combatants of the Navy would be equipped with antimissile missiles;
command, control, communications and intelligence systems (C3I);
and cruise missile launchers. Ofﬁcials also look to create and deploy
“battalion sized forces at various strategic points . . . [on] short notice,
and disperse them quickly from the landing or dropping zone before
any adequate enemy response.”86 Ofﬁcials also insist on the need
for a submarine launched nuclear missile capability, presumably to
establish a second strike capability and to counter the naval buildup
by Pakistan’s Navy that they see as a “medium term” threat to India.
Pakistan’s Agosta 90-B diesel submarines can, along with its three
Orion P-3C maritime strike aircraft outﬁtted with missiles, conduct
effective sea denial operations against India’s coast. However, it
is just as likely, if not more likely, that the real threat Indian naval
planners perceive is China, whose ﬂeet they see, rightly or wrongly,
as being increasingly able to project power into the Indian Ocean.
One Indian study actually states that the power vacuum in that ocean
in this century can only be ﬁlled by India, China, or Japan, either by
“complete preeminence or by a mutual stand-off.”87 While this may
seem a rather fanciful or extremely alarmist assessment, perceptions
often drive policy. Consequently, India has searched for a submarine
that could launch nuclear missiles, and aircraft carriers, as well as
long-range missiles that could strike targets over 2,500 KM away,
clearly a sign that China, too, is in its sights.88
India’s maritime acquisitions clearly ﬁt into this strategy that
has both an expansive threat assessment and an equally expansive
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objective. As reported by the International Institute for Strategic
Studies in London,
The Indian navy remains the most powerful in the Central and South Asian
region. However, progress remains slow toward achieving the aims set
out in the naval doctrine of 2000, mainly due to ﬁnancial constraints. This
new doctrine stressed the need to have a ﬂeet capable of operating in both
the eastern and western Indian Ocean by having two operational aircraft
carriers and highly capable submarines. Negotiations about the transfer
of the Russian (mod-Kiev class) aircraft carrier, Admiral Gorshkov, are still
ongoing, though it is believed that India cannot afford to pay for the 3-year
reﬁt needed to attain operational capability. In February, 2002, [Defense
Minister George] Fernandes announced that India would not lease, as
was proposed in late 2001, two Russian nuclear-powered submarines,
but would instead buy six French Scorpene diesel submarines, with a
further six to be built in India. . . . In November 2001, India announced
plans to equip some of its principal surface combatants with the BrahMos
supersonic antiship cruise missile with a range of 280Km. This was seen
as a partial response to China’s acquisition of Russian Soveremnnyi-class
destroyers, armed with Russian Sunburn anti-ship missiles.89

And this program has now been adopted, and even extended, by
the new Singh government. The May 2004 Indian Maritime Doctrine
that reﬂected the Vajpayee government’s outlook won acceptance
by the new regime, signaling the elite consensus about India’s
national security objectives. Whereas earlier doctrine focused on
inward-looking strategies, the new doctrine attempts to deal with
“conﬂict with [an] extra-regional power and protecting persons
of Indian origin and interest abroad,” points that clearly suggest
action against China and in the Gulf where four million expatriates
are living.90 Indian analysts attribute the need for these missions to
the likely conﬂict for scarce energy supplies originating in or near
the Persian Gulf. As those resources are depleted, new contenders
(i.e., China in particular) will enter these waters, compelling the
Indian Navy to “beef up its striking power and its command-andcontrol, surveillance, and intelligence abilities.”91 Not surprisingly,
China’s naval relations with Myanmar, Pakistan, Iran, Bangladesh,
Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Saudi Arabia received special scrutiny.
The doctrine demands for India a submarine-based nuclear launch
capability, as well as a ﬂeet that could operate far from home well
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into the Arabian Gulf (or the Strait of Malacca for that matter).
Even if this is a long-term rather than an immediate goal, given the
costs involved it signiﬁes a marker being laid down, a set of clear
objectives, and a corresponding economic-political requirement
that can only be met by signiﬁcantly expanded ties to Washington
and other major defense exporters.92 Not only does this doctrine
lay down guidance for a robust program of naval construction and
acquisition, especially for such potential submarines as Russia’s
Amur and/or Akula subs, the French Scorpene-class and India’s
own advanced technology vessel (ATV), it also calls for a marinebased rapid mobility force to conduct missions of landward power
projection. The war on land and suppression of enemy power from
the littoral mandates the enhancement of that capability, as well as
of India’s ability to project airpower from the sea and defend its seabased and home land-based platforms. This justiﬁes the acquisition
of the Russian Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier and the construction
of India’s own Air Defense Vessel or aircraft carrier.93 Finally, the
Navy intends to increase spending by 40 percent through 2014, and
its annual allocation rose from an annual $7.5 Billion during 19972001 to $18.3 billion annually for 2002-07.94
This program requires extensive foreign and American support
building upon the cooperation hitherto achieved. It also serves as a
challenge to China and to Pakistan while demonstrating the sweep
of India’s ambitions and determination to realize the capabilities
needed to sustain them. Since this program reﬂects and embodies
an elite consensus, it is clear that Washington must deal with that
consensus as it approaches India. Simply because many scholars and
analysts dismiss India’s capabilities does not mean that policymakers
can enjoy that luxury when dealing with what is clearly a rising,
ambitious, and proud government that is the bearer of an ancient
civilization. These goals and programs are known by now to the
administration, and it has not offered any public criticism of them,
suggesting its comfort with India’s growing capability.
Since then, the Indian Navy has conducted exercises with both
the Omani and Iranian navies, and conducted port calls to those
countries, Bahrain, and the UAE. India is also upgrading Iran’s
port of Chahbahar and has gained access to Iranian bases in case of
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war with Pakistan through its 2003 agreement or treaty with Iran.95
India’s ties to Iran may also be deepening as a result of the October
2004 visit to Tehran of India’s National Security Advisor J. N. Dixit.96
India’s Maritime Doctrine clearly postulates the importance of a
naval presence in the unsettled Gulf.
At the same time, India’s requirements for realizing these goals as
they pertain to both the Army and the Navy offer the United States
signiﬁcant opportunities regarding defense technology transfers
and arms sales, as well as for strategic coordination with India
throughout the Indian Ocean. In this sense, there is a genuine bilateral
opportunity for both sides to realize the objectives suggested in 2001
by Ashley Tellis regarding Indian strategic objectives and defense
purchases. Tellis observed then that,
Thanks to its economic growth, India is about to embark on another cycle
of major military modernization—one that had been postponed for the
better part of the last 2 decades. Once this cycle is complete a decade
or so from now, it is likely that India will possess: a modest nuclear
capability intended to deter both China and Pakistan from mounting
the most obvious forms of blackmail; a signiﬁcant naval capability that
allows it to dominate the northern Indian Ocean (and one that would be
very interested in active cooperation with the U.S. Navy); a refurbished
air force that will remain one of the most effective in Asia; and large land
forces that will be able to defend successfully Indian interests against
both Pakistan and China (along the Himalayan frontier). Even as this
modernization program proceeds, however, India will seek to further
accelerate the great improvement in U.S.-Indian relations that has occurred
in recent years. Conditioned in part by fears of a rising China, India
seeks to promote a relationship that emphasizes “strategic coordination”
with the United States. While its traditional, and still strong, desire for
political autonomy and its continuing search for greatness will prevent
it from ever becoming a formal U.S. alliance partner, it nonetheless seeks
to develop close relations with the United States both in order to resolve
its own security dilemmas vis-à-vis Pakistan and China and to develop
cooperative solutions to various emerging problems of global order. Even
as it seeks to draw closer to the United States, India remains committed
to developing those instruments it believes are necessary for its longterm security, like nuclear weapons.97

Even if this program remains incomplete and is adopted, at least
in part, for reasons more closely relating to India’s psychology of
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being a great power, it is solidly rooted in material capabilities. In
fact, India’s growing economic-technological-military capabilities
are very much at the root of this partnership. At least Indian and U.S.
ofﬁcials think so.98 For example, India’s new Agni II missile can reach
targets throughout Central and East Asia, including China.99 And if
India continues building nuclear weapons like an intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) or sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM),
it will truly have an intercontinental capability, not to mention an
intertheater one. America’s quest for partnership with India duly
represents an acknowledgment of those capabilities and of their
signiﬁcance for world affairs. And it should also represent a similar
acknowledgement of India’s strategic autonomy; namely, that, while
it might prefer partnership and even arms sales from America, it can
do perfectly well without either that partnership or those arms sales
and not suffer major or at least unacceptable lasting strategic losses
thereby.
Nevertheless India, despite its ambitions, faces serious obstacles
to its quest for great or major power status in Asia. These obstacles
include both domestic, largely economic, obstacles and various
regional threats or challenges that would be difﬁcult to meet under
the best of circumstances. While India has to be the primary actor who
meets and overcomes these diverse challenges, many of them also
work against American interests or obstruct Indo-American efforts
to maximize the beneﬁts of any potential partnership. Therefore
those challenges, too, must be factored into any analysis of prospects
for Indo-American strategic partnership.
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CHAPTER 3
THE CHALLENGES TO INDIAN SECURITY
It may be a cliché to say so, but Indian security begins at home.
The ruling coalition clearly came to power with a mandate to
improve the economic life of the masses, many of whom did not feel
they were partaking sufﬁciently in India’s growth. Thus the Singh
government’s foreign policy agenda is very much tied to, or grows
out of, its perception of economic issues. Moreover, Singh and his
coalition partners are acutely aware that failure to deliver improved
economic conditions to the masses will trigger a signiﬁcant loss of
popular support. And slowed growth certainly will not create a
rising tide of improved economic conditions that could ease social
tensions in Kashmir or in the troubled northeast which is already
aﬂame with various low intensity conﬂicts. Thus the projected
growth of 6.5 percent for 2004 actually represents a retreat from
earlier projections of matching the 8 percent growth of 2003. In order
for the economy to achieve its hoped for growth rate of 8 percent
that will allow India to compete with China, improve its internal
economic conditions, and play a major power projection role (not
only militarily) in Asia, it must therefore attract investment from
within and without. And this can only be done by major economic
reforms.100 In this respect, the government’s understanding of these
facts corresponds to the increased American understanding of the
fact that economics must play a much greater role than previously in
Indo-American relations.
Indeed, both Indian and American analysts strongly stressed in
reports to the American based Asia Foundation that an emphasis on
promoting socio-economic development throughout South Asia, and
not just in India or Pakistan, would facilitate the realization of major
American and Indian interests and further the overall cause of peace
and stability (not to mention development) across the subcontinent.101
The Singh government clearly understands as well that no foreign
policy of any kind can command mass or coalition support or project
power abroad unless it directly improves the material conditions of
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both the national economy and especially the poor and lower classes
who claim to have been left out of preceding growth and who make
up its electoral constituency.102 Indeed, the Navy, in fact, does not
have enough funding to make good on the promises it is making
or policy goals laid out in the new maritime doctrine. So even if its
capability expands considerably, it will not reach its proclaimed
goals absent major domestic economic transformation.103 Similarly,
Prime Minister Singh believes that only by transforming the Indian
economy can India achieve genuine international recognition and
project real power abroad. Thus, given his government’s perspective
and those articulated by external analysts and increasingly by U.S.
ofﬁcials, there is a growing consensus about the kinds of economic
policies, both domestic and foreign, that both states must pursue
jointly in order to strengthen the lagging framework of economic
ties and buttress thereby their strategic partnership.
While Singh is conﬁdent that his comprehensive program of
reducing bureaucratic interference in the economy, liberalization,
and decentralization will galvanize the economy, it is also clear that
strong foreign investment and issues like energy security must be
addressed within a strategic framework if India is to increase its
growth rate and keep pace with China.104 But the attempt to ensure
energy security, which is vital, while also attracting major foreign
investment and accelerating technological growth, creates a foreign
policy quandary for India. Singh told the Financial Times that “energy
security is second only in our scheme of things to food security.”105
Thus India’s dependence upon secure oil and gas supplies from the
Gulf and from Central Asia, as manifested in its energy ﬁrms’ quest
for equity holdings in Russian, Angolan, Sudanese, Venezuelan, and,
most of all, Iranian energy ﬁelds or for major deals with states like
Iran, represents a vital national interest. Accordingly, in November
2004 India’s state-run oil corporation announced a $3 billion deal with
Iran’s Petropars.106 At the December 3-4, 2004, summit with Russia,
India announced a $3billion Indian investment in the Sakhalin-3
oil ﬁeld and the joint Russian-Kazakh Kurmangazy oil ﬁeld in the
Caspian. India Energy Minister Mani Shankar Aiyar has stated that,
“what I am talking about is the strategic alliance with Russia in
energy security, which is becoming for India at least as important
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as our national security.”107 Indeed, India’s quest for energy is so
driving a factor in its foreign policy that it agreed to have the Oil
and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) enter what is a transparent
dummy bid for the remnants of Yukos in Russia, the most efﬁcient
energy producer there that was destroyed by President Putin and his
government for political reasons, in order to gain favor in Moscow’s
eyes by legitimating this phony auction. Presumably, this favor
will lead to enhanced access to Russian energy and heightened
cooperation with Russian energy ﬁrms.108 Similarly, India still shows
interest in participating in a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through
Afghanistan and Pakistan, even though it is understandably reluctant
to allow Pakistan to have a hand on its gas or oil supply.109
While such statements and policies highlight India’s capabilities
and ambitions, they also clearly underscore its economic vulnerabilities and the inherent dilemmas of the economic dimension of
its ties with the United States. India must balance its dependence
upon external energy sources like Iran or Russia with its need for
U.S. support. While India’s close ties with Iran have not inhibited the
development of a ﬂourishing commercial and military relationship
with Israel, those ties could cause trouble with the United States,
even if Indian ofﬁcials like Hamid Ansari, a member of the Policy
Advisory Group to Foreign Minister S. Natwar Singh, stated that,
“What is going on with regard to Iran is a complex game—part
chess, part poker. But we have done our sums with regard to Iran.
It isn’t an area where we will be pushed to resolve our position.”110
On the other hand, if Iran’s nuclearization could be arrested, thanks
to the recent Irano-EU agreement of November 2004, then perhaps it
might be possible for some improvement of Iran’s ties with either, if
not both, Jerusalem and Washington to occur. If that were to happen,
some Indian analysts believe that India could then function as an
interlocutor between Tehran and Washington.111
The relationship with Iran is very important to India because of
the need to ensure reliable energy access, the two states’ common
opposition to what they perceived as Pakistani-sponsored terrorism
in Afghanistan and Central Asia, India’s rising interest in the
stability of the Persian Gulf, and the importance of the North-South
trade corridor. This corridor, beginning in Northwest Russia, is the
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centerpiece of a grand Russian design to exploit Russia’s geography
as a bridge between North and South and East and West, and
make Russia the hub of a vast overland and maritime trading and
transportation network that would embrace Europe to the West and
Iran, Central Asia, and India in the South.112 Obviously, the corridor’s
value for India grew when trade routes through Afghanistan and
Pakistan were held hostage to Pakistan-backed terrorism before
2002. The North-South corridor bypasses Afghanistan and Pakistan
and is a strong symbol of India’s political closeness to Iran, Russia,
and Central Asian regimes.
While this relationship with Iran substantiates India’s own claims
to be a rising power and reﬂects Iran’s awareness that cooperation
with India beneﬁts it in and around Central Asia, it also exempliﬁes
the broader trend of Indian relations with key actors in Central
Asia and the Middle East. Whereas Pakistan’s strident Islamism
and support for terrorism and drug-running has strongly alienated
Central Asian governments and even estranged Iran and its ally,
China, India’s opposition to those policies and superior economic
attainments enhances its political status and fosters an alignment
with Iran against Pakistani-inspired terrorism.113 And the powerful
linkages that India has created thereby enable it to project power and
inﬂuence further aﬁeld, e.g., the North-South trade corridor with
Russia and Iran which could only take shape on the basis of common
political goals. The relationship with Iran is not based exclusively
either on this fact or on the fact that India’s main supplier of oil will
continue to be the Gulf states, Iran among them.114 But undoubtedly
energy is a key factor, along with Central Asia, Afghanistan, and
Indo-Pakistani relations and general trade, especially as Iran seeks
to become a center of the international energy trade and sees Central
Asia as the biggest market for its goods and capital investment.115 In
fact, Indo-Iranian relations exemplify the pattern whereby economic
and energy security become inextricable parts of a web of greater
security and defense interests.116
On the other hand, Iran cannot provide the foreign investment
or the civilian technological transfers that India desperately needs
and for which it looks to Washington. So, in order to preserve its
partnership with Washington and obtain the resources that only such
partnership makes available, it must indeed “do its sums.” From
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India’s perspective, that means debureaucratizing and liberalizing
the economy and reducing the obstacles to foreign investment
and imports of necessary technologies.117 It also means massive
investments in infrastructure (which also entails obtaining sufﬁcient
energy from abroad while this is happening, and to facilitate the
transition to a more efﬁcient energy economy). Infrastructural
investments will not only facilitate domestic growth but also the
export of Indian goods and investments abroad, so that India can
then compete with China—which is increasingly the overarching
standard of comparison for India—as it occupies an ever larger role
in Asian economies. In an age where the projection of economic
power is on a par, if not superior, to the projection of military power
as a factor making for a state’s global importance, and given India’s
openly expressed ambitions for becoming a great power, there is no
other strategic route to economic power. More importantly, it also
is the case that Washington and its representatives, in their quest
for strengthened partnership with India, have fastened upon a
comparable agenda in order to buttress the economic dimension of
this relationship.
Washington’s main concerns about India relate to what it believes
are obstacles to both domestic growth and foreign investment in
India from the United States. The Bush administration wishes to
see ongoing reforms of India’s statist and excessively dirigiste and
quasi-socialist economy; reduction, if not termination, of India’s
extensive trade and investment barriers; and greater protection of
American intellectual property rights.118 Such moves should facilitate
an expansion and freeing of trade that both sides claim to want, both
for its own sake and as part of a global move toward freer trade.
In particular, Ambassador David Mulford strongly emphasizes the
pressing need for putting the transformation of India’s infrastructure
on a wartime basis so that its quality will be able to support India’s
ambitious economic and foreign policy programs.119 Mulford also
advocates major reforms to eliminate the deﬁcit ﬁnancing at the
federal and state levels in India, and for reforms that will allow
capital to be more productive.120 Other ofﬁcials from the U.S. Treasury
Department emphasize the increased productivity that would result
from a freer economy.121 All these statements of high-level ofﬁcial
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interest in Indian economic development signify Washington’s
heightened overall interest in a stronger India that can participate
with the United States on a broad range of foreign and defense policy
issues.
However, India’s challenges are not merely economic. In many
cases, they are strategic because all around its periphery there are
growing threats of terrorism, failing states, insurgency, drug running,
and the like. Actually, at least 14 terrorist and separatist movements
“of varying rigor and intensity,” other than the violence in Jammu
and Kashmir, “are raging across India.”122 Recognizing this, the
U.S. Government has discreetly, but clearly, acknowledged that the
challenges to security in areas like Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar
could open up a third front in the war on terrorism and prevent the
full fruition of its growing ties to India. Only quite recently has the
full magnitude of the threat posed by these phenomena become clear
to or accepted by policymakers, but they are beginning to see them
as linked to the long-standing and well-known struggles in Kashmir.
Thus, for example, Indian ofﬁcials tend to regard disturbances in
Bangladesh as reﬂecting that it is “a playground for Pakistan’s InterServices Intelligence agency (ISI).123 Excepting Kashmir, we and Indian
ofﬁcials can easily see an accelerating Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka,
much of which receives ﬁnancial support from Tamils in Southern
India; a ﬂoundering state in Bangladesh that is experiencing growing
terrorism; a Maoist insurgency in Nepal that is gaining the upper
hand over the state there and could either precipitate state failure
or a successful violent insurgency that is now apparently spreading
into Northeast India; insurgent and terrorist activity in Myanmar
that threatens Indian interests and that has led to the participation of
Indian military personnel in actions there and to the signing of a new
agreement with the government of Myanmar, hitherto regarded as
something of a pariah due to its repressive dictatorship.124
The threats posed by the efﬂorescence of terrorism here combine
the usual plagues of terrorist activity, insurgency, drug running, and
strong evidence of the existence of nuclear smuggling rings, possibly
tied to A. Q. Khan’s network that originated in Pakistan.125 Given
the scope of the challenge and Indian ofﬁcials’ belief that in many, if
not all, cases, Pakistani intelligence or military ofﬁcials are abetting
these insurgencies, there is a discernible rise in both Indian military
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activity in and around its frontiers, from Sri Lanka to Nepal and
Myanmar, even as it withdraws troops from Kashmir in response
to lessened terrorist inﬁltration there.126 Moreover, Washington
and New Delhi are sharing sensitive information about activities at
terrorist bases throughout South Asia, particularly Bangladesh and
Nepal, and Washington has pledged $1 million to Nepal as security
assistance. 127
U.S. ofﬁcials agree with their Indian counterparts that terrorist
camps in Bangladesh pose a terrorist threat to the stability of the
region. The United States is also trying to ascertain the threat of
terrorists to Bangladesh itself, as well as the “potential utilization of
Bangladesh as a platform to project terror internationally, according
to J. Cofer Black, coordinator for counterterrorism in the U.S. State
Department.128
Clearly the earlier neglect that apparently characterized India’s
attitude toward the Maoist insurgency in Nepal is becoming a thing
of the past. Indeed, Myanmar, Bhutan, and India are preparing for
an armed crackdown against insurgents. But for Indo-American
security partnership, these insurgencies and threats along India’s
peripheries beyond the struggle in Kashmir point simultaneously
in two directions. On the one hand, they highlight the obstacles to
India’s grandiose vision of the future and give reasons for alarm
about India’s own internal stability.129 If India cannot ﬁnd the means
to overcome these challenges, even if they are protracted operations,
its stability, that of South Asia, and the heralded arrival of a great
power will be set back considerably. On the other hand, the threat of
spreading terrorism, insurgencies, and failing states has galvanized
U.S. ofﬁcials into taking broader action with India to confront
those challenges. Ultimately, the cooperation that we now see
along India’s peripheries could serve as a starting point for future
highly beneﬁcial security cooperation in the other key areas of IndoAmerican interests.
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CHAPTER 4
INDIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF
One area where both the United States and India have vital
strategic interests is the Persian Gulf. But while both sides have
expansive strategic ambitions regarding the Gulf and share a hostility
to Islamic terrorism and a vital interest in ensuring the security of
reliable energy supplies from this region, the current situation in the
Gulf makes cooperation between them difﬁcult, albeit by no means
impossible. Both necessity and ambition, fueled by opportunity, drive
India’s efforts to cut a major ﬁgure in the Persian Gulf. Four million
Indians reside in the Gulf and send valuable remittances home to
their kinsmen, making them hostages of the local security situation,
but also signifying India’s rising interest in the Gulf. This rising
interest takes place in a context dominated by three interacting and
profound strategic trends: India’s rise as a major Asian power with
continental aspirations throughout all Asia, American dominance of
the Gulf, and the visible Indo-American strategic partnership.
Consequently, India is determined to prevent any maritime or
landward threat to it from the Gulf. Indeed, following Ashley Tellis’
analysis in 2001-02, we can state that, for India, the Middle East and
the Persian Gulf constitutes a vast strategic buffer, an outer ring,
if you will, that cannot be allowed to become a base from which
policies inimical to India’s interests and security can be pursued
with impunity. Because India must engage local states to forestall
such negative trends, India robustly counters the related threats of
terrorism, proliferation, and the export of radicalized Islam.130 The
threat of proliferation in the Gulf, for example, as abetted by China,
obligates India’s policymakers to assert New Delhi’s presence there.
As Tellis wrote,
The relationship between China and various key states in Southeast Asia,
Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf, which have the effect of marginalizing
India, reducing its access to the region, and creating pockets of Chinese
inﬂuence in areas where natural resources, physical access, markets, and
sources of inﬂuence are increasingly coveted, remain a good example of
how the relationships among various states in the “outer ring” [of Indian
security perspectives— author] could directly affect Indian interests.131
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India, in many ways, thinks as did its erstwhile British masters
who also confronted the threats of advancing major powers and
crumbling or failing states on the approach to India.132 Indeed, the
Gulf ﬁgures prominently in India’s overall strategic horizons as one
of the key areas where it must be able to project power in the future.
Indian elites share a consensus that envisions an expanded concept
of India’s national interests encompassing Asia from the Middle East
to the Strait of Malacca. This expanded strategic concept comprises
not only classic military and/or geostrategic perspectives, but also
a broader deﬁnition of security and security interests. For example,
Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh revealed that, for many years,
India’s Middle Eastern policy was hostage to the “communal card”
at home, i.e., Muslim sympathies. But now it is freed from that and
can determine its policies on the basis of a pure national interest.
This kind of reasoning certainly helps explain the vastly improved
relationships with both Israel and Iran. However, it obviously is
not completely true, as the refusal to send forces to Iraq shows.
Nevertheless, this conﬁdence underscored and still underlies India’s
apparent willingness to play a partnership role in the Gulf despite
differences over Iraq.
Equally, if not more important is India’s acceptance of the logic
of the Raj that no maritime threats must be tolerated, as that was the
basis of the British threat to Mogul India and of subsequent threats
to British interests. That threat was also perceived in the dispatch
of the U.S. ﬂeet to check Indian power during the Indo-Pakistani
war of 1971. In 1979, former Admiral A. K. Chatterji wanted “a
force equal in size and competence to the naval forces of any one
of the superpowers now formally operating in the area.”133 Defense
Minister George Fernandes said in 2000 that, since India has “high
stakes in the uninterrupted ﬂow of commercial shipping, the Indian
Navy has an interest in the ocean space extending from the north of
the Arabian Sea to the South China Sea.”134 Others talk of denying
outside forces an autonomous capacity to act in the Indian Ocean
and thus proclaiming what amounts to a kind of Indian Monroe
Doctrine throughout its expanse.135
Scholars, too, now see a fundamental change in India’s geostrategic position. In a major study of South Asia’s geopolitics,
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Graham Chapman concluded that, “The major deductive viewpoint
is that provided by [Halford] Mackinder and [Saul] Cohen, [namely]
that South Asia is an independent geopolitical region, strategically
placed as one of the rim-land regions ﬂanking the central Eurasian
heartland.”136 Consequently, India, as the dominant power of South
Asia, has both the interest and capability to take an active, even
forceful, interest in strategic events happening either in the central
Eurasian heartland or in the two “shatterbelts” adjoining it, the
Middle East and Southeast Asia. Hence, India’s active pursuit of
national interests in those two regions and Central Asia.137 Chapman
further illustrates how the intersection of geographic location and
military capability create India’s expansive strategic vision, and he
explicitly invokes the British and Mogul heritages in that context.
India is committed to developing a “blue water” navy capable
of strategic action within the Indian Ocean and not just coastal
defense. There is some logic to this, in that many important cities
and installations, including most of her atomic power stations,
are within range of submarine-launched missiles, not necessarily
intercontinental missiles like Polaris, but small cruise missiles
launched from a submerged or surfaced submarine. These are now
within Pakistan’s capability. In other words, India now recognizes
that the defense of the sea is as important as the defense of the land
borders. The heir to the Moguls and the British appreciates India’s
position as a unique geopolitical region, which must face both the
potential of land power and of sea power.138
Obviously this concept of security reﬂects both rising Indian
capabilities and a sense of pervasive threats on the peripheries,
not least throughout the entire Indian Ocean. And the program
advocated by Vajpayee, as well as the new maritime doctrine cited
above, represents efforts to realize that concept in policy.139
India’s determination to prevent hostile powers from controlling
the northern approaches to India from both the East and West and
to control the maritime approaches in the Indian Ocean clearly
derive from both traditional Realist perspectives of strategy and
international relations, as well as from British approaches to the
defense of the Raj.140 This determination clearly is also tied to critical
aspects of India’s current economic transformation like the need for
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secure access to energy. Indian interests in the Gulf, for example, are
clearly also closely tied to the need to ensure reliable and regular
access to supplies and to tie into the expanding network of the
growing north-south corridor trade from Russia and Central Asia
through Iran to India and beyond.141 Indeed, Indian analysts regard
the Gulf as the priority source of its anticipated energy needs for the
long term, hence its importance to India grows commensurately.142 In
this respect, India, like so many other states, sees energy and overall
economic security and defense as being inextricably connected to
each other. And such interests also mandate a close relationship
with Iran that is quite unlike the posture of frozen hostility that
characterizes U.S. relations with Iran. Likewise, India maintains that
the Gulf must remain a stable and unimpeded source of energy. India
not only depends on a stable supply of oil and gas from the Gulf, it
is also now seeking to gain equity investment, through the Oil and
Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), in local energy projects.143 And
India’s vital security interest in stable energy supplies, cited above,
is not a function of recent developments in the Gulf but has been a
major issue for several years.
Similarly, India’s participation in the aforementioned North-South
transport corridor that traverses the Gulf also represents a major
trading and political interest insofar as it brings India closer to Russia,
Central Asian states, and Iran. Finally, as speciﬁed in Vajpayee’s
November 2003 program, India will both seek to develop its longrange capabilities of power projection to the Gulf and seek more
defense cooperation with local states. This cooperation will proceed
to more bilateral exchanges and exercises and greater sharing of
defense advice with friendly nations. To realize those goals, he argued
that strategic partnership with Washington is essential so that India
always has the option of U.S. support for its objectives. Otherwise,
India’s ability to project power and inﬂuence abroad anywhere would
be greatly compromised.144 This overarching strategic fact clearly
still applies to Indian policy, even if the government has changed.
And since the Indian government has apparently done its sums, as
it believes, it has been able to maintain and expand its ties to Iran,
while simultaneously expanding its ties to both Israel and the United
States. In so doing, it has furthered signiﬁcantly its own interests
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and isolated Pakistan, probably contributing thereby to the latter’s
willingness to enter into negotiations with India. Meanwhile, Iran
beneﬁts materially and politically from its ties to India that reduce
its sense of isolation in the face of perceived American threats.
Thus Iran has sought assistance in building an overland gas
pipeline through Pakistan to India. Other options include a pipeline
along Pakistan’s shallow water coastline, or on the seabed from
the Persian Gulf to India’s west coast, or an already existing fourth
option, liqueﬁed natural gas, which is most expensive. India hitherto
has rejected including Pakistan in the pipeline so the North-South
corridor may come to include gas and/or oil.145 Iran also seeks Indian
support for joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), G-17, and
G-77 trading regimes and greater business and perhaps also defense
ties with India.146 Finally, both states oppose Islamist takeovers in
Central Asia where Iran has been a notably cautious actor.147 While
Pakistan has guaranteed the safety and security of Indian gas or oil
supply through an overland pipeline from Iran (and probably must
do so since the project originates in Turkmenistan), India remains
reluctant. Still, ties to Iran remain strong, given both states’ overall
strategic harmony, shared interests, and Moscow’s support behind
the scenes. So this pipeline probably will be built.148
Iran and India have come even closer with regard to hard security
and defense. In 2003 they forged what amounts to an old-fashioned
alliance. India will provide repairs and maintenance for Iran’s
Russian-built weapons and training for its ofﬁcers in return for the
use of Iranian bases in any future war against Pakistan. Undoubtedly
any Indo-Iranian military cooperation will raise questions here and
in Jerusalem about Indian policies, but so far that has not precluded
India’s advancing ties with either Israel or America. Despite the
prospect of a new government, Indian ofﬁcials in the Ministry of
Defense claim that India will still advance military help to Iran.
Apparently a joint working group will be established, and Iran wants
to go beyond troop training to have India take an advisory role in
helping the Iranian Army develop a logistics strategy to manage its
stores. The Indian Defense Ministry is also eager to establish regular
naval exchanges between the two countries that would include
annual joint naval exercises.149 Clearly Pakistan’s beliefs that it could
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destabilize its neighbors and rivals with impunity, using terrorists as
its instrument, or that it could then switch sides to recoup a positive
position in Central Asia, have been rudely shattered. In Central Asia,
Pakistan is now isolated while a potent Indo-Iranian-Russian entente
that disposes of formidable economic and military power is visibly
taking shape.
India could also bring several assets to the Gulf security equation.
India already possesses considerable experience and capability to
project power in the form of peacekeeping or peace enforcement
forces abroad. Indeed, in anticipation of playing exactly this role in
Iraq, the Army and some in the government began to plan for that
mission in 2003.150 However major domestic political controversy
and the failure of the UN to authorize foreign participation in an
Iraqi peace operation prevented the government from authorizing
the dispatch of troops there.151 Somewhat surprisingly, in the wake
of Iraq’s successful January 30, 2005, elections, there are signs of
a reviving Indian interest in according the new regime legitimacy
and in getting into position for the competition for reconstruction
contracts in Iraq.152 This could occur even though the strength of
opposition among members of the current ruling coalition will, for
now, preclude any Indian dispatch of troops to Iraq in the foreseeable
future. Although the Pentagon clearly wanted such troops in 2003
and an intense political debate about it occurred as shown by the
military’s preparations for such an order, it should have been clear
to Washington that the balance of factors in Indian domestic and
foreign policy militated against such a dispatch of forces, especially
during an election campaign.153 Nevertheless, the Indian government
is already deeply engaged in the Gulf.
For example, while it remains unclear who will join the projected
Asian NATO that both India and America have discussed or what its
missions, rules of engagement in peace operations, and purpose will
be, India has already provided access to the United States in its quest
for bases against terrorism in the Indian Ocean, bases which were
and are being used to prosecute the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In the event of future contingencies, they could be used in the Gulf
as well.154 Because of domestic terrorism, India also regards the Gulf
as a potential breeding ground for anti-Indian terrorism, if not more
generalized expressions of this threat. Thus it is determined to assert
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itself there to prevent that threat’s overt expression and mutation
into a threat based on WMD proliferation and the acquisition of such
a capability by terrorists.
This opposition to terrorism and proliferation not only brings
India and America closer, it also catalyzes India’s drive to outﬂank
the territorial bases of these threats by ﬁnding points of inﬂuence
in the Gulf and Central Asia and by developing a capability to
assert and project its power in enduring fashion into these areas.
But beyond rivalry with Pakistan, the great strategic objective of
India’s rapprochement with Washington is to convince it that India
truly merits being seen as an Asian power that can project inﬂuence
and power on behalf of common interests against common threats
throughout Asia. To the degree that the United States regards India
as having legitimate security interests in the Gulf, Southeast Asia,
and as far aﬁeld as the Strait of Malacca, India can then play a
much greater role on its own and in support of Washington. Thus
frustrating terrorist challenges in a post-Saddam Iraq is intrinsically
an important Indian interest, even if it cannot yet commit forces
there due to domestic considerations and a different valuation than
America’s concerning the need for a UN authorization.
The Indian government not only wants Washington to keep
Pakistan “in the dock” and under constant pressure, it also wants
Washington to stabilize the Gulf in order to stabilize the South Asian
subcontinent and eliminate the territorial and political bases of the
terrorism that threatens it. Indian diplomatic support will be discreet
and measured, maybe even covert, but there is a visible basis for
Indo-American collaboration here, even if it is somewhat limited
by the asymmetric, though not opposed, interests of the two states.
The architecture for regional security in the Gulf clearly is broader
than merely establishing the basis for Iraq’s long-term stability and
security. But the latter is the essential precondition for any successful
security architecture or structure in the region. And without such an
architecture, India’s and America’s interests, security, and standing
will be severely compromised.
India’s ambitions, capabilities, experience, and interests all
suggest that it is interested in playing a major role in helping to
stabilize the Persian Gulf in a post-Saddam era. As C. Uday Bashkar
of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses recently wrote,
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In the immediate future, U.S. policy toward South Asia will, to a great
extent, be determined by the way in which Iraq is stabilized, and the
January (2005) elections will be a signiﬁcant punctuation that will shape
the degree of U.S. involvement in that country in the Bush second term.
It is relevant that India also shares an interest in the swift return to
normalcy to Iraq and its citizens, and it remains to be seen if the U.S. will
be able to facilitate such joint effort under the appropriate multilateral
banner. India’s abiding concern about radical Islamic militancy and its
supra-national aspirations is the more complex element and this will
be the common template for the long-term security relationship, not
withstanding the immediate divergence over Pakistan and its military
DNA.155

The issue is how do we craft an invitation to India to do so that
has a chance of succeeding. Obviously we must stop dismissing the
UN, for no matter what we think, India, like many other states, sees
its authorization as indispensable to any legitimization of the use of
force or for deployment in post-conﬂict stability operations. Second,
before India enters into any such operation, it will be necessary to
conduct a candid discussion with it as to its strategic objectives,
interests, and concerns in the new Gulf. And those objectives, interests,
and concerns must be accommodated. During this dialogue, it will
be necessary as well to elucidate its views as to how that structure or
architecture should work, and not just what it hopes to gain from its
participation in any such system.
Here it should be noted that India appears to be shifting gears in
its policy toward Iraq. For example, in December 2004 Iraq interim
Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari came to New Delhi, signifying a
resumption of formal contacts with Iraq and the change in Indian
policy. Indian observers had noted several earlier signs of New
Delhi’s interest in moving to adapt itself to the evolving Iraqi situation
despite the intense public opposition, particularly strong among
members of the ruling coalition, especially the Communist Party, to
the U.S. campaign in Iraq. It had become clear to New Delhi that other
states were moving to engage the new interim Iraqi government and
that it was being excluded by its inﬂexibility. Thus, even if Indian
engagement with the interim government and its successor that
was elected in January 2005 remain low-key, India clearly intends to
remain engaged with Iraq and help shape a future status quo there
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that is consonant with its interests. And those interests are broadly
consonant with U.S. strategic interests regarding proliferation and
terrorism.156
Thus there are opportunities for enhanced Indo-American
cooperation, even with regard to the evolving situation in Iraq.
But for that cooperation to take root, India has to be able to look
beyond the domestic opposition to American policy there, and that
requires some American actions to facilitate such movement within
Indian politics. For example, the perception in India that U.S. policy
is characterized by excessive unilateralism must be shown to be
groundless. And that altered perception must be based on what is
actually transpiring among our allies and us. Allies like India must
be consulted and accommodated, much more openly than was
previously the case. This consultation must mean, and be seen to
mean, more than that they were simply heard and that then we
proceeded as we had intended to do anyway. Their interests in a
stable Gulf, which, after all, are not far removed from our goals
for the area, must be seen as legitimate, and it must be understood
that no unilateral American system stands any chance of more than
ephemeral success in constructing a post-Saddam order in the Gulf.
The beginning of wisdom in constructing a sustainable and enduring
Gulf security architecture entails genuine dialogue with allies and
partners, and a genuine give and take among them and us. The gains
in getting the participation of a rising power with a good reputation
in the Gulf and a democratic tradition in this security architecture far
outweigh any losses involved in accommodating their interests there
and in taking their advice when it makes sense. Since partnership,
if not alliance, with India is one of the fundamental points of the
administration’s agenda and even preceded September 11, as India’s
power and standing grow, it makes all the sense in the world to
exploit that partnership on behalf of interests and values that are
fundamentally shared and compatible and against common threats.
Failure to devise a basis for a signiﬁcant Indian presence in the new
Gulf, on the other hand, all but ensures that the architecture we then
build will be built on sand.
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CHAPTER 5
CENTRAL ASIA
If the Gulf is of rising importance to Indian security and stability
and has been a vital interest of the United States since 1941 when
it entered World War II and participated in the Grand Alliance’s
occupation of Iran, Central Asia has been vital to India for millennia.
Indians like to point out that India frequently has been invaded
from Central Asia, and the essence of the Raj’s security policy was to
prevent another such invasion. Moreover, geostrategic imperatives
of today’s world have transformed the situation, making Central
Asia not just vital to India, but also increasingly important to the
United States, and not merely because of terrorism. Energy access to
this region, in part to ensure a diversity of supplies to America and
its allies that does not rely merely on the Persian Gulf, has grown in
importance to America since 1992.157 The geostrategic implications
of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan also are clear. For the ﬁrst time
in history, externally based naval and air based military power has
been projected successfully and sustained against Central Asian
forces and targets. As Graham Chapman wrote recently, invoking
Sir Halford Mackinder, “The Americans have also now built bases in
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan; and so the maritime powers
have penetrated the heartland for the ﬁrst time ever.” 158 Indeed,
Norman Friedman calls the war in Afghanistan a littoral war,
highlighting the sustained strategic projection of offshore or externally
based power into this theater.159 Second, these capabilities can also
be projected from there to all of Asia, or Europe (including the Middle
East), and vice versa, making the Transcaspian literally a pivotal
Eurasian theater. Therefore we can and must think seriously about
the future projection of naval, land, and air power into or from the
Transcaspian theater to or from adjacent theaters in Eastern Europe,
the Middle East, South Asia, and/or East Asia. But this fact obligates
the United States to engage this entire area with more strategic
purposefulness in order to maintain permanent access to it and
to help ensure its security and stability. Therefore, by using those
forms of power projection—which can project ground forces into the
47

theater and sustain them for a long time—India, America, and other
similarly endowed states can now, or in the future, leverage military
power in and throughout Central Asia, and from there throughout
Eurasia in hitherto unforeseen ways. Not surprisingly, both halves
of the Transcaspian, Central Asia and Transcaucasia, now enjoy
heightened analytical and policy interest. Ever more security
professionals here and abroad realize the importance of addressing
the Black Sea and Transcaucasia as well as Central Asia in order to
complete the stabilization of Europe or to help stabilize the “Broader
(or greater) Middle East” or a reconceptualized Eurasia or consider
Central Asia as an integral part of Asian security.160 Many Indian
and American writers, as well as others with expertise in the region,
emphasize the strategic importance of Central Asia and/or the
Caucasus to the current geopolitical order. Frequently, they see new
geographical and even strategic unities between the two halves of
the Transcaspian and areas like South Asia or Europe. For example,
Even before the war in Iraq, Sir John Thomson, a former British High
Commissioner to India wrote that,
The geographical deﬁnition of South Asia has expanded. If we had any
doubt before, September 11 has made it clear that we have to take into
account Afghanistan and its neighbors: Iran to the west, all the former
Soviet republics to the north, and China to the east. The geographical
context for South Asia may be even wider. We in the West say—sincerely,
I believe—that we are not against Islam, but many Muslims do not believe
it. So, to a greater or lesser extent, our relations with Arab countries can
be connected with our South Asian policies. And this potential extension
of our area of concern is being reinforced, unfortunately, by the spiraling
disaster in Israel-Palestine.161

Rajan Menon of Lehigh University also writes that:
A seamless web connects Central Asia proper, the South Caucasus,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and China’s Xinjiang province.
Thinking in terms of a “greater Central Asia” captures the bigger picture
and reﬂects how forces from one part of this extended region radiate
across borders to other parts. Thus, an axiom of both policymaking
and analysis should be that the consequences of a major change in one
part of greater Central Asia will affect its other parts, often quickly and
dramatically and through multiple networks. 162
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In 2003 Indian Foreign Secretary Kinwal Sebal similarly told a
U.S. audience that,
Asia has traditionally been seen in terms of its sub-regions, each with its
own dynamics and its own problems. Traditionally, we deal with them
as unconnected compartments. However, lines that insulate one region
from the other increasingly are getting blurred by proliferation deals that
link the east to the west, by the chain of terror network(s) across West,
South, and Southeast Asia, by the concerns about the safety of commerce
from the Straits of Hormuz to the Straits of Malacca, by the challenge of
connecting major consumers of energy to its sources in West and Central
Asia.163

Most tellingly, Paul Bracken writes that,
The arc of terror cuts across the military and political theaters into
which the West conveniently divided Asia, essentially for the purpose of
ﬁghting the Cold War: the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and
Northeast Asia. The ballistic missile once launched, does not turn back
at the line that separates the territory of one State Department desk from
another. Thus the Gulf War (of 1991) brought the troubles of the Persian
Gulf to Israel, linking theaters that had once been considered separate.
Israel, for its part, sends up spy satellites to spy on Pakistan, 2000 miles
away, spooking Islamabad into seeing an Indian-Israel squeeze play
against it. Chinese and Indian military establishments plot against each
other, making East and South Asia one military space.164

Given the Transcaspian region’s proximity to the centers of
contemporary terrorism, it is hardly surprising that both U.S.
policymakers and foreign analysts see enhanced U.S. attention
to Central Asia and the Transcaucasus as essential. Indeed,
Blackwill wrote that “Asia is increasingly a geopolitical whole” and
recommended that America and its Asian allies—Japan, South Korea,
and Australia—consider Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia a
geopolitical unit with which they should engage.165 And as we have
seen, such geopolitical ruminations and policy recommendations are
by no means alien to Indian policymakers and analysts. Therefore, it
is not surprising that Vajpayee’s 2003 program emphasized Central
Asia as a key theater where India must project its power and inﬂuence,
or that India, since 2000 if not before, has been steadily expanding its
presence using all the instruments of power at its disposal.166
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Recent Indian assessments of Central Asia thus correspond to
emerging American strategic perspectives. Although some analysts
believe that America’s supposed partiality to Pakistan leads to a
U.S. disinclination to have India be a major presence and potential
rival in Central Asia, in fact, India’s interests there derive from the
same bases as do American strategy, namely geopolitical interests
and energy security.167 Since Central Asia has long been a source of
potential threat to India, its primary interest here was and is selfpreservation.
The basic underlying aim was to ensure that the heart of Asia
does not turn hostile to India. Indian policymakers knew it was in
their interest to see that these countries also do not end up helping
hostile forces or falling prey to the ravages of militant Islam.168
Equally importantly, and like U.S. analysts and policymakers,
Indian observers long have seen growing geopolitical rivalry in this
area as well as a high degree of potential threat. They intend to take
part in the geopolitical competition, not to seek a hegemonic position
which they know is beyond them and in any case unattainable, but
rather to prevent a hostile force from doing so whether it is Pakistan,
China, or Islamic radicalism.169 Indian and Russian diplomats have
also long shared similar apprehensions about Central Asian security.
Already in 1997, Russia’s press reported that in private Indo-Russian
diplomatic conversations, “Russian and Indian diplomats willingly
open the cards: both Moscow and New Delhi see a threat in the
excessive strengthening of China and the Islamic extremists.”170
Thus as both states become economic powerhouses regionally, if not
globally, there exists genuine potential for rivalry between them.
For example, Indian naval building in and around Pakistan’s port
of Gwadar also certainly intends to counter Chinese interest in the
Indian Ocean as China is investing heavily in Gwadar’s development.
India also hopes to wage economic war on Pakistan by restricting
the development of trade from Central Asia through that port even
as Pakistan seeks to open its ports to Central Asian states in the hope
that it will become their entrepot.171 However, it is not only Pakistan’s
presence in Central Asia that concerns India. The rising specter of
China’s presence there is also a matter of considerable concern to
Indian elites.
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Not surprisingly, many Indians now view China as India’s current
and long-term main rival and threat and see Central Asia in terms
of that strategic rivalry encompassing both economics and more
traditional security relationships. U.S. analysts in touch with Indian
elites before September 11, 2001, observed that Russia’s decline has
galvanized Indian apprehensions about Central Asia.
Russian weakness in Central Asia compounds India’s immediate
and long-term problems there. In the short term, the chaos in
Afghanistan and parts of Central Asia over which Russia might once
have exerted a strong restraining inﬂuence is now free to spread,
and most Indians believe—correctly it appears—that it will spread
southward, infecting Pakistan and eventually possibly India’s large
northern Islamic population. In the longer term, Russian weakness in
the core of Central Asia creates a vacuum, especially in energy-rich
Kazakhstan, into which China will expand. Among Indian strategists,
one frequently hears the term “encirclement” by China, and they
view Central Asia as a part of the top of a China-dominated circle of
states that includes most of Southeast Asia, Burma, Bangladesh, and
Pakistan. In this sense, Indian national security specialists believe
that Russia’s weakness encourages India’s encirclement.172
Central Asia’s rising strategic importance to India would be
important to its foreign and defense policies even if it was bereft of
energy deposits, but the fact that it is and will become an even more
important source of oil and gas make it even more important to India
which seeks, like China, to diversify its sources of energy supply
and which cannot afford to be excessively dependent on the volatile
Persian Gulf for its energy sources. And from these twin standpoints
of geopolitics and energy, India and China’s rising interest and
capacities for projecting power and inﬂuence in Central Asia must
be mentioned in conjunction with Indo-American ties. According to
analysts like James Clad, India, like China, appears to be moving
from an approach that emphasized security of supply to one that
spreads supply risks through greater reliance on market mechanisms
and diversiﬁcation of supplies. These two states also are moving
towards greater reliance on liquid natural gas, two factors that will
stimulate investment in capital intensive projects in Central Asia and
elsewhere, greater interest in preventing interruptions of seaborne
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energy trade, and in the restructuring of their formerly state-owned
oil and gas companies. Accordingly, both states now tend to focus
on exploiting short-term advantages to lock in, if possible, overall
lower cost delivery over the long-term.173 However, other analysts,
like Ashley Tellis, discern a suspicion common to both states of
the market mechanism’s effectiveness and viability with regard to
securing reliable access to raw materials. Moreover, stability in the
energy market assumes a stable Middle East, a highly questionable
assumption. Therefore, if problems in the Middle East or in their
bilateral relations with each other or with the United States, or
crises in world politics on a larger scale preclude the Middle Eastern
option, or if their politics veer toward greater reliance on non- and
extra-market mechanisms, Indo-Chinese rivalry over Central Asia
will grow.174 Thus it is still unclear whether or not this shared
approach that seeks to balance mechanisms of cooperation abroad
with maximization of indigenous capabilities will promote greater
amity or greater rivalry among them generally, and in Central Asia
in particular. To a signiﬁcant degree, the outcome of their current
policies in Central Asia depends on factors beyond either of these
states’ control.
Though the balance of the factors impelling each state to assume
a larger proﬁle in Central Asia differs, these factors are common to
them both. Given the expected length and intensity of the global
struggle against Islamic radicalism and terrorism and these two
states’ exploding demand for energy and foreign markets, in the
context of Asia’s unsettled security equations, we can expect them
both to increase their capabilities and interest in Central Asia.
Likewise, there already appears to be some ad hoc collaboration in
intelligence against the common threats of terrorism and drugs in
Central Asia.175 Finally, we can expect numerous efforts either by
them to join forces with other powers against threats that either
they or their prospective partners perceive to be in their interests.
Consequently both governments’ policies in Central Asia reﬂect
these similarities and differences in their situations.
For example, the Shanghai Cooperative Organization (SCO) is
essentially a Chinese-inspired organization to counter terrorism and
separatism in Xinjiang and Central Asia and preserve a mechanism
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for bilateral and multilateral cooperation with Russia and Central
Asian states with regard to threats to security there. Often those
threats also are conjoined with China’s efforts to use the SCO against
regional American inﬂuence of any kind.176 As such, it perfectly
embodies the trend to form regional associations or security
organizations in Central Asia that include China or India. Hence, it
is not surprising that India has duly sought to join the SCO to make
sure its voice is heard, although no ﬁnal answer has yet been given.
Likewise, Russia’s continuing and frequent attempts to create an
Asian security triangle comprising India, China, and Russia against
Islamic unrest and America’s local inﬂuence represent an effort to
manage Indo-Chinese rivalry in Asia by bringing both states into
a compatible relationship where Russia holds the balance between
them and can avoid having to choose between them.177
America’s efforts to build a broader connection of Central Asian
militaries with its own forces and with NATO, and the talk of an
Asian NATO comprising India, America, and other Asian powers
also reﬂect this trend and grow out of India’s strategic partnership
with America.178 Indeed, India has even supported Washington’s
indeﬁnite retention of its bases in Central Asia.179 Nor is India’s
search for partners in Central Asia and across the continent limited
to Washington, although it clearly is conditioned by Russia’s longterm weakness. India and Iran have even forged what amounts to
a classic alliance against Pakistan and its support for terrorism in
Afghanistan and Central Asia.
Indian Capabilities and Interests in Central Asia.
Compared to the long-standing awareness of China’s rising
economic power and its implications for Asia, India’s rising economic
power is only beginning to register across Asia.180 Therefore,
India’s ability to expand its capabilities in Central Asia depends on
successfully continuing this record of growth and extending it to
ever larger sectors of Indian society, much of which still suffers from
terrible poverty and backwardness.181 Therefore, we cannot doubt
India’s seriousness about playing a major role in Central Asia or its
growing interests there, which comprise internal security against
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terrorists, largely sponsored by Pakistan, economic and energy
activities, and the desire to play a major role in Central Asia to deny
to both China and Pakistan opportunities to encircle India or keep
it penned up in South Asia. In other words, beyond perceptions of
security or of economic need and opportunity, a primary motive
of India’s overall foreign policy and particularly in Central Asia, is
India’s determination to play a great power role throughout Asia
and belief that it now can begin to do so as Vajpayee’s 2003 directives
indicate.
Whereas other powers in and around Central Asia, especially
Russia, previously had discerned Indian hesitancy regarding Central
Asia, that is no longer the case.182 Central Asia has deﬁnitively entered
into the “mental map” of India’s sphere of interests.183 During the
1990s, India sought to reduce Pakistan’s ability to deﬂect it from
playing the broader Asian role India craved by reaching out to all its
interlocutors, including Central Asia.184 Retired Brigadier General V.
K. Nair, a leading strategist, spoke for the entire Indian establishment
when he told the U.S. National Defense University in 2001 that,
India needs to evolve a broad based strategy that would not only ensure the
security of its vital interests but also provide policy options for effectively
responding to developing situations in the area. India’s geostrategic
location dictates that the primary focus of its security policies must be its
relationship with the neighboring countries and the countries that form
part of its “extended security horizon” which in one ofﬁcial publication
is deﬁned as “regions with economic, social, cultural, and environmental
linkages [that] result in overlapping security interests.”185

Central Asia is explicitly and widely cited as part of this “horizon,”
and this interpretation of that term was publicly conveyed to Central
Asian audiences at a Tashkent conference in 2003 by Foreign Minister
Yashwant Sinha.186 And the strategic goals of projecting economic
and military inﬂuence and power abroad clearly are tied to this
determination to cut a major ﬁgure in Asian politics.
Indian interests in Central Asia do not only grow out of its
rising capability. To sustain that capability and create new avenues
of inﬂuence for itself, India must ﬁnd markets abroad and Central
Asia was historically a place to look, especially as the Soviet Union
collapsed. This major policy innovation grew out of the vacuum
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created by that collapse, the pressure of globalization, and the socalled Washington consensus in liberalizing much of India’s quasisocialist economy, particularly as China’s rise became too palpable
to ignore. As Kishore Dash recently wrote,
Such a paradigmatic shift in India’s regional policy can be explained by
post-Cold War global political-economic developments. Indian leaders
well know that the success of their country’s [concurrent] economic
liberalization depends upon its ability to increase exports to new
markets in developed and developing countries. Until recently, India has
achieved only restricted access to the markets of Japan, North America,
and Western Europe due to these countries’ projectionist policies and
various kinds of nontariff barriers against Indian products. Additionally,
with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the gradual incorporation of
Eastern Europe with the West European economy, India has lost two of
its privileged market links.187

India’s trade with Central Asia underwent a tremendous decline
in 1991-94 that highlighted its faltering competitiveness with an
already reformed China.188 Indeed, observers of Chinese policy
quickly grasped China’s exploding economic and political ties
with Central, South, and Southeast Asia.189 Thus the appearance of
Islamic terrorism, abetted by the Taliban, and behind it, Pakistan,
strengthened a rising disposition to see in Central Asia an area where
important interests were already at stake. However, interest in trade
and investment do not end there.
India’s strategic capability also depends on a rapidly growing
economy with a signiﬁcant and well-known high-tech component
that seeks markets and guaranteed energy supplies to sustain this
growth. India’s energy deﬁcit, rising domestic demand, and need to
sustain high growth rates make securing reliable long-term sources
of energy a vital strategic priority.190 The pursuit of energy sufﬁciency
and markets in Asia impels Indian leaders to look seriously at Central
Asia, East Asia, and the Middle East, and to attempt to inﬂuence
trends there.191
The quest for energy access and more open markets is part of India’s
overall foreign economic strategy, and on a daily basis, economic
power is perhaps the most important instrument in India’s arsenal
because it is the indispensable prerequisite for advanced military
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capability and for offering other states inducements to cooperate
with India. Foreign Minister I. K. Gujral noted in 1997 that much of
India’s foreign policy revolves around economic and infrastructural
needs.192 He outlined a vision of regional economic development,
including Central Asia, which he called “our near abroad.” Gujral
emphasized investment in infrastructure: railroads, roads, power
generation, telecommunications, ports and airports, informatics,
cross-border investments, energy exchanges, up to and including
“Trans-Asian pipelines,” strengthened regional organizations, tariff
reductions and freer trade, and meeting “an exponential surge in
energy demand” through the cooperative development of all forms
of energy.193
Indian businessmen clearly also are eager to compete with China
in the region and exploit opportunities for expanding overland
commerce with Central Asia, provided that the trade routes go
through paciﬁed countries. As S. Frederick Starr, director of Johns
Hopkins Central Asia Caucasus Institute, has observed,
The opening of transport corridors to Iran, Pakistan, and India will
dramatically shift these dynamics [China’s rising share of Central Asian
trade—author]. Indian and Pakistani businessmen and traders are quite
blunt about their desire to supplant China as a source of goods for Central
Asia. Both countries have assigned governmental commissions to explore
the development of transport to bring this about.194

Obviously hopes for greater trade and Gujral’s vision would
collapse if Central Asia, including Kashmir, were engulfed in antiIndian violence. Then sustaining India’s economic development
and internal security would become much more problematic. Thus
foreign trade factors are also a compelling motive for resolving the
Kashmir issue.
Indian energy companies, including the state-owned ONGC,
take part in projects from Azerbaijan to Kazakstan and hope to get
in on the ground ﬂoor with respect to both oil and gas pipelines
becoming players in a network that supposedly will revive the
old silk route to Asia and give it an Indian branch as well.195 India
also evidently holds the deciding voice as to whether the projected
Turkmen-Afghan-Pakistani pipeline will ever materialize. Although
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it would greatly beneﬁt all those states, offering Turkmenistan
an alternative to Russia’s pipeline system and offering Pakistan
and Afghanistan energy and revenues from transit fees, there are
considerable economic and political difﬁculties. Those difﬁculties are
not connected solely to the many political imponderables in all three
of those states and Pakistan’s rivalry with India. Financing remains
unsettled because political instability precludes a stable climate for
investment by the Asian Development Bank and other interested
institutions.196 But while India would be the main consumer of gas
ﬂows from this pipeline, it was not invited to the 2002 meetings in
Ashgabat that formulated the new proposal and has refused to tie its
gas supply to a pipeline through Pakistan.197 Clearly India’s decision
will materially affect economic and political outcomes in the other
three states.198
Indian strategy also entails further exploration of India’s interior
and off-shore regions for energy, investment of domestic resources
in them, and welcoming foreign investors, e.g., Russia’s Gazprom.199
Thus India has developed a four-part foreign economic program to
materialize this vision. First, its state-owned ONGC now invests in
foreign oil and gas ﬁelds across Central and East Asia, even to include
Sakhalin. Second, India also aims to assert itself as a major player
throughout Asia and cement political ties with key states. Third, India
seeks to increase exploration within its own conﬁnes. Indeed, with
respect to Uzbekistan, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Iran, these policy
dimensions march together. Indian and Russian policymakers both
accept that the strong bilateral political relationship is insufﬁcient
without deeper economic and trade ties.200
The fourth aspect is stabilizing Afghanistan, a necessary
condition of a revival of Central Asian trade with India that declined
precipitously after the Soviet breakup. Instability in and around
Afghanistan prevents India and Pakistan from fully realizing
potential economic gains from trade with Central Asia.201 Indian
businesses stand ready to expand their overland trade with Central
Asia and Afghanistan once they can safely move cargoes through
those areas, but violence in Afghanistan, and perhaps Pakistan
too, inhibits them.202 Therefore, India has made a large effort to
stabilize Afghanistan, providing ﬁnancial assistance and aid in
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transport, education, and health care. India was also among the ﬁrst
governments to accept the Karzai government there and has steadily
intensiﬁed its connections with Afghanistan. And by so doing, it has
repeatedly aroused Pakistan’s long-standing suspicions about Indian
activity there, indicating that their rivalry connected to inﬂuence in
and over Afghanistan is by no means a thing of the past.203
Indian Regional Diplomacy.
To realize these interests and goals, India recently has improved
ties with China, Russia, Iran, Israel, and the United States and also
is consolidating key military and trading partnerships with them.
Similarly, the shared perspective on terrorism with Moscow and
Washington has allowed India to form permanent relationships and
working groups with those governments to combat terrorism. As the
new exercises and potential arms purchases from Washington show,
these groups enhance military-political-intelligence collaboration
with both capitals and their discussions about Central Asia
apparently now include India as a shared subject of discussion.204
India’s membership in the UN-sponsored 6+2 process to deal with
Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, and the favorable reaction to its interest
in the SCO, also demonstrate its growing weight and repute in Asia
generally, including Central Asia. Thus India has substantially
improved relations with major players in and around Central Asia.
Special emphasis here belongs to Indo-Uzbek and Indo-Kazak
relations, which comprise heightened economic exchange and a
growing security relationship.
The Military Instrument.
India’s policies also reﬂect the rising importance of military
factors and instruments in its overall national security policy. While
its conventional power projection capabilities have always been
intended for use primarily against Pakistan, they are fungible and
usable wherever applicable, e.g., against terrorist activities on the
high seas or for aerial reconnaissance over Central Asia or Pakistan’s
interior through airborne warning and control system (AWACS) or
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satellite technology. These examples show what capabilities India is
developing, improving, or seeking to acquire from its suppliers.205
Simultaneously, India also projects military power into Central Asia
in other forms.
First, responding to Pakistan’s closing of its air space, India
negotiated base rights with Tajikistan in 2002. While little is known
about this air base, it is reportedly at an operational level and could
therefore be used for operations against either Central Asian insurgents
in support of a friendly government or Pakistan.206 However, this
base may not be India’s last one or remain small. Indeed, it could
become the spearhead of a deepening Indian involvement in Central
Asian defense. Thus the ties with Tajikistan have led to joint TajikIndian military exercises involving the air, airborne, and ground
forces of both sides.207
India’s increased ability and willingness to sell weapons to
Central Asian and to buy from them earlier Soviet models parallels
Pakistan’s similar capability, as both are entering the international
arms market to ﬁnd new export markets and keep defense plants
open.208 Indian spokesmen frankly admit the drive to ﬁnd export
markets among former “pariah” states like Israel and South Africa
to achieve economies of scale for their domestic defense industry.
They hope that capturing those markets will then reduce Indian
dependence upon foreign suppliers, especially as India increasingly
can compel them to transfer technology and know-how as part of
their sales.209 Probably India will provide training and assistance to
Central Asian militaries, as do Turkey, Russia, China, and the United
States, and also ﬁnd in them willing buyers of its weapons, especially
those made jointly with Russia.
But India has even broader objectives. Because it competes with
China in the small arms market and also seeks to penetrate into
Southeast Asia and Central Asia where China seeks to expand its
inﬂuence, India must compete with China on price and quality in
the same categories of weapons. India sells small arms, ammunition,
patrol ships, light ﬁeld guns, trucks, and aircraft parts to Southeast
Asia at reduced price and with better equipment.210 Furthermore,
Over the next decade, India intends to produce weapons systems China
cannot, including an indigenously designed air defense ship—basically
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a small aircraft carrier. Through subsidies, loans, and higher technology,
New Delhi hopes to supplant China as a major regional arms supplier.
It also can take advantage of underlying concerns about China within
Southeast Asia, touting Indian weapons systems as free from the risks of
being swallowed by an aggressive China in the future.211

All this also applies to Central Asia, which is already the target of an
Indian arms sales offensive. India has sold Kazakhstan and Tajikistan
Ilyushin-76 transports and helicopters, respectively.212
Finally, India has built a burgeoning security relationship with
Uzbekistan based on a common antipathy to Islamic terrorism. Indian
scholars believe these two states are natural allies who confront
the same threats: terrorism, insurgency, separatism, drugs, etc.
Uzbekistan steadily has widened its security discussions with India
to include intelligence sharing, military and paramilitary training,
and joint working groups against terrorism, as India has done
with Washington and Moscow.213 Here again, New Delhi emulates
Moscow, Washington, Ankara, and Beijing. More importantly, it
has only begun to display its military instruments of power locally.
As long as security threats remain and Pakistan seeks to obstruct
India or to use this area as a “strategic hinterland” against it, India’s
projection of all forms of military power will likely grow. Indeed,
the threat of terrorism against India and its measures to ﬁght that
threat evidently have received sympathetic hearing in Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan and has allowed India to build enduring security
and intelligence cooperation fora with those states.214
Conclusions.
India’s display of its military instruments of power in and to
Central Asia is ultimately a harbinger of future trends. As long as
security threats remain and Pakistan seeks to obstruct India or to use
this area as a “strategic hinterland” against it, the projection of all
forms of military power will likely grow. But India will also increase
its capabilities and inﬂuence in Central Asia for reasons having to
do with internal economic needs like energy and trade, as well as
for traditional geostrategic imperatives that will make themselves
increasingly important as India’s economy and military capabilities
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grow, along with its aspirations to cut a meaningful ﬁgure in Asia.
This means that Indo-Chinese interests in Central Asia will inevitably
collide with each other, but not necessarily violently. Nonetheless,
the relationship will contain considerable elements of competition,
as is already seen from the history of Indo-Chinese relations.215
While Sino-Indian tensions throughout Asia are likely, whatever
stresses divide them in Central Asia will also be a function of
American, and to a lesser degree Russian, relations with them. SinoIndian competition in Central Asia cannot be separated from the
larger Asian and global context in which the two countries operate.
Thus their rivalry over nuclear issues, South Asia, and Southeast
Asia, as well as their current efforts to ﬁnd a largely economic basis
for a modus vivendi, will spill over into and inﬂuence their relations
in Central Asia and vice versa. Indo-American cooperation in
Central Asia cannot only help both sides prevent destabilization due
to terrorist attacks or potential future Chinese efforts to establish
a sphere of inﬂuence either unilaterally or with Moscow against
Washington, their collaboration can also exercise a moderating or
restraining inﬂuence on the tendency of Indo-Chinese competition
in Asia.
Moreover, India’s and China’s participation in Central Asia,
and the degree to which they do so, will be a function of the success
of their economic and military policies. If those policies continue
to bring about substantial rises in both economic and military
capability without endangering the domestic fabric of their societies
and governments, that capability will ﬁnd an outlet in Central Asia
as well as elsewhere in Asia. Indeed, if they can continue growing
at their current pace for another generation, they may well begin to
eclipse other powers’ capability to project meaningful inﬂuence and
power in to Central Asia, e.g., Russia and Iran. Likewise, if India can
surmount the obstacles to a genuine rapprochement with Pakistan,
not least among them being Chinese support for Islamabad’s efforts
to block Indian hegemony in South Asia, it will become that much
more formidable a challenger in Central Asia. After all, there is good
reason for arguing that India’s grand strategy took a decisive turn in
the 1990s to recover something of the heritage of the British Raj and its
quest for enduring inﬂuence in Central Asia as expressed by leaders
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like Lord Curzon.216 Because the capabilities that India can bring to
bear in Central Asia are growing and are perceived as legitimate and
nonthreatening by local governments, the utility of cooperation with
India in Central Asia grows along with its importance to both New
Delhi and Washington.
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CHAPTER 6
INDIA AS PLAYER IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Southeast Asia is a region whose importance to both American
and Indian interests has risen for the same reasons: the threat of
terrorism and the enormous growth of Chinese economic power
and inﬂuence throughout the region that could soon and relatively
quickly translate, or so it is feared, into enduring political and military
power and/or inﬂuence. Thus Washington’s and New Delhi’s
appreciations of potential short-term and long-term threats that could
put vital national interests of both states at some risk in this area are
convergent, if not identical. If one includes Myanmar in Southeast
Asia, for example, the threat posed by terrorists there to India’s
Northeast provinces has already been cited.217 Indeed, the eruption
of terrorist activity throughout Southeast Asia has only refocused
the attention of both the United States and neighboring states,
including India and Australia, on the area. Australia has proclaimed
a preventive intervention doctrine, along with assigning forces to
the Solomon Islands, precisely to forestall a rise in indigenous civic
violence that could lead to further terrorism there, or else originating
from there but conducted elsewhere. And it has created a 1,000 mile
nautical maritime security zone around its coastline.218 Similarly, a
recent American analysis states openly that,
Southeast Asia is a promising hub for not only al-Qaeda, but also other
terrorist groups, and many within the U.S. military view Southeast
Asia as the next front in the war on terror. Although there are terrorist
networks throughout, there are no overt sponsors of that terrorism. This
does make the problem harder to solve since there are no obvious targets,
but it also creates greater possibilities for cooperation in the war on terror
and opens the door to the expanded use of the U.S. military beyond the
Philippines.219

Such cooperation has begun with India’s Navy conducting joint
patrols with the U.S. Navy in the Strait of Malacca in 2002. And
there also appear to be possibilities for trilateral cooperation with
Australia, if not other local powers, in prosecuting antiterrorist
63

missions.220 Under the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that
Indian analysts display greater interest in Southeast Asia. So while
there may be increased scope for practical bilateral or even trilateral
cooperation with Australia here, any serious upgrading of U.S. and
Indian inﬂuence and capabilities in Southeast Asia, whether pursued
singly or in tandem, will force policymakers in India, America, China,
and local governments to interact in a highly complex manner.
Moreover, Southeast Asian analysts and elites would welcome
greater American and Indian involvement in the region provided
that these two governments each adopt a comprehensive view of
the Southeast Asian security agenda to comprise all the ﬁelds in
economics and social issues where mutually beneﬁcial cooperation
could occur and where America and India take regional security
institutions like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) seriously. These strictures, it
should be noted, apply more to Washington than to New Delhi, for
there is a widespread view throughout Southeast Asia that harbors
some reservations and criticisms about America’s willingness to
take the nonterrorist security agenda and organizations like ASEAN
and the ARF fully into account.221 Thus Ambassador Tommy Koh of
Singapore writes that,
Southeast Asians do not want the U.S. to see the region purely through
the lens of terrorism. Engagement between Southeast Asia and [the]
U.S. should be more comprehensive, covering the whole spectrum of
social, economic, cultural, political, and security issues. The war against
terrorism cannot be won by military means alone. A winning strategy
should be multifaceted and include social, economic, political, and
military components.222

Due to this demand for a comprehensive security strategy, India,
as an important neighboring partner of Southeast Asian security
organizations, is in an excellent position to ﬁnd ways of working with
Washington to advance shared interests against commonly faced
problems that threaten all local governments and other interested
parties in Southeast Asia. Obviously, there is a wide ﬁeld of activity
for both the United States and India with regard to Southeast Asian
security, especially if one takes the modern and not exclusively
military deﬁnition of security into account as well as opportunities
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for beneﬁcial cooperation between these two states and among them,
Australia, and local governments. Indeed, ASEAN members openly
state that they seek greater Indian, American, and Chinese economic
involvement in Southeast Asia to ensure greater prosperity there.
As Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi told ASEAN
leaders, without greater integration with China and India, ASEAN
cannot remain competitive merely by strenghtening intraregional
cooperation.223 Following through on this, in late 2004, ASEAN set
up a Regional Trade and Investment Area to enhance the ﬂow of
foreign direct investment into Southeast Asia, regional monetary
cooperation, and promote an Asian bond market and set up a plan
of action to implement the ASEAN-India partnership for Peace,
Progress, and Shared Prosperity.224 And, at least with regard to
American policy, there is a widespread feeling in the region that there
is a much greater scope for action than what Washington currently
perceives.225
At the same time both Indian and American policy initiatives
in Southeast Asia must confront the challenge that China’s rising
power poses even if Chinese intentions are deemed to be peaceful
and nonaggressive. Indeed, as Koh suggests, Southeast Asians, for all
their wariness about China, perceive its rise not as a threat, but as an
opportunity and a challenge.226 Whether or not that is the case, Indian
defense planners are very wary of China, even though a substantial
rapprochement is underway between Beijing and New Delhi and
despite the fact that India, as its spokesmen regularly announce, will
not take part in a policy of open containment of China.227
Thus, while Indo-American strategic partnership—to whatever
degree that it exists—checks China’s ability to dominate Southeast
or Central Asia, that partnership cannot, for India at any rate,
become a vehicle for containment of China. One reason for India’s
calm vis-à-vis China is that, even as Chinese military and economic
capabilities grow, causing no small amount of anxiety among Indian
elites, so too do India’s similar capabilities. For example, India’s new
Agni II missile can reach targets throughout Central and East Asia,
including China. But it has refrained from testing the Agni III which
could clearly target China and thus provoke it into a missile race
with India.228 And if India continues building nuclear weapons like
ICBMs or SLBMs, it will truly have an intercontinental capability,
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not to mention an inter-theater one. Similarly, insofar as American
and Indian policymakers discuss a version of an “Asian NATO,” that
immediately arouses Chinese suspicions. So it is hardly surprising
that China immediately voiced concern about what this Asian NATO
might mean, and that it equally has been motivated to prevent
any kind of Indo-American alliance even if its analysts conform to
China’s policy line of downgrading Indian claims to being a major
power, even though Chinese analysts contend that such an alliance
is unlikely to be a serious one.229
Since the Indo-American partnership constitutes a major strategic
reversal from the past history of a troubled bilateral relationship,
this rapprochement made China’s government and armed forces
sit up and take notice and therefore rethink their relationship with
India.230 Indeed, China has gone so far as to publicly support Indian
membership on the Security Council.231 Thus the talk of an Asian
NATO, as well as the visible signs of partnership, has inclined
Beijing to deal more seriously with New Delhi in a departure from
its traditional policy of not wanting even to discuss the possibility of
India’s being a major Asian power.232 Indeed, China is now calling
for upgraded economic and military ties with India, a new departure
in its policies as well.233
Similarly, Tellis cites Indian views that India’s perceptions
of a threat from rising Chinese power do not mandate a direct
confrontation with China, but rather merely a buildup of India’s
own capabilities and resources for a subtle multidimensional policy.
Partnership with Washington then becomes a major, but still only
one, part of that multidimensional strategy that mixes regional
competition with engagement on issues of less strategic centrality,
sufﬁces to check China’s ambitions, and makes India more worthy of
being seen as a genuinely equal strategic partner of America in Asia.234
The many signs of an economic-political rapprochement with China
also suggest that Beijing is coming to terms with Indian power, and
that New Delhi believes that this recognition sufﬁces to maintain
a balance with China for the foreseeable future. Indeed, wherever
possible, cooperation on a broader scale than ever before with China
may well occur, even if many of the reasons for persisting suspicion
remain.235 Thus there is no apparent need for a formal alliance with
Washington as long as both partners understand and accept that
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the steady rise of India’s power at the current rate of economic and
military growth sufﬁces to check Chinese ambitions in Southeast and
South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Indeed, the ofﬁcial 1998-99 Indian
Defense Report, written soon after India’s nuclear tests displayed open
tension with China, already stated that India “does not regard China
as an adversary but as a great neighbor with which it would like to
develop mutually beneﬁcial and friendly relations.”236
Furthermore, Indian ofﬁcials from Prime Minister Singh on down,
profess not to be worried by China’s economic growth, even though
China clearly serves both as a rival and as a benchmark against
which to measure Indian economic progress. They profess to believe
that, because India is a democracy and China is not, India’s slower
rate of growth is not a problem because China’s political system
will enter into a crisis. Indeed, India’s rising proﬁle easily could
presage a fundamental and lasting strategic change throughout Asia,
especially if India can maintain a high rate of economic growth into
the future. Because India is a democracy, not only would economic
growth strengthen its overall capabilities, it probably also would
not unleash a major political crisis, something that many people
expect or fear for China if growth there continues at a high rate.237
Indeed, some observers report the possibly counterintuitive ﬁnding
that, “Indian policymakers are more conﬁdent than their Chinese
counterparts regarding their ability to deal effectively with domestic
ethnic and economic forces.”238
In the 1990s the concern that a rising China might economically and
politically isolate India from Southeast Asia led Indian policymakers,
inﬂuenced by world trends and ideas like the Gujral doctrine, to “look
East” even well before September 11.239 And ASEAN welcomed this
policy both for its own sake and obviously to serve as a potential
counterweight to China. Thus an Indonesian assessment of ASEAN
and cooperation in East Asia states that,
At this point some ASEAN countries view the entry of India into the
whole framework of cooperation as the strategic means to balance
the inﬂuence of Northeast Asian countries, which are much superior,
compared to those in Southeast Asia. This had been clearly reﬂected in an
analogy made by the Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong of Singapore that “if
ASEAN is a fuselage of an aircraft, and Northeast Asian economies serve
as one wing of the aircraft, then India’s engagement with Southeast Asia
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is—and should be viewed as—the other wing which made the aircraft
operational and stable.”240

Indeed, that Look East program, a clear response to the end
of the Cold War, aimed to upgrade diplomatic and economic
relations with the area and put them on a greater, expanded, and
regular footing. Once those objectives were accomplished, the
extension or projection of military capabilities was found to be less
objectionable by Southeast Asian governments than was previously
the case.241 However, Indian governments did so, not just to compete
economically and politically but also in line with their aspirations
to play a major role throughout Asia. This consensus concerning
India’s expansive interests throughout the entire Indian Ocean and
its littoral are rooted in India’s geography as it is refracted through
the prism of contemporary strategic capabilities (which very much
include economic, energy, and technological capabilities) and in
domestic Indian political discourse.
As virtually every analyst of Indian policy emphasizes, Indian
elites carry within themselves a mental map that says India is a state
that has a major power potential and future international importance
which should become a major “pole” in an ideally multipolar or
polycentric world. This polycentric or multipolar world where India
is one of the centers or poles is the ideal Indian goal, hence it is clear
that, despite partnership with Washington, there is considerable
skepticism about Washington’s penchant for unilateralism. Therefore
and despite the need for strategic partnership with America and other
major players, India must retain its strategic autonomy to pursue
its vital interests throughout its “extended strategic neighborhood,”
i.e., Asia from the Middle East to the Strait of Malacca.242 This
expanded strategic concept comprises not only classic military and/
or geostrategic perspectives but also a broader deﬁnition of security
and security interests.
Moreover, India has been expanding its strategic proﬁle steadily
throughout the Indian Ocean in recent years. Beyond the joint patrols
in the Strait of Malacca and the possible discussions with Australia
regarding the Indian Ocean, the Indian Navy is making port calls
in Vietnam, the Philippines, and even South Korea and Japan. In
July 2004, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia began coordinated
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antipiracy patrols there, too, and discussions between them and
India are taking place to see if the Indian Navy will join ASEAN
members in these patrols.243 In September, the Indian and Indonesian
Navies began patrolling the area west of the Straits known as the
Six-Degree Channel that separates the Indian island of Nicobar
from Indonesia’s island of Sabang and the coast of Aceh and which
is home to virtually all the commercial trafﬁc entering or leaving
the Straits. These activities, as well as Indian naval maneuvers and
exercises with the U.S. Navy off of Goa and in the Arabian Sea region,
underscore India’s arrival as a major player in Asia and reﬂect the
implementation of Vajpayee’s directives even after his government’s
defeat.
The enhanced Indian naval proﬁle in Southeast Asia serves several
objectives. One is to strengthen India’s so-called “Look East” policy
that is intended in part to balance China’s inﬂuence in the eastern
Indian Ocean region (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand,
Myanmar, etc.) and in Southeast Asia. A second is to familiarize the
navy with a potential theater of operations—the South China Sea—
that probably would be important in any contingency involving
conﬂict with China. India’s naval presence in this region also is likely
intended to help stymie the apparent ﬂow of arms across the Bay of
Bengal to insurgents in India’s northeast and to the Tamil Tigers in
Sri Lanka. Finally, as stated by an Indian Navy spokesperson, the
deployment would also demonstrate the navy’s ability to operate
far from home. Taken together, these latest naval initiatives, in
conjunction with an October air exercise with Singapore in Central
India, ongoing Indian base-building efforts in Tajikistan and possibly
elsewhere soon in Central Asia, the ﬁnalization of a defense pact
with Sri Lanka and newly strengthened security ties with Myanmar
all underscore India’s strategic emergence as a major player in the
broad Asia-Paciﬁc region.244
Clearly India’s and China’s rising capabilities in economics and
defense already impel them to expand their interests even beyond
South and East Asia. Both of them will also try to co-opt Washington
to support them, if need be, against each other, or in their interactions
with other Asian states. Washington, for its part, will also exploit
latent Indo-Chinese rivalry for its interests which include, inter alia,
holding the balance in South and East Asia.245 Since the United States
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will likely remain the strongest power in Asia for a generation, its
role in conditioning Sino-Indian interactions in Asia absolutely is
critical. As Mark Frazier writes of Indo-Chinese relations, “future
relations between the two states will remain ﬁrmly embedded
within a triangle formed with the United States.”246 At the same
time, local actors in Southeast Asia will also be engaging China,
India, and America, thereby multiplying the complexity of local and
international interactions.
While there is a current Indian rapprochment with Beijing and
a search for common grounds and increased economic interaction,
this does not mean that the two states’ rivalry is over—far from it.
But for now and the immediate future, that rivalry will be limited
by the interests and capabilities of India, China, and all the other
states they engage in this region, including America. For now, the
mainstream Indian view is that India must be wary of China, but
that no serious threat presently exists. However, the future may
bring undesirable changes in that regard unless Indian growth keeps
pace with China’s growth. Therefore, even if we assume China to
be a strategic competitor for both India and Washington, the major
architect of a strategy to tie India down to being a contested power
in South Asia and a state that cannot play a major role in Asia, e.g.,
by major proliferation to Pakistan, it is by no means foreordained,
indeed it is unlikely, that Washington and New Delhi will reply to
that strategy by implementing their own concerted version of the
containment of China.247
U.S. leaders are on record as saying that current relations with
China are at an all-time high and that a ﬂourishing partnership with
Beijing is now taking place.248 Thus current U.S. strategy to China
is not exclusively a containment strategy and the future course of
those relations depends upon events in Beijing and Washington,
if not places which neither can control, like North Korea. None of
this diminishes the element of competition in our ties to China or in
India’s ties to it. But it does mean that Indo-American collaboration,
strategic partnership, or even alliance need not inevitably replicate
the Cold War containment of the Soviet Union. Indeed, as Arun
Sahgal writes, despite both sides’ concern to understand and limit
the possible negative consequences of China’s rising power, India
“is clear that a long-term Indo-U.S. relationship cannot be based and
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sustained on the China containment theory.”249
Instead, strategic partnership with America, plus improving
relations with other key states in Asia, enables India to have the best
of both worlds, partnership with Washington and other key actors,
and the strategic autonomy to engage with whomever it chooses
whenever it wants to do so. As Mark Frazier writes,
Given the importance of retaining its foreign policy autonomy, India
will be reluctant to stake its future on an exclusive alliance with the
United States. Instead, India will develop multifaceted, ﬂexible security
relationships that also involve Japan, Russia, and ASEAN. The underlying
purpose of Indian strategy is thus to signal to China that India can become
part of an anti-China coalition, should China take stances that threaten
the security of its neighbors.250

This strategy grows out of the aforementioned assessment of
India’s elite consensus on China and informs all of India’s regional
policies in Asia. Direct confrontation with China is ruled out in
favor of economic-political cooperation and muted strategic rivalry
whenever possible. Thus there is no apparent need for a formal alliance
with America, as long as both partners understand and accept that
the steady rise of India’s power at the current rate of economic and
military growth and its strategic partnership with America sufﬁces
to check Chinese ambitions in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the
Indian Ocean. Moreover, India’s own steady and impressive rising
power potential demonstrates the power of the democratic option in
Asia and stands in stark contrast to Chinese authoritarianism, which
many fear will run inevitably into a major domestic crisis. In that case,
an Indo-American partnership will be strengthened by its being “an
axis of democracy,” not a purely military alliance whose purpose
is containment of China.251 And this is true even if India is in favor
or not averse to further U.S. deployments in the region or if some
sort of alliance along the lines of the so-called Asian NATO comes
into being.252 As that alliance has yet to take shape, it could become
like today’s NATO, a crisis manager and provider of stability, rather
than replicating the Cold War alliance.
On the other hand, China and India currently are undergoing
major military buildups, and there is a more honest awareness in
both capitals of strategic rivalry and of the need to take each other
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into account as strategic factors than was previously the case. In large
measure, this mutual realization is due to the fact that the 1998 nuclear
tests awoke China to the reality that India would not be deterred
from its aspirations to play a major role in Asia. Therefore, Beijing
had to take the potential trajectory of rising Indian military and
economic capabilities more seriously than it had ever been willing to
do beforehand or than it is willing to admit.253 Indeed, many Chinese
analysts perceive the burgeoning partnership with the United States
as more than an expression of India’s efforts to carve out a greater
role in Asia. They see this partnership as part of a joint, if generally
American-led, effort to encircle China, or at least to contain it. While
ofﬁcial China does not mention the possibility of encirclement or
of a formal Indo-U.S. alliance in keeping with China’s policy to say
nothing that might give rise to the idea that India is a legitimate
major player in Asia, undoubtedly this perception does color some
of China’s views and may actually be a major feature in its post-1998
efforts to improve diplomatic relations with India.254
Both China’s concerns about this partnership and its efforts to
improve ties with New Delhi work to the advantage of both partners
here because these factors reduce China’s margin for threatening
behavior, create a broader Asiatic balance than would otherwise be
the case, and enhance the U.S. position vis-à-vis those two states,
and in Asia more generally, making it the focus of each side’s effort
to gain greater leverage and traction in Asia.255 Consequently,
enhanced bilateral military partnership and arms sales to India
offers Washington another card to play when needed and provides
both states with an ever-present factor of restraint that acts upon
Chinese policy. It also is clear that India’s military buildup, while
parallel to China’s, does not have to be as comprehensive as China’s
to counter Chinese expansionist ambitions. As long as that Indian
buildup sufﬁces to check or to constrain Chinese strategic options,
helping it represents a sound investment for the United States. In
this respect, the overall picture bears out the Indian argument
presented here concerning India’s ability to check excessive Chinese
ambitions. Even Chinese sources hint (because they do not wish to
discuss this openly) that this is what is transpiring under cover of
Washington’s rapprochements with India and other key countries
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like Indonesia.256
To the extent that Indian power, backed up and promoted
by Washington, contributes to an overall Asian framework that
restrains the projection of Chinese power, it will foster a broader,
more comprehensive Asiatic equilibrium that keeps all powers in
play and prevents any one power from making a bid for regional
or continental hegemony. Indeed, Indian analysts are conﬁdent of
such an outcome.257 It should be noted that precisely such a balance
of power is postulated in the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2002 as
being a desirable outcome of U.S. policy in Asia.258 So this concept of
Indo-Chinese relations ultimately closely correlates with U.S. goals
as well.259 Certainly Chinese observers have assimilated fully the
notion, reiterated by the Pentagon and the Indian government, that
India and America “have common strategic interests in Asia and
even farther regions.”260
Obviously Southeast Asia is one of those regions. And here, as
elsewhere,
Beijing cannot afford to place much faith in the common Sino-Indian
desire for “multipolarity” because American unipolarity offers India
geopolitical advantages that are far more attractive to New Delhi than
any prospective multipolarity that brings with it grave imbalances in
future Sino-Indian power.261

In Southeast Asia, this observation is relevant particularly since
China has so many historic, vital, and now growing strategic and
economic interests in the area that its rising capabilities are perceived
immediately as somehow opening the way to a sphere of inﬂuence.
While India will not represent or present an overt challenge to China,
Beijing’s growing regional power stimulates its counterefforts and
lends credence to the elite consensus that rising Chinese power here
signiﬁes Beijing’s attempt to move into Southeast Asia to encircle
India.262 This rivalry is particularly visible as regards Myanmar and
its neighborhood.263
Thus, observers like Tellis perceive three overarching Indian
strategic objectives here, many of which can be seen to harmonize
with U.S. interests as well. The ﬁrst objective is to prevent China
from acquiring foreign basing and presence that could threaten the
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Indian homeland and its freedom of action in South Asia. The second
objective is to prevent China from acquiring sufﬁcient regional
inﬂuence so as to be able to coerce the local states into supporting
Chinese policies aimed at undercutting Indian security. The third
objective is to develop strategic relationships with the key states that
enable India to operate within the region as required, and to extend
support that may be requested by its regional partners.264
These objectives mandate for India a strategy that unites the use
of defense and economic instruments of power in Southeast Asia. At
the same time, America’s recent success in projecting naval based
air power from the Indian Ocean to Afghanistan also is not lost on
Indian planners who also know that much of Pakistan’s and India’s
trade is seaborne and therefore particularly vulnerable to maritime or
maritime-based air threats. That consideration is especially pertinent
to energy supplies, given instability in Central Asia and the Gulf and
adds another reason for a combined military-economic approach to
regional security issues in Southeast Asia.
These strategic considerations, in an environment where India’s
increasing ability to project power beyond its borders has also long
been recognized, bring together economic needs and the impetus for
a big navy and an expansive naval policy as detailed above.265 For
example, India has not only used its naval deployments to show its
interest in restraining Chinese penetration of Myanmar, it has also
offered economic assistance and help in the government’s campaign
against terorists to enhance its security. And as a result, the Burmese
Foreign Ministry has assured India that any Chinese military activity
on the Coco Islands off the Burma coast in the Bay of Bengal “will not
be used as a military base by any power against India.”266 Although
Indian interests in Southeast Asia are not quite as sharply focused as
they are in Central Asia, they are no less real for Indian strategists.
Not surprisingly, Indian analysts frequently invoke old strategic
and Realpolitik perspectives in India’s quest for regional hegemony
in the Indian Ocean, including the waters off Southeast Asia. And
they are hardly alone in their approach. Here the clear and speciﬁc
threat that both precedes and will follow the current terrorist threat
is Chinese commercial and maritime penetration (which in Indian
threat assessments are one and the same with the ships following
the trade) into the Indian Ocean, particularly Myanmar and more
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recently Pakistan’s port of Gwadar.267 If China were to achieve the
goals imputed to it by Indian elites, it could then actualize the three
268
potential threats to India from Southeast Asia that Tellis cited.
Therefore the Indian policy response, most notably in its “Look
East” policy of the past decade, has combined military and economic
programs and both bilateral and multilateral fora, though until
recently it has been primarily commercial and diplomatic. India
participates in ASEAN’s talks to create a free trade area (FTA).269 It
appears that the major thrust of India’s foreign economic diplomacy
here is to push for agreements that incorporate it and Southeast Asia
in a formalized free trade regime. Thus India has supported a variety
of initiatives spanning both South Asian and Southeast Asian states
that would move in this direction.270 India also participates in the
ARF and was clearly invited into it as a hedge against China.
India is also steadily upgrading its commercial and arms sales
relationship with Vietnam, which it clearly regards as a principal
check upon China’s aggrandizement in the vicinity of the South
China Sea and Southeast Asia. Apparently ASEAN also increasingly
is persuaded that a closer association with India is useful to it for
this same purpose of balancing China in the South China Sea and
Southeast Asia.271 Therefore, as long as India employs a diversiﬁed
strategy using both economic and military instruments of power and
avoids perceptions that it seeks to export South Asia’s dilemmas,
including its rivalry with Pakistan, to the area, it should be able to
support its and ASEAN’s goal of helping ASEAN become strong
enough to ward off either Chinese blandishments or coercion.272
For India, Southeast Asia is not just important as a place for
trade rivalry with the dynamic Chinese economy and as a strategic
or potentially strategic theater for Indian inﬂuence, it also has an
important bearing on energy security. Based on extensive interviews
with Indian military and political ﬁgures, Juli MacDonald reports
that,
Indians look to Southeast Asia to diversify their energy imports away
from West Asia. Indians anticipate that India will rely increasingly on
Southeast Asia’s abundant natural gas to meet its growing demand
for that fuel. [In addition] several retired Indian military ofﬁcers spoke
of rising Islamic fundamentalism and instability in Indonesia as a
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combination that at best provides safe havens for terrorists and at worst
could destabilize the entire region. Indians see Indonesia as a key, and
increasingly fragile, part of India’s strategic periphery.273

Clearly India and Indian spokesmen also are not afraid to advertise
that all of Southeast Asia, including the Eastern reaches of the
Indian Ocean and at least some of the land mass adjoining the South
China Sea, also constitutes either part of India’s “extended strategic
neighborhood” or part of a single strategic unit. Consequently, they
readily proclaim that Indian security interests span “the region
from the Gulf to Southeast Asia.”274 They do so even though some
American military perspectives do not envision India as more than a
secondary player in the Eastern reaches of the Indian Ocean whose
interests might one day come into conﬂict with the vital U.S. interest
of controlling and/or denying access into the Indian Ocean.275
Indeed, MacDonald found that Indian ofﬁcers and policymakers
claim that India needs no U.S. “blessing” to confer “legitimacy”
upon its presence there, as local governments have already done so
after substantive consultation.276
She also found that, while India and America concur concerning
a harmony of shared interests against common threats—terrorism,
piracy, concern for the safety of SLOCs, counterdrug, environmental
pollution, counterproliferation, and search and rescue operations—
Indians have an expansive view of their responsibilities there that is
much grander than what the Americans she interviewed are ready
to concede. Thus a retired Indian lieutenant general opined to her
that Indo-American collaboration in the Indian Ocean basin helps
expand the relationship and perception of India from the IndoPakistani conﬂict, restricts the rise of Chinese power, and protects
sea lanes.277 He further elaborated that,
The Indian Ocean basin is extremely important to India. India seeks to
prevent this region from becoming an area of turbulence and competition
among the navies of this region. India wants to keep China out of the
Indian Ocean. This means that the Indian Navy must be strengthened.
It must bolster its bases in the region, including the Eastern Command
on the Nicobar Islands. It must work with other navies to protect the
sea lanes and enhance all maritime security in India’s EEZ (Economic
Exclusion Zone).278
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Not surprisingly, India has followed his recommendations, even
without waiting for the United States to “bless” its policies. India
reorganized its naval command to create an Andaman and Nicobar
Island command for the Fleet at Port Blair in the Bay of Bengal in
2001 to monitor China’s presence in Myanmar and the Indian Ocean
more broadly. In December 2003, India also announced that it would
reinforce those bases by basing strike jets, aerial refuelers, and about
100 long, short, and middle range unmanned aerial vehicles there to
monitor developments at China’s Coco Island base.279 The AndamanNicobar command at Port Blair,
Is tasked with exerting inﬂuence over Indian Ocean sea-lanes, combating
piracy, and guaranteeing the smooth entry of ships heading toward the
Malacca Straits. It also includes surveillance and monitoring stations
across the 750 Km long Andaman and Nicobar Archipelago. The islands
are 1,200 km from India, but just 90 Km from Indonesia and 50 Km from
Myanmar. The Indian Air Force plans on establishing a ﬁghter air base
at southern Nicobar, giving its newly acquired Russian Su-30MKI (sea
based ﬁghters)—likely to be based there from time to time—an extended
regional role.280

India is increasing military sales to Vietnam, providing spares for
overhauling its aged MiG-21 series ﬁghter aircraft with new avionics
and radars to support Russia’s latest missiles, including the R-77
AMRAAMSKI and R-27 DOGFIGHT, sending its ofﬁcers to Vietnam
for training in counterinsurgency and jungle warfare operations,
while India’s coast guard and Vietnam’s sea police would cooperate
to ﬁght piracy. India also is providing help to build up the Vietnamese
Navy, including repairs, upgrading, and construction of warships
and patrol craft. Reciprocal visits by senior military ofﬁcers and
regular intelligence exchanges are also part of the agreement with
Hanoi, and India has also agreed “in principle” to sell Vietnam the
locally developed surface-to-surface Prithvi missile, train Vietnamese
scientists in India’s nuclear establishments, and help Vietnam
establish its own arms industry for small arms and other kinds of
ordnance.281 The Indian Navy also conducted combined exercises
with the Vietnamese Navy.282 As one writer observed, “India needs
Vietnam in strategic terms as a spear in the Chinese underbelly to
counter the threatening Beijing-Islamabad-Rangoon entente now
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taking shape against New Delhi.”283 The BJP government has also
sent some ships to Southeast Asia on goodwill missions, during
which they took part in naval maneuvers with Japan and Vietnam.
The exercises and policy actions cited above are also evidence of
this growing naval capability and interest in power projection. The
Navy is also proposing an amphibious force towards achieving this
capability.284 Clearly the Navy, if not the government, regards itself
as a force for stability and a security manager in the Indian Ocean and
its littoral against a range of threats that encompasses much, if not
all, of the spectrum of conﬂict, including humanitarian operations,
guaranteeing energy supplies, and controlling the strategic choke
points of the Indian Ocean.285
The Indian government and Navy also are implementing
Fernandes’ 2000 statement that Vietnam and Japan are emerging
as strategic partners for countering piracy from the Indian Ocean
east to the South China Sea. By doing so, they also serve notice on
286
China that they will contest its efforts to dominate that Sea. India’s
increasing defense ties to Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Singapore
(agreeing in principle to letting Singapore train its forces on Indian
territory) must also be seen in this light of a common concern about
Chinese power in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, a vital lifeline
for both states.287
Signifying its desire for a visible and favorable strategic proﬁle,
India also committed itself to respecting the agreement on a nuclearfree Southeast Asia even though it refuses to sign the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). As one commentator indicates, this shows
India’s willingness to compromise on strategic issues for the sake of
improved relations with Southeast Asia despite Pakistan and China’s
nuclear arsenals.288 Given the linked energy, trade, and strategic
issues tying this region to India and due to the presence of Islamic
terrorism and a sharp rise in piracy here (perhaps not unconnected
with that terrorism), it is clear that this region enjoys a rising proﬁle
in Indian and American security calculations, and that it, like Central
Asia and the Gulf, reinforces the intertwined nature of energy,
economic, and strategic factors in India’s security calculations.289
Therefore, it is not unlikely that further progress towards a bilateral
military and strategic partnership with the United States will include
serious discussions about security trends and both sides’ interests
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throughout Southeast Asia and its adjoining maritime reaches. But
beyond that, at least some Indian analysts think that it is very much
in Washington’s interest that India play a substantially larger role
here.
What’s in it for the United States? For one, the proposed security
system is principally an in-region solution for dealing with two of the
biggest international security threats—an over-ambitious China and
the spread of Talibanised Islam. Second, this scheme being entirely
indigenous, there is none of the odium that attends on U.S. troops
deployed locally as in South Korea and Japan. Third, it can eventuate
in more economical and even effective policing of the proximal Asian
waters against piracy, drug-trafﬁcking, and gun running. It could also
protect the sea lines of communications and the oil-bearing oceanic
trafﬁc more effectively than the U.S. naval ﬂeets and air ﬂights out
of Sasebo Bay and Guam may be able to manage. And, ﬁnally, it in
no way precludes the presence in the extended region of the U.S.
armed forces or limits U.S. military initiatives. But crucial to making
this system work is India’s being convinced of its “manifest destiny”
and for it to act forcefully. It will require in the main that New Delhi
think geostrategically and give up its difﬁdence when it comes to
advancing the country’s vital national interests and its almost kneejerk bias to appease friends and foes alike. The corrective lies in the
Indian government expressly deﬁning its strategic interests and focus
and, at a minimum, proceeding expeditiously towards obtaining a
nuclear force with a proven and tested thermonuclear and an ICBM
reach. Nothing less will persuade the putative Asian allies that India
can be an effective counterpoise to China in the region, or compel
respect for India in Washington.290
Two conclusions emerge from this discussion of Indian activities
and interests in Southeast Asia. First, India’s own actions and
outlooks, combined with growing U.S. interests and the stress on
U.S. military capabilities, should impel both governments to initiate
a sustained bilateral discussion on roles, interests, threat perceptions,
and responsibilities throughout that area. Second, we should not
underestimate the importance attached by India to all of Southeast
Asia. Beyond Vietnam, India might ﬁnd possibilities for enhanced
defense cooperation with Thailand, Australia, Singapore, Indonesia,
and the United States, either bilaterally or in a multilateral forum
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with some or all of these states. There are many dimensions for this
kind of cooperation to take shape, e.g., provision of intelligence
support and training in the war against terror, patrolling the Strait
of Malacca, or as a supplier of military technology and parts to local
militaries.291 Indeed, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL), one of
India’s leading defense ﬁrms, seeks to become an aviation industry
hub for Southeast Asia, and India seeks to become, in general, a hub
for missile building programs throughout Asia, and even Africa.292
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CHAPTER 7
PRACTICAL MILITARY COOPERATION
As India’s April 2001 agenda indicates, it is critically important
to India that America treat it as an equal and that this relationship
lead to “partnership where security cooperation played a prominent
role.” India wants both the respect it feels has not been forthcoming in
the past and sustained security cooperation with the United States.293
Therefore, its practical military actions in cooperation with the U.S.
military or in support of American interests have a dual goal, not
just to improve the relationship but also to show Washington how
important and useful an ally India can be. Certainly many ofﬁcers
in the U.S. armed forces have come to know the high quality of
India’s Navy, Air Force, and Army and on these grounds alone
recommend greater military cooperation with India in general and
with these services in particular.294 At the same time, these actions
are or at least should be clearly undertaken as well out of hardheaded calculations of national interest on both sides because they
add substantially to both sides’ capabilities to realize their vital and
important Asian security interests. For example, General William J.
Begert, Commander of the U.S. Paciﬁc Air Forces (PACAF), stated
that, “The increased interaction between U.S. and Indian military
services helps U.S. efforts to reduce tensions between India and its
neighbor, Pakistan.”295 Yet, a full strategic appreciation of the beneﬁts
of bilateral military collaboration was absent from the Pentagon, at
least as of September 2004.296
By practical defense cooperation, we mean not only joint
and/or combined exercises among and between the forces of the
two governments but also a regular cycle of mutual high-level
interchanges among both political and military leaders, intelligence
sharing and cooperation, and the forging of practical cooperation on
security issues like missile defense, weapons sales, and technology
transfer. From everything that has been written, it is clear that these
manifestations of cooperation are important, if not critical, to both
India and the United States in their relations with key allies and
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partners. Therefore, the indices and trend lines of such occurrences
represent a telling sign of the health and direction of the relationship
over time. Moreover, they also represent substantive progress to the
establishment of viable and credible mechanisms for continuous
strategic dialogue and interaction and provide this relationship with
a basis for further advances.
For example, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
Richard Myers (USAF) traveled to India in July 2003 for talks with
his Indian counterpart and discussed ongoing bilateral military ties.
In his own words, he did so because “Not only is India’s cooperation
in the global war on terrorism signiﬁcant, but the U.S.-India military
cooperation continues to increase, an important fact, given that India
will soon have the largest population in the world.”297 In this respect,
General Myers’ visit is only the most recent of what Blackwill called
“a continual parade” of high-ranking U.S. ofﬁcials’ visits to India
and six major joint exercises as of December 2002.298 These visits
also comprise a similar “parade” of high-ranking Indian ofﬁcials,
including Prime Minister Vajpayee, to Washington.299 Moreover, the
interaction among ofﬁcials at the highest ranks of government and
of high-ranking military ofﬁcers provides a valuable mechanism
for continuous interaction and cooperation beyond exercises.
Thus, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and former Secretary
of State Colin Powell have traveled there frequently, and former
National Security Advisor, now Secretary of State Condoleeza
Rice was in frequent contact with her opposite number, Brajesh
Mishra, who traveled frequently to Washington. Likewise, over 100
senior policymakers traveled to India from late 2001 to December
2002.300 The practical materialization of this kind of regular contact
expresses itself in the joint DPG that was reestablished in 2001 with
Undersecretary of Defense Douglas J. Feith in the lead for the U.S.
side. The invigoration of the DPG paralleled the equal strengthening
of the U.S.-India Joint Working Group (JWG) on Counter-Terrorism
and the ongoing bilateral economic dialogue.301 At its initial meeting
on December 4, 2001, the DPG went beyond exchanging views
on the progress of the campaign against terrorism to that point in
Afghanistan and elsewhere.
Noting that both India and the United States have been targets
of terrorism, the two sides agreed to add a new emphasis in their
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defense cooperation on counterterrorism initiatives, including
expanding mutual support in this area. The two sides also recognized
the importance of joint counterproliferation efforts to achieve the
goals of their defense cooperation.302
At these meetings the DPG also committed its members to an
increased pace of high-level dialogues, bilateral military exchanges
and other combined activities, including programs for combined
humanitarian airlift, special operations training, small unit air/
ground exercises, naval combined personnel exchange and
familiarization, and combined training between the U.S. Marines and
corresponding Indian forces. The DPG also established an ongoing
security cooperation group to manage the defense supply relationship
which is a critical part from India’s standpoint, if not America’s, of
this relationship and agreed to discuss “bilateral ties in the ﬁeld
of defense production and research, military planning, India’s tri303
service doctrine and tri-service institutions.” As President Bush
had already waived sanctions imposed on India for its nuclear tests,
the DPG also took up the critical issue of arms sales and announced
that,
The two sides underscored the importance of a stable, long-term defense
supply relationship as part of the overall strategic cooperation between
India and the United States. Since the waiver of sanctions, a number
of applications for export licenses have been approved by the U.S.
Departments of State and Defense and are in the process of notiﬁcation to
Congress. These include licenses such as that related to weapon locating
radars. The U.S. also agreed to expeditious review of India’s acquisition
priorities, including Engines and Systems for Light Combat Aircraft,
radars, multi-mission maritime aircraft, and components for jet trainers
and high performance jet engines. To assist this licensing and sales
process in the future, the two sides have resolved to establish a separate
Security Cooperation Group to manage
the defense supply relationship
304
between India and the United States.

In January 2002, the JWG on Counter-Terrorism met in New
Delhi and was led by Mishra and Ambassador Francis Taylor, the
State Department’s “point man” on terrorism. It discussed ﬁnalizing
the project of creating the sale of U.S. electronic sensors to be used
on the international border with Pakistan and which could be placed
on the disputed Line of Control (LOC) dividing Indian and Pakistani
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controlled Kashmir. India then claimed that this outcome constituted
an ofﬁcial American recognition of Pakistan’s support for “terrorist”
inﬁltration across the border.305 Since then the DPG has further
expanded its remit so that its discussions now include virtually all
aspects of the bilateral agenda. For example, at its meetings on June
1-3, 2004, the DPG’s agenda was expected to include,
The entire gamut of Indo-U.S. defense relations including strategic
issues, joint exercises, training and acquisition. . . . The talks will also
review counterterrorism requirements of India, terrorism, proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, security of sea lanes in the Indian Ocean,
and peace and stability in Asia.306

Subsequent reports indicated the growing convergence of views on
these issues.307
Finally, another bilateral working group on cyber-terrorism was
also set up in 2001-02. This “Cyber Security Forum” has an extensive
program of action to address cyberterrorism and information
security.308 Thus this forum connects as well to the broader agencies
that are cooperating on Counter-Terrorism and intelligence sharing.
This sharing became possible in January 2002 when Fernandes signed
a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)
with Washington and has particular relevance as both sides try
to determine the extent to which Pakistan may or may not have
reduced, if not terminated, terrorist inﬁltration into Kashmir.309
Judging from remarks by Blackwill and Ambassador to Pakistan
Nancy Powell, as well as Indian intelligence ﬁndings through 2003,
not enough had happened in that regard to justify optimism.310
However, it does appear that in 2004, in no small measure thanks to
U.S. pressure, the ﬂow of terrorists to Jammu and Kashmir and the
incidence of terrorist operations there had abated noticeably already
after 2002. 311
The establishment of new agencies and invigoration of existing
fora for cooperation shows that despite obstacles, a real structure
for enhanced and routine cooperation that both sides can use if they
wish to is taking root. Cooperation through these working groups
and other bodies encompasses exercises, intelligence sharing, trade
and economic relations, defense and technology transfers and joint
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Counter-Terrorist activities. Thus the framework for expanded
cooperation, particularly as seen in continuing visits, working group,
and other agency meetings and exercises is vibrant and expanding.
Combined Exercises.
Six major combined exercises were carried out in 2002, and
Myers’ remarks cited above, as well as the author’s conversations
with members of the various services of PACOM, indicate that
more and perhaps bigger ones, either in number or in scope, will
take place. These exercises will also move from being tactical ones to
encompassing larger units. Thus they will have a more operational
nature.312 At the DPG meeting in August 2003, the participants
registered their satisfaction at the expansion of these forms of
cooperation since 2002. Those exercises include:
Combined special forces counterinsurgency exercise in Northeast India:
Combined Air Force exercise in Alaska; Complex naval exercises on the
East Coast of India; Delivery of “Fireﬁnder” radars to India; Senior-level
missile defense talks; and conclusion of a master information exchange
agreement to facilitate cooperation in research and development of
defense technologies.313

However, there were more exercises than those described here.
For instance, there was a bilateral airlift and supply exercise in India
from October 20-26, 2002.314 Nor does the DPG’s concise description
of exercises capture their full range. A report of the ofﬁcial visit of
Chief of India’s Naval Staff Admiral Madhvendra Singh in September
2002 observed that,
As part of the growing Indo-U.S. Defense cooperation, naval interaction
between the two countries has intensiﬁed this year with the commencement
of the Straits of Malacca joint escort mission in April; several port visits
by U.S. naval ships to India followed by passing exercises; and a big
increase in the number of Indian naval ofﬁcers training in the U.S., the
revival of the “Malabar” series of annual joint exercises (Malabar 2002)
scheduled in the Indian Ocean next month; and the Search and Rescue
exercises scheduled later this year; are further signiﬁcant milestones in
this cooperation.315
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The Malabar exercise (Malabar IV) involved surface, subsurface, and
air operations, and an exchange of both sides’ aural and electronic
signatures, giving some idea of its scope. And as they are scheduled
to expand in size and sophistication in 2005, they exemplify the
progressive trends in bilateral military relationships.316
The U.S. Army also plays a key role in these exercises. In
October 2002, Indian and U.S. Army and Air Force personnel from
the PACOM carried out an exercise in Alaska. This exercise, the
second of two such airborne joint exercises during 2002, aimed to
have each side learn from the other’s experience and procedures
towards achieving “interoperability.” Both countries’ forces carried
out parachute drops, scouting/airborne assault missions, and
various levels of joint ﬁring exercises in conditions of cold and
wet weather. Such exercises in these climates are very relevant to
potential scenarios in Kashmir, the Himalayas, and potential winter
operations in the Afghan mountains. The earlier exercise at Agra in
May 2002 rehearsed such operations in vastly different but equally
relevant climactic conditions, i.e., desert-like conditions which were
particularly relevant in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, respectively.317 Finally, in September
2003 U.S. Special Forces conducted a combined exercise with
Indian commandos based in Jammu and Kashmir. These exercises,
conducted in high altitude, dry, and rocky terrain similar to that in
which Osama Bin Laden is reported to be hiding, fostered greater
interoperability among the forces involved and helped train U.S.
forces in terrain that would otherwise not be available to them in
the United States. The forces involved conducted rock-climbing,
surveillance, and a cliff assault using the latest infantry weapons
needed for operations behind enemy lines.318
Beyond these exercises, other forms of cooperation to upgrade
interoperability, intelligence sharing, and planning are taking place.
The U.S. Joint Staff and India’s IDS have established a normal
relationship to discuss planning and triservice doctrine as envisioned
by the DPG. Likewise, the U.S. and Indian Defense Intelligence
Agencies have instituted a formal relationship and both militaries
are discussing doctrinal issues. Washington has requested that U.S.
troops be allowed to attend training courses at India’s prestigious
Jungle Warfare School at Vairangte, Mizoram, and the High Altitude
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Warfare School at Gulmarg in Kashmir. The former request has been
accepted, while the second request is pending as of this writing.319 In
return, Indian defense ofﬁcials are seeking to increase Indian forces’
participation in American institutions of military education and
training and increased use of the International Military Education
and Training (IMET) program.320 Finally, according to Australian
analyst Ian Storey,
Future exercises are likely to include larger-scale Malabar exercises, while
the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the U.S. Air Force (USAF) are planning
joint combat exercises involving ﬁghter aircraft including IAF MiG-29s
and Sukhoi-30 “Flankers” and USAF F-15C “Eagles” and F-16 “Fighting
Falcons.” The USA speciﬁcally requested joint air exercises with the IAF’s
SU-30s [the best Russia makes—author] as the USAF wants to familiarize
itself with this kind of ﬁghter [Su-30s also are operated by the Chinese
Air Force—original]. 321

Thus these exercises are comprehensive and growing in scope,
provide numerous beneﬁts to all the services involved, and have
immediate operational and tactical relevance beyond the strategic
point of instituting and establishing durable working relationships
among both sides’ forces and ofﬁcers. Jane’s Defence Weekly published
a list of combined exercises in 2004. The Air Forces conducted
Operation “COPE INDIA 04” in February and COOPERATIVE
COPE THUNDER in June. In November 2003 the two Navies
conducted Malabar 04 exercises that were followed by Search and
Rescue exercises through 2003-04 and an anti-submarine warfare
(ASW) exercise in April 2004. In 2004, the Indian and U.S. Armies
conducted Army Aviation exchanges, a peacekeeping operations
workshop, the continuing special forces ‘Iroquois’ series of exercises,
and Operation YUDH AABHYAS 04. And the Marines conducted a
High Altitude Artillery exercise in November 2003.322 But beyond
these signs of a deepening and expanding relationship, these
exercises provide the immensely important foundation of shared
experiences, understanding, and training that make it possible to go
beyond exercises and even smaller, though important, operations
like Search and Rescue to talk seriously about combined operational
planning. Indeed, the evidence of recent exercises with India’s Air
Forces in Operation COOPERATIVE COPE THUNDER has forced
87

us to rethink the issue of whether the F-15 is, in fact, superior to
Russian made Su-27, Su-30, and even older MiG-21 Fighters armed
with Russia’s AA-10 Air-to-Air missiles.323 So there is no doubt of the
importance and beneﬁts of these exercises to both sides.
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CHAPTER 8
TOWARD ALLIANCE?:
ASIAN NATO, BASES, AND IRAQ
These combined Indo-American exercises and the high level of
intergovernmental and intermilitary dialogues are all essential to
the creation of a durable partnership, if not alliance. They establish
trust; a sound knowledge base of both sides’ interests, capabilities,
and objectives; predictability; and mutual conﬁdence among the
players. They also create overlapping and routinely functioning
mechanisms of communication and dialogue between the two sides.
All those attributes are essential ingredients of a successful alliance.
If there really will be an Asian NATO or some other kind of as yet
undeﬁned alliance, those exercises and dialogues would constitute
the foundation of that alliance. But for an alliance to materialize,
there has to be resolution and concord concerning its purpose and
both sides’ contribution to the realization of each other’s interests
and objectives, especially mutual defense. Otherwise partnership
on an ad hoc basis and warm, but noncommittal, relations will be
the best we could hope for. We see these points or considerations
emerging with special clarity as regards the discussions concerning
an Asian NATO.
At present it is unclear exactly what that entails, although some
aspects appear to have been hinted at in the press. In his campaign
to expand the scope of the bilateral partnership with New Delhi,
Blackwill also strongly urged the administration to invigorate
“military-to-military relationships with those Asian states that share
our democratic values and national interests,” i.e., India.324 America
thereby would not only strengthen its position in the GWOT, but
also more generally in the Indian Ocean and largely at Russia and
China’s expense. Thus some see in this Asian NATO an updated
version of the old Cold War Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO) alliance or containment of China during the Cold War.325
Others like Professor Madhav Nalapat, an advisor to India’s National
Security Council, who is close to Dr. Andrew Marshall, Director of the
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Ofﬁce of Net Assessment, argue for such an alliance to “defend
democratic values and exclude countries with authoritarian
structures or religious states. The test [for membership of such an
alliance] is whether people enjoy equal rights under the law and the
democratic freedoms that this alliance would defend.”326
Such statements suggest that there is, or at least was during
Vajpayee’s tenure, considerable interest in ofﬁcial and semi-ofﬁcial
circles about the possibility of such an alliance.327 The fact that this
deﬁnition also excludes Pakistan and China is not lost on either
side. But it also suggests what at least some Indians want out of it.
However, beyond an alliance against or to contain China and/or
Pakistan that would overtly restore bipolarity in Asia—something
that nobody in either government has espoused—there are clearly
some Indian elites who view any alliance with America as allowing
for a substantial expansion of India’s political-military reach to the
areas outlined above. In other words, partnership with America will
not only realize Washington’s but also New Delhi’s agenda, which
are both expansive ones. If we are to proceed towards some form
of an Asian NATO, these strategic interests of India, as seen by at
least some members of its military-political community of elites,
must duly be taken into account. Since any serious contradictions in
these two expansive agendas would preclude any effective strategic
coordination, the need for ongoing high-level strategic dialogue on a
host of issues like those discussed above, is imperative.
The expansiveness of India’s agenda emerges from many sources,
e.g., Vajpayee’s program cited above, the new naval doctrine, India’s
continuing foreign policy and India’s own ingrained self-perception
as a major global or at least Asiatic power.328 Vajpayee’s directive
lays out the sphere of strategic interests that such an alliance would
embrace, i.e., from the Middle East and former Soviet South to the
Strait of Malacca, and at least some of the issues that must be dealt
with—Pakistan, arms control, missile defense, Iran, terrorism in
general and Indo-Pakistani relations, and of course, China’s rising
power. But it is not clear how this expansive version of Indian aims
might comport with those of the other listed potential members of
this alliance, Japan, Australia, and Singapore.329 Neither is it at all
certain that the new Indian Government led by Prime Minister Singh
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subscribes to the idea of an Asian NATO. Finally, it also is unclear
whether any Asian NATO seen from Washington encompasses the
same strategic outlook as does India’s outlook.
These difﬁculties in the way of deeper and more sustained
practical coordination do not, however, preclude the achievement
of that coordination provided that both sides are willing to meet the
other’s interests and perceptions. This is the reason why sustained
high-level ofﬁcial and unofﬁcial dialogue is so necessary, because
that is a proven method by which differences in understanding can
be bridged. Interestingly enough, although India has long publicly
harbored expansive ambitions in the Indian Ocean, its practical
cooperation with the United States and desire to be seen as a reliable
partner have led it to take steps that were hitherto believed to be
impossible. For example, in June 2001, i.e., before the terrorist attacks
of September 11, Defense and External Affairs Minister Jaswant
Singh indicated that he did not exclude the possibility of U.S. access
to military bases in India because both Australia and America now
recognized India’s regional role, and this changed situation made
military-to-military cooperation a major aspect of overall bilateral
cooperation with the United States.330
Since then, Indo-American
cooperation in the Indian Ocean has grown. Despite years of trying
to prevent any foreign state from getting near Diego Garcia and
Eastern Sri Lanka’s base and port of Trincomalee, India has acted
on behalf of the U.S. Navy to secure its access to these ports and
offered Washington access to its own ports for the GWOT. In return,
Washington successfully pressured the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka to
persevere in peace talks with the Sri Lankan government.331 The Bush
administration has recognized that access to these bases in the Indian
Ocean not only allows it to exercise considerable command and
control of the seas through that ocean, but also is extremely valuable
for operations and missions from the Middle East to Southeast Asia
and could thus also serve as a check upon Chinese naval ambitions
in the Indian Ocean.332 This fact alone illustrates India’s enduring
relevance to any U.S. strategic presence in the Indian Ocean and in
projecting power to Afghanistan, Central and South Asia, and the
Gulf. Moreover, at the moment, U.S. ships and planes now enjoy a
case-by-case access to Indian bases. Conceivably, this access could
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become part of this Asian NATO and ultimately lead to a more
regularized right of access that would be in tune with the broader
transformation of U.S. strategy because, since 2001 the United States
has been seeking broader access to bases throughout Asia.333
Administration ofﬁcials have spelled out openly the rationales
for obtaining new bases throughout Asia. The Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) of 2001 openly asserted the need for more forces and
bases in Asia due to the expansion of threats there across the spectrum
of conﬂict.334 Subsequent statements and testimony by Pentagon
ofﬁcials reinforces and expands upon the strategic rationale for this.
Basing himself upon that QDR, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense Peter Brookes told Congress in 2002 that,
Distances in the Asian theater [note the singular—author] are vast, and
the density of U.S. basing and en route infrastructure is lower than in other
critical regions. Moreover, the U.S. has less assurance of access to facilities
in the Asia-Paciﬁc region than in other regions. The QDR, therefore
identiﬁes the necessity of securing additional access and infrastructure
agreements and developing military systems capable of sustained
operations at great distances with minimal theater-based support. The
QDR also calls for a reorientation of the U.S. military posture in Asia. The
U.S. will continue to meet its defense and security commitments around
the world by maintaining the ability to defeat aggression in two critical
areas in overlapping time frames. As this strategy and force planning
approach is implemented, the U.S. will strengthen its forward deterrent
posture. Over time, U.S. forces will be tailored to maintain favorable
regional balances in concert with U.S. allies and friends with the aim of
swiftly defeating attacks with only modest reinforcement.335

In subsequent testimony to the House, Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter Rodman fully
explicated the administration’s thinking regarding overseas basing
in Asia. Rodman stated that the administration’s goals entail tailoring
our forces abroad to the particular conditions of those regions
and strengthening U.S. capabilities for prompt global response
anywhere. He observed that since threats are not conﬁned to a single
area and because we cannot anticipate where the next one will be
even though an immediate response is often warranted, we need
a capabilities based strategy, not one based on force levels. Forces
are not expected to ﬁght where they are based, and mobility and

92

speed of deployment are the critical factors.336 Rodman then laid out
the working assumptions behind the transformation of our basing
structure. And a consideration of administration objectives, taken
in conjunction with these assumptions, immediately tells the reader
why an Asian NATO with India is now a priority.
India as an ally or area where bases may be located meets virtually
every criterion laid out in Rodman’s testimony. These working
assumptions for the transformation of our basing structure are as
follows:
• U.S. regional defense postures must be based on global
considerations, not regional ones.
• Existing and new overseas bases will be evaluated as combined
and/or joint facilities as beﬁts the new emphasis on combined
and joint operations.
• Overseas stationed forces should be located on reliable, wellprotected territory.
• Forces without inherent mobility must be stationed along
major transportation routes, especially sea routes.
• Long-range attack capabilities require forward infrastructure
to sustain operations.
• Forward presence need not be equally divided among all the
U.S.’ regional commands in order to reduce the “seams” that
separate them from each other.
• Expeditionary forces and operations require a network of
forward facilities with munitions, command and control, and
logistics in dispersed locations.
All these requirements would increase U.S. forward forces’
capability for deterrence and operations and allow for reinforcement
of other missions by reallocating forces. Rodman observed that
we intend to accomplish these objectives by increasing precision
intelligence and strike capabilities on a global basis and exploiting
our forces’ capability for superior strategic mobility.337 Therefore,
changes in U.S. basing policies aim to strengthen defense relations
with key allies and partners and respond more effectively to
unforeseen contingencies. These changes entail:
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• Diversifying the means of U.S. access to overseas bases and
facilities to obtain military presence closer to combat regions
and offer our forces a broader array of options;
• Posturing the most ﬂexible forces possible for overseas
missions so that they will be capable of conducting a wide
range of expeditionary operations; and,
• Promoting greater allied contributions and establishing
more durable defense relationships with those allies and
partners.338
India, due to its location, excellent ports, many air bases and
developed infrastructure, democratic values, and the harmony of
interests with the United States, would exemplify such an alliance
if it came about. But it is by no means clear that an alliance will
emerge from those discussions on an Asian NATO or that we will
obtain permanent peacetime access or lodgment and deployments
in Indian bases. Nor is it clear how the requirements of an alliance
with Washington would square with what appears to be an alliance
with Iran and rapprochement with China. A formal alliance would
require a sovereign political decision by India’s government, a
treaty, and probably Parliamentary ratiﬁcation, which cannot simply
be counted on in advance—especially with the new government in
power since it will be a left-wing coalition. Therefore, to obtain these
capabilities and this access, Washington also must respond to Indian
needs and interests. And even if it does so, in some cases that might
not be enough to achieve what we want.
The effort to obtain Indian participation in Iraq cited above
exempliﬁed this possible dilemma.339 It showed that obtaining
Indian support in Iraq and for a binding alliance would require
considerable “side payments” by the U.S. Government, and even
then that might not be enough. Similarly, it would be extremely
naïve to hope that India will give America bases and opportunities
for permanent lodgments and deployments on its territory or in its
sphere of interests without demanding ultimate discretion over how
those bases and forces are used. In other words, we will have to be
forthcoming to some discernible and presumably considerable extent
on India’s regional and defense agendas if we are to elicit support for
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anything resembling an Asian NATO. For example, a recent article
about the negotiations over an Asian NATO observed that,
The aggressive U.S. push is tempered by India’s own reluctance to rush
into any such arrangement without securing its immediate objective of
dousing terrorism on its borders inﬂamed by the policies of Pakistan’s
military establishment. In fact, what could have been a straightforward
defense relationship with Washington has been complicated by the U.S.
State Department’s relentless patronage of Pakistan’s military dictatorship
at a bruising cost to India.340

Whether or not this perception of U.S. policies is accurate or
not is irrelevant because it is shared by much of India’s militarypolitical elite and constantly reiterated in the press. Therefore, it is
a constant factor in Indian media and politics that any Indian and
U.S. Government must take into account. But what is important
here is that the United States cannot secure or even begin to pursue
its broader agenda in Asia through the mechanism of an Asian
NATO or some other alliance system without substantive actions to
address India’s own security agenda and priorities, which are rather
different than America’s, for all the harmony of interests between
them. That agenda involves India’s ability to inﬂuence trends in the
geographic areas listed above, and in particular three other issues
of major concern: missile defense, general technology transfer, and
Pakistan. In other words, no policy of unilateralism, however it may
be clothed, has a chance of success in enlisting Indian support, which
is increasingly necessary for the advancement of U.S. interests in
the Gulf, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, or with regard to missile
defense and proliferation.
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CHAPTER 9
INDIA AND MISSILE DEFENSE
Missile defense is an issue that cuts in several directions
for India. On the one hand, many commentators both here and
abroad, mainly those opposed to the Bush administration’s missile
defense programs, contend that America’s construction of missile
defenses will lead China to build more missiles to retaliate against
or overcome our system. This in turn would then threaten India
further, causing it to feel impelled to build defenses and add to its
offensive capabilities, leading Pakistan to follow suit in turn, and
thereby creating a kind of Asian chain reaction. A Chinese reaction
to build more offensive missiles to defeat an American system would
also probably force India to build more of its own offensive medium
range ballistic missiles (MRBM) to deter China and retain a secondstrike capability as prescribed by the classical theory of deterrence.341
Since India faces two adverse nuclear powers, China and Pakistan,
U.S. missile defenses could entail further complications in India’s
security environment that are decidedly negative. Another negative
possibility is that the U.S. system might not work, while other nations
further arm themselves with increased offensive capabilities or else
they may acquire still newer technological and military capabilities
that would force India into an exhausting competition with them.342
On the other hand, it equally is arguable that China’s buildup is
continuing anyway, regardless of what America does. Since advocates
of this view contend that America’s commitment to missile defense is
not the real factor driving China’s nuclear and missile buildup, India
might as well take effective steps now to ensure its own security.
India, this side argues, has no credible ally in Asia, and indeed faces
an array of political and military threats, including nuclear ones
from Pakistan and China. Consequently, a Chinese buildup, coupled
with India’s commitment to no ﬁrst use, may render any hope of
possessing a survivable second strike capability illusory. Hence
defenses are needed, and sooner rather than later.343 By the same
token, an effective U.S. missile defense would provide possibilities
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for extension of that “missile umbrella” to allies. As the U.S. Ballistic
Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) stated during the Clinton
administration, “such a globally expansive missile defense system
would help safeguard unipolarity, providing the impetus to other
nations to enhance their military arrangements with the United States
and come under its missile-defense umbrella.”344 Thus there were and
are positive and negative features in the U.S. program as India might
have seen it. A third argument in favor of missile defenses takes an
anti-American twist, namely, that by building them, India somehow
would render itself more capable of resisting American bullying
and unilateral or neo-imperial tendencies. Or, equally importantly,
these factions hope to escape the irksome situation where India still
depends on foreign military suppliers for advanced technologies As
one recent study observes,
While much has changed in India’s relations with the West, and with
the United States in particular, the West’s continued support to Pakistan
and its ambivalence towards China is the cause of lingering suspicion
that India stands without allies in its disputes against its two adversaries.
Russia, too, is of little help, especially with regard to China. This sense of
isolation has persisted, and continues to suggest that the country needs
some level of deterrence against even the big powers. The events in Iraq
have only reinforced such thinking.345

Obviously this argument plays well among those sectors of Indian
opinion that harbor decidedly negative views of U.S. policy. But it,
too, leads to policy conclusions that no less decidedly concur with
current administration preferences.
What this discussion of alternatives, however rudimentary,
shows is that,
Critical decisions relating to further “horizontal proliferation” in South
Asia-–that is to say, decisions bearing on both the number and kind
of strategic technologies acquired-–will ultimately be linked to larger
Indian perceptions about issues relating to “vertical proliferation” and
by extension, the structure of the global nuclear regime in general. This
in turn implies that as long as Indian decisionmakers perceive that the
existing nuclear weapons states either will not or cannot move toward
deeper stockpile reductions that will ultimately lead to nuclear abolition,
India (and by implication, Pakistan) will not countenance the prospect of
rolling back its own programs. This obduracy is linked both to strategic
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concerns about perceived threats emerging from some of the nuclear
weapons states—China in particular in the case of India—and to ideational
fears about enshrining “discriminatory” organizational regimes such as
the NPT (Nonproliferation Treaty) in international politics.346

A second consequence of this way of thinking about nuclear
weapons is that India will not yield unilaterally its nuclear assets or
roll back programs without constraints on other potential threats.
Therefore, American approaches to nuclear weapons issues will
exercise the greatest inﬂuence on India of all players. This is not only
because Washington can extend or withhold strategic technologies
and weapons, but also because its own strategy will inﬂuence all the
other nuclear players.347 Third, this line of reasoning implies strongly
that one way to slow down India’s nuclear program is for America
and the other nuclear powers’ partners—primarily Russia—to reduce
their dependence upon nuclear weapons and their stockpiles.348
Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that in May 2001
India applauded President Bush’s National Defense University
speech outlining his view of missile defense, citing, in particular, his
assertion that the classical canons of deterrence no longer sufﬁced
and that we were now living in a transformed strategic environment.
Certainly one facet of Bush’s speech and of subsequent American
strategy was the commitment to reduce substantially the number
of strategic offensive missiles and warheads in the American and
Russian arsenals. This policy accorded with a longstanding Indian
demand and had been one of the major reasons why India had
consistently stood apart from the NPT, which had required progress
towards such reductions. As long as such reductions did not occur,
protestations of the need for nonproliferation seemed to New Delhi
like a hypocritical attempt to keep India in what its leaders called
nuclear apartheid, while reserving the beneﬁts of possession of
nuclear weapons to the existing members of the club. Bush’s new
formulations and the subsequent treaty of Moscow in 2002 (the
Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty [SORT]) clearly shattered
what India saw as the preexisting paradigm here.349
While this positive response was not quite an endorsement of
national missile defense (NMD), it certainly was a strong signal
of interest in the idea. Some commentators explained that India’s
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reaction was that it saw from Bush’s and his administration’s
statements that NMD was inevitable; therefore, India might as well
accept reality and position itself to beneﬁt from technology transfer
relevant to it and from the opportunity as a nuclear power to shape
the future rules of the international nuclear game.350 But it is also
the case that the decision to support Bush’s speech and subsequent
initiative ﬂowed logically from the principles of nuclear policy stated
above. Indian analysts like C. Raja Mohan duly contended that by
mid-2001, India adroitly had positioned itself vis-à-vis Washington
on the issue of missile defense. As he wrote then,
Mr. Vajpayee will be right in claiming that India is now in tune with
all the four aspects of the [Bush administration’s] strategic framework:
radical nuclear force reductions, strengthening the nonproliferation
regime, counter-proliferation, and missile defenses. In endorsing missile
defenses and nuclear cuts envisaged by the two great powers, Mr.
Vajpayee can also demand a larger Indian role in managing the global
nuclear nonproliferation regime by becoming a member of the various
export control mechanisms such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. He
can also proclaim Indian interest in a cooperative counter-proliferation
strategy that hopes to deal with the emerging threat of weapons of mass
destruction in the hands of terrorists and other non-state actors.351

More recently he analyzed the problem from the standpoint of India’s
own declared nuclear doctrine.
India believes that missile defenses are an all important
supplement to its strategy of nuclear no-ﬁrst use. Having deliberately
accepted the risk of absorbing a potential nuclear ﬁrst strike by its
adversaries, India hopes the deployment of missile defenses will
help curb the temptations of a ﬁrst strike against it. India may have
two other reasons behind its quest for missile defense. One is the
presumed need to cope with the growing spread of nuclear weapons
and missiles capable of delivering them around its neighborhood.
The other is the recognition that the development of missile defense
appears an inevitable technological trend, and a country like India
has no choice but to invest in it.352
Therefore, it is clear that India’s interest in missile defenses in
some form of association with the United States, either directly or
through a third party like Israel, has grown. In November 2001
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India Ambassador for Disarmament to the Permanent UN Mission
in Geneva Rakesh Sood publicly speculated about India building
missile defenses if the preliminary research and development (R&D)
turned out to be fruitful. This missile defense would be a limited one,
unlike the projected U.S. national missile defense.353 In September
2002, it was revealed that bilateral military and intergovernmental
consultations on missile defense were taking place.354 Since then, it
has also become clear that if legislation is passed in the United States
permitting either research into nuclear weapons or even testing, that
India, and probably Pakistan, would follow suit. Again, this would
follow the logic of America being the main, though not only external
inﬂuence upon Indian strategic policy. The conclusion that India
would then test nuclear weapons is not necessarily at odds with the
Pentagon’s preference. For in July 2002, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense Marshall Billingslea testiﬁed to the Senate Governmental
Affairs Committee that,
We believe that missile defenses, generally speaking, are part of an
inherently stabilizing concept. The right to defend yourself against these
missiles is something we feel is a matter to explore with the Indians [and]
with the Pakistanis if they’re interested.355

Meanwhile India is stepping up production of its Prithvi and Agni
missiles to counter Pakistan’s Hatf, Shaheen, and Ghauri missiles, along
with its successful quest for the U.S.-Israeli Arrow-2 missile defense
system, the accompanying Green Pine radar system, and Russia’s
S-300 V theater missile defense system.356 India has also asked the
administration for the Patriot missile defense system (PAC-3). These
examples of transfer of advanced technology serve for Indian elites as
a test of how serious the administration is about technology transfer
and arms sales, a critical issue for New Delhi.357 India clearly is trying
to develop both an indigenous and reliable missile defense system,
at least for its Western border with Pakistan. India also reafﬁrmed
the view it shares with Washington that missile defenses enhance
cooperative security and held a missile defense workshop in India in
2004. India also agreed to participate in the 2005 Roving Sands missile
defense exercise with the United States.358 Finally, in September 2003,
as a result of previous bilateral meetings where the issue of missile
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defense was discussed, President Vajpayee submitted a proposal to
President Bush, laying out the conditions under which “Vajpayee
accepts a U.S. condition that India establish a strict nonproliferation
regime, and assents to U.S. monitoring of the deployment of missile
defenses—and possibly even overall U.S. control of deployed
systems in India.”359 In return, the United States would help create
a missile defense shield for India against both Pakistan and China’s
perceived increasing nuclear threats, or possibly in some sense to
control missiles deployed in India.360 While some ofﬁcials profess
concern that India might export U.S. technologies to Iran (a fear that
India alleviated with Israel by agreeing not to transfer Israeli defense
technology to Iran361), India also received a green light to buy the
joint U.S.-Israeli Arrow missile defense system.362
Vajpayee’s September 2003 proposal triggered a major debate
within the U.S. national security bureaucracy on the advisability of
lifting sanctions and of sharing data with India on missile defense. The
State Department, and particularly the U.S. arms control community,
much of which is lodged there, tends to look at India through the
lens of proliferation and to prioritize that issue above all others in
the relationship. Without entering into an assessment of whether this
outlook is justiﬁed, correct, or not, it is clear that these ofﬁcials have
obstructed arms sales to India because they still are aggrieved over
its nuclearization in 1998 and cherish the idea that India can be kept
from being formally declared a nuclear power state by punishing
it through the withholding of conventional arms and military
technologies, including perhaps nuclear related ones. DoD, on the
other hand, strongly favors moving to expanded defense relations
with India, which encompass not just the 17 combined exercises that
occurred with the Indian armed forces in 2003, but also relief from
existing sanctions, expanded technology and weapons sales, and
discussions with India on missile defense. Indeed, as we saw above,
the Pentagon has stated publicly its support for India’s having its
own missile defense system.363 Naturally this divergence in outlook
has created major policy debates within the administration, slowed
the momentum in the development of the partnership (at least from
the Pentagon’s standpoint), and caused enormous resentment in
India.364
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It appears that the Pentagon’s viewpoint prevailed to some degree
during the winter of 2003-04. In December 2003, it was reported that
an agreement would be signed in January 2004, ending most U.S.
sanctions on advanced technology transfer to India, in return for
India’s tightening up of its regulations and laws relating to export
controls over materials usable for proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD).365 On January 12, 2004, both governments
released an announcement stating that they had agreed that the U.S
Government will expand cooperation in civilian nuclear activities,
civilian space programs, and high-technology trade. There will also
be an expanded engagement on nuclear regulatory and safety issues
(i.e., tightening up of Indian export control laws and regulations)
and an enhanced dialogue on missile defense.366 By all accounts, this
outcome greatly satisﬁes Indian elites who viewed access to these
technologies as the litmus test of America’s seriousness in building
close ties to India. Indeed, Vajpayee and President Bush both stated
that the vision of the bilateral strategic partnership that they share
“is now becoming a reality.” Although it is also abundantly clear
that the State Department is going to drag its feet on approving
these technology transfers where they could relate to proliferation
of WMD, this outcome seems to have satisﬁed everyone at least for
now.367
Thus it appears that India, under Vajpayee, was ready to move
both toward a genuine alliance involving missile defense that entails
a commitment to missile defense or to protection under the U.S.
program that is coming into being. Whether the new government
will continue along that line remains to be seen. But Vajpayee’s 2003
initiative and Bush’s response in January 2004 signify an increasingly
solid basis for strategic cooperation on the basis of expanded dialogue
and R&D between both countries. To the extent that strategic dialogue
continues here and is successful, it could also spill over into other
areas with no less productive results. This is especially true for the
linked issues of technology transfer and arms sales, issues that are far
more problematic insofar as a strategic partnership is concerned.
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CHAPTER 10
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND ARMS SALES
The part of the April, 2001 agenda pertaining to arms sales and
technology transfer may arguably be the most critical part of the
agenda as far as Indian elites are concerned. MacDonald reached the
conclusion, based on many interviews, that “For Indians, technology
transfer from the United States is military cooperation’s touchstone.”368
Other Indian assessments conﬁrm the great importance that India
attaches to transfer of civil and defense technology, including
technologies for missile defenses, as a critical and essential element
in any partnership with America.369 For Indian ofﬁcials and observers
America’s willingness to enter into serious technology transfer and
arms sales is a fundamental barometer of the seriousness with which
it views this relationship. Certainly many observers believe that
requests like those for the PAC-3 also are intended to gain access
to such technology as well as to ﬁll up gaps in Indian security.370
Undoubtedly this issue will come up, if it has not already done so, in
discussions about an Asian NATO, for transatlantic arms sales and
technology transfer are very important issues within NATO as well.
But the issue of technology transfer and arms sales to India will not
only directly affect the bilateral relationship with America, it will
also affect American allies, particularly Israel, who is emerging as a
major supplier to India. And it also is an issue where India’s rising
economic and technological capabilities as well as its ambitions
could allow it to play off other potential suppliers against America,
for it is obvious that major players in the transfer of both civil and
defense technologies, not to mention weapons systems, increasingly
believe that India, whose demand is huge, is a market from which
they cannot afford to be excluded. In this regard India exempliﬁes
some of the major contemporary trends in the global arms market,
which in many respects is now a buyer’s market where sellers must
increasingly compete against each other to meet clients’ demands.371
Indian elites attach so great an importance to technology transfer
and arms sales for the following reasons: ﬁrst it will conﬁrm the
U.S. understanding of India’s rising importance as both a regional
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and global power with whom it shares a serious partnership and
converging strategic interests on a wide range of issues.372 Second,
Indians want the technological transfer and arms sales up front as a
sign that the U.S. Government is willing and able to share its weapons
with India and that America will then be seen as a reliable partner
that is committed, by virtue of the previous arms deals, to long-term
partnership with India.373 This appears to resemble the pattern with
Indo-Russian relationships going back to 1955. Indian interviewees,
all of whom concurred on this point, told MacDonald that such
transfers would signify U.S. acceptance of India’s strategic role in
the regions of India’s interests as a source of stability in support
of American interests, that Washington regards India as a serious
partner with similar strategic concerns, but which can be trusted to
use the technology. Withholding of technology indicates a belief that
India cannot be trusted. A third perception is that technology transfer
and arms sales show India that it is regarded as a preferred friend, not
as a former Soviet ally or rogue state that deserved to be sanctioned
because it looked after its own interests exactly as America does.374
Indians also see technology transfer as enabling them to perform the
expansive role they wish to play in world politics.
So while Russian weapons remain the bedrock of the Indian
defense arsenal and may conceivably dominate that market for
the foreseeable future; major changes are afoot in India’s weapons
programs, particularly as India’s comprehensive rearmamment
during this decade promises to be one of the most lucrative sources of
funding for global arms companies. American ofﬁcials and analysts
already talk about the extensive modernization of the Indian Air
Force that will have to take place soon and the need for America
rather than other sellers to win the contract to replace the IAF’s
ﬁghters.375 Moreover, as the gap between American and Russian
military technology widens and as the gap also widens between
European and Russian technology on the one hand and between U.S.
and European technology on the other, some Indian experts argue
that we can expect increasing Indian purchases from the Europeans
(including the Israelis) and even more from the United States.376
Thus for India technology transfer comes in several different forms.
First, there is the hope for increased American trade and investment
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in general, not least in the technology sector. In that context there is
particularly strong interest in receiving greater access to U.S. civilian
high technology that also possesses military applications, i.e., so
called dual use technology.377
There is increasing hope in Indian circles that India’s ability to
gain access to this kind of technology will grow steadily as a result
of the Bush administration’s Next Steps in Security Policy (NSSP)
program of which the January 12, 2004 announcement was the
ﬁrst step. The NSSP, according to Administration ofﬁcials, fully
represents its name, i.e., it is an attempt to tie together existing
and new programs and Indo-American desires for mechanisms to
strengthen the idea and reality of a bilateral strategic partnership that
meets India’s craving for technology transfer and arms sales while
also satisfying the administration’s perception that such transfers
should also embrace civilian technology and the private sector. It
duly grows out of India’s long-expressed desire for unimpeded
technology transfer, especially dual-use technology, arms sales,
and space and nuclear technology transfer while respecting antiproliferation concerns and the Bush administration’s broad-gauged
effort to reinforce private and public sector cooperation with India.
From 2001-2003 Indian ofﬁcials described these three issues as the
trinity and, pace MacDonald, presented it as a touchstone of the
sincerity of U.S. interests in a partnership. In 2003 missile defense
was added to this trinity, making it a quartet and President Bush’s
January, 2004 statement, cited above, represented the ﬁrst step in the
multi-phase NSSP.378 Even though several non-governmental experts
still maintain that while India is not regarded as a proliferator,
existing legal obligations might lead to bureaucratic obstacles that
degrade the value of the program. Some Indian analysts, too, hold
this view.379
Nevertheless Under-Secretary of Commerce Kenneth Juster and
his Deputy, Matthew Borman, have both emphasized that this is a
serious and genuine program even if it is a multi-phase one. Phase
one, or the ﬁrst step, was the January 2004 announcement that Juster
presented as providing a “framework for takeoff” for the overall
NSSP.380 He emphasized that the Bush administration desires to use
the program to strengthen a bilateral strategic partnership and also to
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deepen bilateral ties among both states’ private sectors. That would
give everyone a much greater stake in the bilateral relationship,
thereby preventing political disputes from derailing it. Second, the
NSSP, as embodied in the January 2004 bilateral statement, outlines
several phases of reciprocal steps that can be taken that would really
enable the United States to ease its licensing requirements and other
technology transfer restrictions, while at the same time insuring
that our nonproliferation commitments and policies are intact and
that both of our countries jointly work together to ensure that the
nonproliferation goals we share are met.381
As Borman also notes, the NSSP binds the two countries together
and adds a nonproliferation and high-tech trade relationship to their
common interests while leading to the removal of India’s Indian
Space Research Organization from the Commerce Department’s
list of entities to be sanctioned. It has also applied a presumption
of approval for all dual use items excepting the troubled reactors
at Tarapur, which come under the aegis of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, and agreed to eliminate the need for export licenses for 25%
of all U.S. items that India seeks to import.382
Ultimately, fulﬁllment of this multi-phase program will allow
India to move from being a country that was on various U.S. export
lists to one that can obtain civilian nuclear, space, dual–use, and
eventually, should it so desire, ballistic missile defense technology,
though this last one depends on India’s decision whether to pursue
BMD or not.383 In September-October 2004, both sides announced the
completion of phase 1 and commenced movement to phase two of
the NSSP.384 As Tellis noted, the NSSP should, for several reasons, be
regarded as a revolutionary point of departure in bilateral relations,
despite the criticisms of some Indians that it did not change the laws
that India earlier found to be so irksome. First, the NSSP sees India not
as proliferator, but rather as part of the solution to the proliferation
issue. Thus India gains access to world class technologies while
formally remaining outside the global nonproliferation regime. In
return India will institutionalize its world class export controls.385
This is the true revolutionary import of the NSSP: a change in the
U.S. strategic orientation towards India that in time will be far more
consequential than the minutiae encoded in the current agreement.
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In effect, the NSSP implies the administration would seek to build
a transforming partnership with India that includes satisfying its
longstanding desire for greater access to restricted commodities so
long as it does not utilize these artifacts to advance its own strategic
programmes or for unlawful export. Some might argue that if the
Bush administration wanted to be truly revolutionary, it would
not only increase New Delhi’s access to controlled technologies
but would also permit their utilization in India’s strategic weapon
programmes. While this policy may be desirable in the long run, no
U.S. administration today can permit such an arrangement without
completely undermining the global nonproliferation regime at a
time when it is more fragile than ever before. It is to Bush’s credit
that he has actually reached out to India in such unsettled times.
True, the administration is not yet prepared to support India in
enlarging its strategic capabilities. However, it has expressed its
willingness—through the NSSP—to at least look the other way. As
U.S. Ambassador to India David Mulford recently noted, the United
States does not have any agreement comparable to the NSSP with
two other states –Israel and Pakistan –that share India’s anomalous
status in the nonproliferation order. That the administration has
consented to such a unique covenant speaks volumes for New Delhi’s
importance in the president’s geopolitical calculations.386
Third, the NSSP not only shifts U.S. perspectives, it also opens
the way to further, even more consequential changes in policy than
have hitherto been the case. It creates a mechanism for reciprocal
and mutually beneﬁcial actions as well as a structured process
for discussing issues of concern without jeopardizing the overall
strategic relationship.387 At the same time, the NSSP bypasses many
of the obstacles to one of India’s most compelling interests, namely
the termination of all restrictions upon direct access to purchases
of U.S. weapons systems and defense technologies. Although the
Bush administration has lifted many earlier sanctions, this access is
not yet as open as India would like, and, in any case, negotiations
over the sale and acquisition of major defense systems generally are
protracted affairs everywhere. While we will only be able to see the
extent to which India has successfully achieved its goals regarding
the acquisition of U.S. defense systems over the medium to long-
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term, the administration is moving rapidly, as noted above, to
overcome even that barrier to partnership.388 In offering a program
of conventional weapons sales to India, the administration conﬁrms
what the DPG recognized already in August 2003, i.e., there is reason
to believe that the earlier obstacles to defense sales and technology
transfer are being overcome.389 For example, at the May 2004 DPG
meetings the issue of selling the Orion P-3C reconnaissance plane to
India was discussed, apparently favorably as it is now going to be
sold to India.390
More recently, in the fall of 2004, Secretary Rumsfeld visited
India. While he was greeted with a storm of protests from the media,
evidently to some degree orchestrated by the Ministries of Defense
and Foreign Affairs, over proposed U.S. arms sales to Pakistan,
national security advisor J. N. Dixit, who died suddenly on January
3, 2005, reportedly told him that, “I am not going to whine at you—I
am going to only tell you that you can go ahead and do what you
like with the Pakistanis. But if U.S. aid to Pakistan upsets stability in
this region, then India reserves the right to address this instability in
any way it chooses.”391
Not only did Rumsfeld get this message, he said Washington
would build a stronger relationship, including defense ties, with
India and also brought forward the discussions on a U.S. package
of arms sales that would be offered to India and that was revealed a
week before he came to New Delhi.392 The arms sales package offered
by the Bush administration also eclipses what it proposes to offer
Pakistan.
The offer includes the much-touted Patriot anti-missile defense
system that tackles aircraft and also tactical and cruise missiles, C130 stretched medium-lift transport aircraft, P-3C Orion maritime
surveillance planes, and even F-16 ﬁghters. The United States has
also offered Perry-class frigates and Sea Hawk helicopters, while
special operations forces will be looking at chemical and biological
protection equipment.393
Although India may not accept the F-16s because it already
possesses Su-30MKI’s and French Mirage 2000s, it is likely to pick
up the P-3C to obtain the long-range maritime surveillance and antisubmarine capabilities it possesses. Moreover, this deal provides
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the necessary strategic depth to India’s arsenal to distinguish it
from either Pakistan or China. For example, the P-3C that India is
being offered is an upgraded version with the latest avionics and
equipment as well as offensive capabilities that eclipse what Pakistan
is being offered.394 This offer conﬁrms the trend cited in the 2003 DPG
meetings of an increasingly favorable environment for weapons sales.
And it also underscores the fundamentally strategic and qualitative
transformation of past policy that, as Tellis observed, is embedded
within the NSSP. But this is by no means the only way in which India
can assure itself of a regular access to quality weaponry and hightech transfers that links it up to the United States.
The third way in which India can enhance its access to U.S.
technologies and weapons is through purchase of systems that are
jointly made by the U.S. and other third parties, e.g., Israel. This is
one reason for the interest in Israeli missile defense and AWACSlike systems such as the Phalcon. But negotiations for these systems
also are inherently protracted affairs because of the legal restrictions
incumbent upon U.S. partners regarding the subsequent sale of
these systems to other governments and to political considerations
that may be brought to bear inside the United States. Thus earlier
Washington forced Israel to scuttle its deal to sell the Phalcon to
China. And since Israel coordinates its arms sales with Washington
due to the close technological and defense links between them,
Indian purchases from Israel can open another or broader pipeline
to U.S. defense sales.395
Furthermore, India is a notoriously slow negotiator in arms deals.
Consequently, going the route of third party sales and technology
transfer with states other than Russia or the United States is a very
time-consuming process. As a result, it is possible that by the time
the deals are ﬁnalized the weapon or technology in question may no
longer be state of the art and the costs attached to the goods under
discussion will probably have risen as well. Therefore this method of
obtaining arms is not cost-free.
The high priority of such defense sales, and not only from the
United States and its allies, is a constant reminder that India’s
indigenous defense industry still cannot produce sufﬁcient high
quality, reliable, state of the art, and competitive weapons systems
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for domestic use and for export abroad.396 Although several highranking military ﬁgures—e.g., the new chief of the Air Force, Air
Chief Marshal Shashindra Pal Tyagi—espouse greater indigenization
and point to India’s rising economic capabilities, this is only
beginning to bear fruit. In the meantime, imports in many sectors
will be necessary for quite some time. For example, the Air Force
must replace half of its 350 planes and is seriously short of spare
parts for half of them.397 Therefore India, like many other aspiring
arms producers, must still rely on foreign providers and seek offsets,
technology, and knowhow transfer, as well as direct product sales
in order to maintain its forces at a competitive level and to ﬁnd a
way to bring its defense industry up to global standards.398 This
consideration places India in several quandaries, particularly, if
as seems to be the case, its problems remain intractable and it still
must rely excessively upon Russian weapons, which appear to be
manifesting ever more problems to judge from the Indian press. For
instance, this dependence upon Russian tanks obviously irks those
who are pushing for the completion of the indigenous Arjun tank
project despite the many problems that have dogged this project
since its inception.399 Throughout its history India has sought to
eschew excessive dependence upon any one source for the provision
of arms and to obtain as much self-sufﬁciency as possible in its
defense sector. Given the socialistic and dirigiste origins of Indian
defense industrial policy, the ensuing rigidities and failures of that
sector as characterized in numerous studies are well known.400 But
these failures to attain the objective of self-sufﬁciency, a goal that is
particularly chimerical and difﬁcult under globalization, have left
their mark on Indian defense policy writ large and forced that policy
and policymakers to accommodate themselves to reality.
As a result, India actually pursues three simultaneous avenues to
modernization of its defense arsenal: importing weapons, importing
foreign production technology for licensed production, and indigenous production.401 We can see aspects of each of these pathways to
building a robust defense capability and some of the consequences
thereof in Indian defense policy and the bilateral ties with America.
First, India still tries to upgrade its indigenous capabilities. Indeed
it seeks to become a major arms exporter consonant with Vajpayee’s
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November 2003 directives cited above.402 For example, Vijay Kumer
Saraswat, program director for development of ballistic missile
defense systems, recently said that India might soon begin exporting
ballistic missile systems that could be used in local warfare, a term he
did not deﬁne.403 India seeks to become a major exporter of weapons
not just because that would give it the semblance, if not the reality
of self-sufﬁcient arms production, but because many still hanker
after the status accruing to such states or fear too much dependence
upon outsiders. Probably no less important is the fact that Indian
elites now see arms sales as a way to gain inﬂuence in key zones,
as Vajpayee’s 2003 directives suggest. We see this approach with
particular clarity as regards Central Asia and Southeast Asia. Here
economic motives, the quest for status, and classical great power
politics come together.
India’s increased ability and willingness to sell weapons to
Central Asian governments parallels Pakistan’s similar capability as
both are entering the international arms market to ﬁnd new export
markets and keep defense plants open.404 Indian spokesmen frankly
admit that they seek export markets to achieve economies of scale
for their domestic defense industry. Capturing those markets will, in
turn, reduce Indian dependence upon foreign suppliers, especially
as India can increasingly compel them to transfer technology and
knowhow as part of their sales.405 Probably India will provide
training and assistance to Central Asian militaries as do Turkey,
Russia, China, and the United States, and also ﬁnd in them willing
buyers of its weapons, especially those made jointly with Russia.
But India has even broader objectives. Because it competes with
China in the small arms market and also seeks to penetrate into
Southeast and Central Asia’s markets where China seeks to expand
its inﬂuence, India must compete with China on price and quality in
the same categories of weapons. India sells small arms, ammunition,
patrol ships, light ﬁeld guns, trucks, and aircraft parts to Southeast
Asia at reduced price and with better equipment.406 Furthermore,
as India intends to supplant China as regional supplier of arms, it
will aggressively seek markets in Central and Southeast Asia.407 For
example, India has already sold Kazakstan and Tajikistan Ilyushin76 transports and helicopters, respectively.408 In order to realize these
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goals, India must also undergo a simultaneous modernization of
its existing indigenous defense industries. Thus India is now also
trying to stimulate its naval defense industry as well to build up
capabilities for a robust and competitive indigenous naval defense
industrial sector.409 As noted above, HAL also seeks to become an
aviation industry hub for Southeast Asia, and India seeks to become
a hub for missile building programs across Asia and Africa.410
However, many obstacles stand in the way of achieving this
objective of becoming a major indigenous producer of weapons
for export. Indigenous industries are heavily subsidized and have
a poor track record replete with long delays, cost overruns, and
inferior quality. Moreover, there is a very serious problem with the
transfer of technology from civilian discovery and use to military
411
production and use. As a result of these outcomes, India has
had to resort to the other alternatives listed above. But, given the
institutional and political inﬂexibilities and rigidities that pervade
India’s defense industrial system, it is unlikely that it will give up
that dream unless it bites the bullet, so to speak, and abandons it by
giving more scope than it has done until now to private and foreign
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investors and producers. Paradoxically, to have any chance of
realizing indigenization to any signiﬁcant degree, India must, for
now, increasingly import technology and open up Indian production
facilities to foreign ownership and participation.
Indeed, that has begun to happen because India found it had
no choice if it wished to remain competitive in a globalized world,
and if it wanted to acquire the best technologies on the market. As
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute stated in its
annual report for 2004, arms imports by India increased by more
than 100 percent in 2003 over 2002 to the highest level for the present
5-year period, maintaining a constant increase since 2000. While
Indian imports accounted for only about 9 percent of major arms
imports in 1999-2003, giving India second place for the period, India
accounted for 19 percent of global transfers in 2003, making it the
largest recipient that year. Russia provided 79 percent of all Indian
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arms imports in 1999-2003 and 75 percent in 2003.
Since these ﬁgures show also that Russian arms exports to India
decreased in 2003 and were a somewhat smaller percentage of a
much larger market, this trend in Indian defense policy also creates
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expanded opportunities for the United States and its allies, like
Israel, to gain greater entrée into the Indian defense market. And
there are many signs that these exporters to India would be welcome
because imports are essential for India to meet its defense industrial
and strategic objectives. For example, HAL is also pressing an
outsourcing program whereby it will help private Indian companies
ﬁnd and choose foreign partners to undertake high-tech projects like
avionics integration, weapons system integration, and other related
efforts. This program is intended to “lay the foundation for a credible
domestic aerospace industry base that could meet the majority
of India’s military aerospace requirements in the next 10 years.”
Thus it is clear that a major part of the growing diversiﬁcation of
India’s defense industrial program is intended to stimulate domestic
production by opening up that sector of industry to outside foreign
private investment.414 Jasjit Singh, Director of the prestigious Institute
of Defense Studies and Analysis, suggested that in the future,
“Collaboration [with Russia and other powers—author] must extend
to components and sub-systems which could be handled through
the private sector. We need to link up with industrial countries for
joint development, production, and sales.”415 Many states, Israel and
the United States among them, can be expected to take advantage of
this opportunity and to do so with India’s blessings.
Indeed, such programs are necessary if India is to realize its goal
of being a competitive military player, not to mention becoming
a major defense exporter. For instance, it is clear that India faces
several continuing problems if it continues to rely so much on
Russian defense systems. Engine trouble forced it to ground all 18 of
its ﬂeet of Sukhoi-30MKI Fighters in August 2003. The AL-31 engine
developed trouble after only 1,000 hours of ﬂight time. As these
ﬁghters lie at the heart of India’s future Air Force strategy, due to
their long range and midair refueling capacity, these ﬂaws are telling
indicators of the risk associated with an almost exclusive reliance upon
Russian systems.416 And they are hardly the only instances of Indian
unhappiness with Russian performance. Three areas in particular
seem to have caused some anxiety in New Delhi. In March 2002, The
Times of India reported that the Parliamentary Standing Committee
had issued recommendations last week urging the government to
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avoid overdependence on Russia for armaments and spare parts. The
committee report reportedly did acknowledge that Russia has been
and will remain a steadfast source of defense equipment for India,
but cautioned that New Delhi’s current dependence on Moscow for
as much as 80 percent of its arms imports is not a healthy situation. It
likewise observed that Russia was not providing military hardware
on the same beneﬁcial ﬁnancial terms that it had during the Soviet
era, and urged both that New Delhi cease making advance payments
for future weapons acquisitions from Russia, and that it seek in the
future to put more defense contracts up for competitive tender.417
There also are numerous complaints about the failure of the
Russian contractors to deliver systems and parts rapidly—a longstanding defect of the Russian defense industry. In fact, India has
warned Russian industry that if their products are not reliable and
of the highest quality, India will shop elsewhere.418 This failure to
obtain timely delivery is becoming a major impediment to realization
of Indian defense programs. For example, in 2002 it became clear
that, given the worsening relations with Pakistan, India was seeking
to diversify its foreign purchases and also use foreign partners to
develop its own defense industrial capability, e.g., by conditioning
purchases on obtaining offsets from the sellers to develop that
indigenous capability. This search for offsets continues a longstanding Indian policy.419 Thus one major solution to the problem
inherent in excessive reliance upon Russian production is the
acquisition of foreign licensing in the form of transfer of technology
from Russia to build weapons inside India, i.e., offsets, a process
whereby the seller transfers know-how and production capability,
as well as weapons, to the buyer. However, it is also clear that the
prospects of major American arms sales to India alarms Moscow
for it threatened India that it could not merge Russian systems with
forthcoming American ones without running the risk of litigation
and charges over abuse of intellectual property. India saw this as
a naked attempt to force it to buy Russian spare parts at exorbitant
prices instead of shopping around or making them locally.420 While
the problem was resolved in negotiations during Russian President
Putin’s visit to India in December 2004, it still underscores the
decreasing attractiveness to India of dependence on Russia. But at the
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same time, India’s dependence on Russian defense production has
greatly diminished, and it is Russia, whose defense industry remains
in a precarious condition, that depends on the Indian market for its
survival.421
Offsets to India from Russia have become a critical factor in
maintaining the long-standing ties to Moscow and its defense
industry, while for Russia it is a vital interest to retain a customer
who buys about 40 percent of Russia’s annual exported defense
production, the only production it can sell anywhere since its own
army cannot buy the weapons. For example, beyond the existing
$10 billion program of weapons sales from Russia to India, India
collaborates with Russia on joint production of a ﬁfth-generation
ﬁghter. More broadly, India is the only country with whom Russia
is collaborating on joint production of sophisticated and futuristic
weapons systems.422 Likewise India, not China, gets Russia’s best
weapons that currently are being produced, systems that not even
Russia’s armed forces can obtain. And Russia is building a missile
defense system based on its S-300 missiles, a move that certainly
raised eyebrows in Beijing.423 Moscow offers offsets in the form of
technology transfer of production skills and know-how to India, one
of its largest customers. And while India obviously seeks to diversify
its sources of foreign procurement, even so Russian ofﬁcials and
exporters continuously have voiced optimism dating back to 2000
when the press reported that,
Russian exporters are still optimistic that they will be able to retain their
positions in the Indian market. To do so, they have had to develop a
fundamentally new approach to cooperation with India. While Russia
used to offer ready-made weapons systems, now the emphasis is on
joint design and production. This new approach was reinforced during
Vladimir Putin’s [October 2000—author] visit to India, during which the
two countries signed an agreement in which they pledged to protect the
conﬁdentiality of classiﬁed information transferred to or developed in the
course of their joint activity. As a result, Russian and Indian researchers
can now conduct joint R&D. Moreover, the leading participants on the
Russian side will no longer be the Rosoboronexport (Russian Defense
Export) State Company, but our actual R&D organizations. The work
will focus primarily on the development of reconnaissance satellites and
surface-sea-and-air launched cruise missiles, as well as nuclear submarine
design.424
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However, it is not clear that this Russian optimism is wellfounded or reciprocated by India, even though it still exists among
most, but by no means all, Russian producers and ofﬁcials.425 For
example, the Defense Ministry in July 2004 announced that it is
phasing out MiG series jets, which the Indian press derisively refers
to as ﬂying cofﬁns, over the next decade.426 India’s behavior vis-à-vis
foreign arms and technology sellers also indicates that New Delhi is
reorienting its overall defense technology relationship with Western
countries. Apart from the well-known economic advantages of
greater access to an interaction with large markets and investors in
purely civilian ﬁelds of high technology and information technology
(IT), one of India’s strongest economic calling cards, greater
access to the U.S. technology market and greater U.S. interest in
India under benevolent government sponsorship offer New Delhi
several tangible strategic rewards. First, since civilian technologies
are today’s cutting edge systems as opposed to military ones that
played that role a generation or so ago, greater closeness to the U.S.
market stimulates and provides a greater guarantee of India’s ability
to maintain a competitive proﬁle, even possibly reach a breakout
stage, or make equivalent technological discoveries. In turn, that
capability or those possible discoveries make it possible to overcome
the barriers in India between civilian and defense technologies that
have impeded defense production. That outcome would generate
real prospects for ensuring that the defense industrial base remains
a competitive one and also permits greater indigenization of India’s
capability to produce its own dual-use technologies or to re-export
American systems to other buyers. A second indirect beneﬁt of such
trade is that the foreign pressure generated by such trade might also
push India’s lagging defense industries to become more robust and
competitive.
A third beneﬁt that would accrue to India from greater exposure
of American ﬁrms to it and vice versa is already discernible in the
rival Chinese case. Substantially expanded U.S.-Indian trade and
investment ties would promote creation within the U.S. political
system of an Indian lobby that could inﬂuence American foreign and
defense policy constantly just as the expansion of such ties to China
has produced an inﬂuential lobby that clearly restrains expressions
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of hostility to China in our policy when the pressure builds to take
such actions. An equivalent Indian lobby would promote favorable
strategic ties to India and win friends and inﬂuence for New Delhi
on Capitol Hill and elsewhere throughout our political system.
New Delhi clearly understands the potential signiﬁcance of a lobby
of Indian-Americans and of high placed friends in the business
community for its broader strategic objectives.427
Therefore, it is hardly surprising that Indian commentators
regarded access to nuclear, high-tech, and space cooperation with
the United States as the “trinity” issues, and hope for a more
accommodating U.S. position on transfer of critical technologies
when issues come before the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).428
Neither is it surprising, under the circumstances, that the turn to
Israel has taken place. Indeed, the Vajpayee government, building
upon past precedents, effected an amazing transformation of India’s
defense relationship to Israel, and it appears that the present regime
is building effectively on it.429 In 2003, Defense News reported that
the Indian government is working on a program whereby Israel
would replace Russia as India’s largest supplier of weapons and
defense equipment by 2008. Under the terms of this program, India
will identify the products it wants and ask the Israeli government to
negotiate with Israeli ﬁrms on its behalf, just as Jerusalem does with
regard to its own weapons. Israel is already India’s second largest
supplier of military systems, if not, as some think, India’s largest
supplier. Therefore, this program could effect a major transformation
in India’s security relationships.430 Israel evidently is willing to sell
India some of its latest and most sophisticated weapons systems,
e.g., the Advanced Naval Attack Missile and the Next Generation
Defense Missile, provided India also invests in their development.431
Similarly, India seeks Israeli investment in Indian defense industry
to modernize it and make it more competitive.432
India’s wish list from Israel reveals the scope of its strategic
interests. India seeks super-high satellite imagery resolution
technology from Israel to gain critical real-time targeting capability
to improve the accuracy of India’s ballistic missiles and gather
intelligence concerning terrorist and Pakistani activities in Jammu
and Kashmir.433 Indian army planners, frustrated by the slow pace
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of India’s indigenous ballistic missile programs and alarmed by
Pakistan’s progress in that area, also advocate an emergency purchase
of either Russian or Israeli missiles, even though Israel’s Long Range
Artillery (LORA), if sold, would, with minor adaptations, trample
on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). That sale might
be a bridge too far for U.S. authorities to accept.434 India also seeks
Israeli help regarding a new inertial navigation system for longrange missiles like the Agni III, the multi-target surface-to-air missile,
and for short-range missiles like the sea-skimming Dhanush.435 Other
issues under consideration are Israeli avionics for India’s Russianbuilt ﬂeet of aircraft, tanks, improved artillery systems, ﬁre control
and thermal imaging systems for tanks, maritime patrol aircraft,
submarines, and “platforms with longer reach and sustainability at
sea.” These include the Barak ship-defense missile and UAVs.436 These
requests come on top of existing purchases of UAVs for all of India’s
services, avionics, night vision devices, artillery, artillery radars, fast
attack naval craft, an electronic warfare system for the INS Virat, and
ammunition.437 Israel is also training up to 3,000 Indian commandos
in urban warfare and counterinsurgency operations.438 Moreover,
this cooperation is poised to grow. There are fresh reports that the
Mossad will train Indian intelligence personnel. Apparently India’s
Cabinet Committee on Security has decided to solicit Israeli training
for four new Special Forces battalions which will be stood up to ﬁght
the insurgency in Kashmir. Likewise, India has already purchased
several Barak missile systems for its Delhi class destroyers, and
Israel’s evident willingness to sell the ANAM and the NGD missile
has been cited above.439
Other projects under consideration clearly suggest Indian interest
in responding to Pakistan’s acquisition of North Korean SRBMs and
MRBMs that can strike deep into India, and to China’s development
of similar conventional and nuclear missiles. Thus India is discussing
acquisition of an aerial attack vehicle conﬁgured for striking ballistic
missiles during their boost phase. India has also asked Israel for
advanced surveillance equipment and an ABM defense system
and received two Israeli Green Pine radars and aerostat balloons
and UAVs for use both by the Army in Kashmir and by the Navy
for monitoring and surveillance in the Arabian Sea and around the
Andaman and Nicobar islands.440
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India’s opening up of its defense sector to foreign investment
creates opportunities not only for Israeli investors and for the
acquisition of licenses for domestic production from Israel, France,
Russia, etc., but it also creates greatly expanded opportunities for
America both directly and through the provision of Israeli assistance,
much of which is contractually tied to American assistance. Indian
elites know this and value the Israeli tie in part because it opens
doors in Washington which were hitherto blocked and which might
be blocked again.441 As Tellis wrote in 2001,
It is worth noting that India’s interest in Russian strategic technology
is accompanied by a growing interest in French and Israeli technology.
The parallelism in these cases is fascinating: all three states are seen as
repositories of critical strategic technologies of interest to India; all three
states are seen to be sufﬁciently independent of U.S. political pressure as
far as transferring many technologies to India is concerned; and all three
states are perceived to be driven more by commercial considerations
than by ideological interests, and even these, to the degree that they exist,
are viewed as aligned with rather than oppposed to Indian perceptions.
Consequently, it is not unreasonable to expect that India’s strategic
ties with each of these countries will grow, both in connection with its
strategic programs and otherwise.442

However, the opportunities now being generated to acquire freer
access to American civilian and defense technologies, as well as to
weapons systems, open up opportunities for both parties to strengthen
their ties and to enhance India’s own defense capabilities through
the invigoration of cooperation. That cooperation would facilitate
not just licensing or direct sales, but would also help India overcome
the problems that have hampered its quest for indigenization. This
hardly means the millennium is at hand for Indian defense. But it
does offer it new posibilities that should be seized if India truly wants
to materialize the expansive security agenda that its elites share.
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CHAPTER 11
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND ARMS SALES
IN INDO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
While India’s wish list to Jerusalem is expansive, it pales in
comparison to what India wants from Washington. That “wish list”
is still more expansive and revealing of the scope of Indian policy
ambitions, as shown in Defense Minister George Fernandes’ visit to
Washington in 2001. India then requested:
• Land, sea, and air-based communication and surveillance
platforms and systems;
• Testing facilities for land, sea, and air-based weapons, avionics,
electronic warfare equipment, and radar;
• Small arms and other infantry gear;
• Testing equipment for defense research programs, including
command and control weapons and laser weapons;
• Air defense network management; and,
• Current and future training concepts.443
India’s wish list from the United States regarding civilian and dualuse technology transfer is equally expansive. At a July 2003 meeting
of the U.S.-India High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG),
a group that brings together private business and governmental
ofﬁcials, a discussion of speciﬁc proposals for joint development in
defense technology included the following items: Communications
systems, including multiplexer and frequency hopping systems,
satellite networks, information security, encryption technologies and
solutions; minesweeper technology; shipbuilding; combat aircraft;
development of precision guided munitions, including laser guided
munitions; nanotechnology; UAV technology and associated sensors;
data links for airborne and vehicular surveillance platforms; software
development; manufacture of electronic components; test equipment;
tanks and armored vehicles, missiles, rockets, and launchers; radar
and sonar systems; air defense systems; torpedoes and mines; and
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small arms and guns.444 India’s abiding fears that America is not
a reliable supplier and confusion about export controls, plus the
fact that actual release of exports is much slower than the declared
policy, India’s own cumbersome bureaucratic deformities regarding
a lengthy acquisition process, and a lack of interoperability between
both forces also ﬁgured prominently in the discussion.445
In practice, of course, the Indian government cannot address so
extensive a list of desired technologies and/or weapons systems to
Washington. Nevertheless, this list shows the desire for partnership
even under the existing obstacles and the expansiveness of Indian
objectives. The government’s ofﬁcial requests to Washington also
show this expansive Indian perspective. For example, in April
2003, the plan prepared for the Indian military developed by the
Directorate of Defense Policy and Planning for the Army, Air Force,
and Navy advocated a rapid reaction capability for real-time troop
deployment to countries along the rim of the Indian Ocean to create
a defense umbrella for them. This plan, “India’s Strategic Vision,”
envisions cooperation with Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius,
and Vietnam. And it comports with Vajpayee’s directives above.
However, it cannot be carried out, given India’s lack of fast long-range
aircraft with aerial refueling capabilities, Airborne Early Warning
and Command (AEW&C) aircraft, attack helicopters, and a carrier in
addition to the existing INS Virat carrier. These deﬁciencies, which
the report insists cannot be made up by India’s defense industry, put
it at a disadvantage relative to China, which allegedly can project
major power into the Indian Ocean area. Therefore, the only way to
acquire these capabilities is through foreign suppliers.446
More recent reports suggest that planning for anti-Chinese
contingencies is still driving much of India’s defense acquisitions
policy, particularly with regard to naval and air forces, while the
Army is still tasked with contingencies closer to home that primarily
target Pakistan and the terrorists it has supported. The Indian Defense
Forces’ new strategic plan mandates the purchase of submarines and
maritime patrol aircraft like the P-3C and the development of littoral
warfare capabilities. The Army must prepare to ﬁght intense, short
wars against the backdrop of terrorism and possible nuclear threats.
Meanwhile, the Air Force is to buy up to 125 multirole aircraft and
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upgrade aging air defense systems.447 And despite the improved
Sino-Indian dialogue,
India plans future acquisitions based on a scenario involving conﬂict
with China, a Defense Ministry ofﬁcial said. The Agni-3 nuclear-capable
missile, with a range of 3,000 kilometers, is ready for testing, and the IndoRussian BrahMos anti-ship cruise missile, with a range of 290 kilometers,
will enter Indian Navy service in 2005, the ofﬁcial said. The Air Force also
received its ﬁfth Il-78 serial tanker from Uzbekistan, which will enable
the service’s SU-30MKI and Mirage 2000-H combat aircraft to ﬂy deep
inside China.448

All these requests, as well as existing programs that are bringing
new weapons into active service, suggest the breadth and scope of
Indian goals and the capabilities that India seeks to acquire in order
to play the great role it envisions for itself in Asia. And the large
scope of India’s requests might also explain at least some of the U.S.
bureaucracy’s earlier hesitancy in giving these systems and platforms
to India, even though arms manufacturers now see great potential in
the Indian market, thanks to the Pentagon’s intervention. Indeed, in
August 2003, the Pentagon showed its approval for sale of the Orion
and for a “deep submarine rescue vehicle,” and for intelligence
equipment and sensors that would allow India to monitor passage
through Kashmir by terrorists and other inﬁltrators. Indian reports
also said that the Pentagon cleared numerous other export licenses
that were being held up in the bureaucracy even as late as November
2004, i.e., up until just before public word of the projected U.S. arms
sales to India were announced.449 However, the combined force of
India’s needs and capabilities, coupled with the transformation of
U.S. policy regarding arms sales and technology transfer discussed
above suggest that we may now be crossing a threshold in the bilateral
relationship with regard to arms sales and technology transfer.
Still, there are obstacles to the realization of such transfer, e.g., the
rivalry between the State and Defense Departments that pertains to
India. As noted above, the State Department and particularly the U.S.
arms control community, much of which is lodged there, emphasizes
the proliferation perspective when it looks at India. That perspective,
regardless of whether it is justiﬁed or not, is clearly conducive to the
obstruction of arms sales to India because of continuing unhappiness
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over its nuclearization. Evidently some ofﬁcials there still believe
that India can be kept from being formally declared a nuclear power
state by punishing it through the withholding of conventional arms
and military technologies, including perhaps nuclear related ones.
Thus Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John S. Wolf
told the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005
Review Conference on the Nonproliferation treaty that,
Turning to South Asia, our focus there is not on compliance, as neither
India nor Pakistan is a party to the NPT. While we remain committed to
universal NPT adherence, our focus in South Asia has been and remains
on preventing actions that would undermine the global nonproliferation
regime and regional stability—be it through nuclear testing, deployment,
nuclear use, or proliferation to other countries. The United States has an
active dialogue with both countries on these issues. We have taken steps
recently with both countries to strengthen relations in order to advance
our regional goals, enhance the ﬁght against terrorism, and to secure
cooperation from both countries on export controls. These steps should
not, however, be taken to suggest that we have “accepted” the status of
either country as a nuclear weapon state under the NPT. We have not.
Moreover, we will not reward either country for their decisions to acquire
nuclear weapons or for the 1998 tests that made the world and the region
a more dangerous place. We have steadfastly avoided taking any actions
that would be contrary to our long-established nuclear export control
policy. India and Pakistan remain ineligible under U.S. law and policy for
any signiﬁcant assistance to their nuclear programs. We continue to call
on India and Pakistan not to conduct nuclear tests, to end the production
of ﬁssile material for nuclear weapons, to take steps to reduce regional
tensions and to prevent the use of nuclear weapons.450

Obviously such a position ﬂatly contradicts the logic embodied in
the NSSP and the President’s offer of weapons to India.
State Department ofﬁcials also are extremely alarmed (and
with good reason) about the possibility of Indo-Pakistani conﬂicts
breaking out over Kashmir or other issues, even though that has not
stopped either side from developing nuclear weapons indigenously.
State Department ofﬁcials publicly cite both India’s and Pakistan’s
possession of nuclear weapons as a threat to American interests and
troops because they are a factor that can ratchet up regional instability. While formally this may be true, this assessment, Indians
reply, omits to mention that Pakistan has used terrorism as a weapon,
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secure in the knowledge that it can match escalation. Thus each side’s
nuclear weapons serve rather different purposes and have rather
different consequences, which are not equal either for the region or
for the United States.451
The State Department’s emphasis on nonproliferation emerged
clearly in a speech by then Director of Policy Planning Richard Haass
who stated on January 7, 2003:
Despite this impressive list of areas of joint cooperation, there is more
we can work on together. Security cooperation tops the list. A key
component of our growing security collaboration must be geared toward
stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The United States
and India share a common interest in bringing about a world where
materials and technologies for the production of chemical, biological, and
nuclear weapons are difﬁcult to acquire. India has shown its willingness
to identify proliferators; we do, however, look for even more aggressive
Indian action on this front, and are prepared to work together and share
experiences to help India achieve our common goal of stopping onward
proliferation.452

In fact, it is rather doubtful if India shares this aim, at least so
far as its ability to acquire new nuclear technologies and capabilities
is concerned, given its nuclear weapons development programs.
While India certainly opposes other states’ nuclearization and does
not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons; it is unclear
if it really holds the State Department’s view, or does so as intensely
as does the State Department. As Tellis points out, based upon
the Indian policy framework cited above, which is taken from his
magisterial study of Indian nuclear policy,
The current global nuclear regime therefore inﬂuences the future direction
of India’s nuclear regime in at least one straightforward manner: it makes
denuclearization impossible, and to the extent that it allows the nuclear
weapon states to continually maintain and perhaps improve their arsenals
even if only in qualitative terms, makes further Indian movement in the
direction of denuclearization all the more likely. 453

Moreover, India shares the principles of U.S. nonproliferation
policy but dissents from their application to the region because of
India’s proximity to China and Pakistan and its commitment to
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democratic and restrained defense policies.454 In addition, India
fears that the application of this nonproliferation policy is inherently
discriminatory, since Washington will not abide by the strictures
it preaches to others and that India would then be locked out of
key avenues for enhancing its security. Furthermore, this logic
leads Indian policymakers into an acceptance of Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons. Indeed, they apparently argue that Pakistan should now
feel more secure by virtue of having them and thus be able to curtail
such manifestations of its abiding insecurity like the support for
terrorism.455
Nevertheless, the State Department and its spokesmen, including
Blackwill when he was ambassador, regularly emphasize that one
of the main common interests of the two states is stopping nuclear
proliferation, even though he was also at pains to insist that America
was a reliable friend and supplier of technology.456 This State
Department’s stress on nonproliferation and desire to arraign India
for its nuclearization in 1998 is an immense source of frustration to
Indians, especially as they view technology transfer and the ending
of sanctions and other obstructions to military sales as touchstones
of the seriousness and genuineness of the bilateral relationship.
Furthermore, it aligns Washington with China’s opposition to
according India formal status as a nuclear power, clearly a sign that
Beijing still seeks to conﬁne India to a lower, purely regional status
as an Asian player, while it reaps the beneﬁts and status of being a
recognized nuclear power.457 From India’s standpoint, that ranking
is intolerable both politically and psychologically. Neither does the
State Department’s stance preclude India’s nuclearization or the
development of its weapons arsenal, since there are others who will
gladly sell whatever Washington denies. As C. Raja Mohan writes,
The administration must also consider that a technology-denial regime
against India makes little sense because it ignores recent technological
developments in India; disregards New Delhi’s emerging capability
to export sensitive technologies, even while it remains outside the
international architecture constructed to manage WMD proliferation; and
belies U.S. proclamations of a strategic partnership with New Delhi.458

Ultimately the withholding of recognition of India as a nuclear
power also allows Pakistan to escape constraints and represents
128

a policy of feeling virtuous rather than doing the right thing
strategically, since there is no evidence that withholding that status
has stopped other powers from proliferating; quite the opposite.
Therefore, Indian elites, be they important correspondents and
observers like C. Raja Mohan or former military personnel like an
admiral that MacDonald interviewed, all speak bluntly about the
consequences of the State Department’s and general bureaucratic
obstruction here.459 C. Raja Mohan writes that,
Where arms control is concerned, the nonproliferation establishment in
Washington has not been willing to match the intellectual boldness of the
Bush administration. Many ofﬁcials at the political level in Washington
recognize that India could be a partner in managing the new challenges
that arise from the proliferation of WMD. Caught up in the old verities,
by contrast, the American arms-control bureaucracy continues to see
India as part of the problem rather than as part of the solution. Unless
there is some fresh thinking about India in the American arms-control
community, talk of a new relationship between the two countries will
likely remain on paper.460

Similarly, a retired brigadier told MacDonald that,
Until the United States changes its approach to nonproliferation, its
policies will be seen as a threat to India’s security interests. Current U.S.
policy is intended to deny India technologies. Moreover, not only does
the U.S. Government deny India technologies, it actively blocks other
countries from selling India technologies (e.g., Israel). For Indians, this is
a direct affront to their security interests.461

While India’s actual nuclear capability has apparently been a key
factor in inﬂuencing the Bush administration’s overall approach to
it, the strong pockets of opposition to military sales to India within
Congress and the Executive Branch bureaucracy are clearly regarded
by Indians as a major obstacle to any genuine strategic cooperation.
This makes Vajpayee’s willingness to accept U.S. supervision over
the missile defense program in 2003 all the more bold a proposal
in the context of Indian perceptions. For example, Sahgal criticized
the U.S. dilatory attitude toward technology transfers as well as the
bureaucratic structure for policymaking toward India and writes
that,
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The centrality of technology transfers in building a strong and enduring
relationship is underestimated. From the Indian perspective, technology
transfers are the touchstone for forging a long and stable strategic
relationship, in particular dual use technologies, space technologies, and
those related to nuclear risk reduction. U.S. righteousness in this regard
is distressing particularly when much more advanced technologies have
been sold to its strategic competitor, China. Long bureaucratic delays on
account of differences between the departments of State and Defense,
particularly when attempts are made to hyphenate India and Pakistan
under the maxim of regional stability. Another area of differences relates to
structural concerns. What is particularly irksome is the strategic rationale
of dealing with the United States Paciﬁc Command (PACOM) when
India’s central concerns lie in [the] Central Command (CENTCOM).462

Indian Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal similarly told an audience
at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in February 2003
that, while there has been much progress in deepening cooperation
in science and technology to overcome past constraints, there is still
much work to do. Accordingly,
A broad cooperation in science and technology and a more robust trade in
high technology areas should be an important element of our strategy to
stimulate our overall economic relations, because in so many ways India
and the United States are already pioneering international partnerships
in knowledge-intensive industries.463

This cooperation already began to appear in the February 2003
technology agreement between the United States and India. A bilateral
technology cooperation group has been formed to promote high-tech
trade and thus remove many of the barriers that have impeded such
trade in the past. At the same time, the agreement recognizes the need
to prevent dual-use exports of sensitive technology as prohibited
by U.S. export control laws.464 While there are high hopes in India’s
high-tech sector due to this agreement, in a sense it exempliﬁes some
of the problems involved in bilateral technology transfer. Despite the
promised reduction of barriers to trade in supposedly purely civilian
and commercial high technology, it also is clear that the efforts to
overcome obstacles to expanded technology transfer and investment
that currently exist in both countries and which impede the kinds
of relationships called for by Sahgal and Sibal, among others, very
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much apply to defense technology that is directly obtainable from the
United States. This pertains both to entire weapons systems and to
enabling technologies. Some of these impediments apply, for instance
to dual-use technologies like nuclear reactors. As a recent paper by
two members of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
that was written for the Moscow-based Center for Policy Studies in
Russia (PIR) observed,
India pressures nuclear reactor suppliers to adapt the nonproliferation
regime to India’s beneﬁt. India wants access to nuclear reactors and
other sensitive technologies that have been denied on nonproliferation
grounds. New Delhi makes such cooperation a test of U.S. willingness to
elevate Indo-American relations.465

Unfortunately other states, like Russia and France, supplied
India with such reactors and might be interested in doing so again if
nonproliferation strictures could be revised. Indeed, Russia is now
promoting the idea of ﬂoating nuclear reactors and/or plants off
India’s shore.466 Thus, as in so many other cases, the U.S. Government
must acknowledge that blocking the transfer of sensitive technologies
may allow other states to capture that market and for political relations
with a key state to suffer. It is an abiding dilemma for policymakers
and for which there are no easy or uniformly correct answers. But
this consideration raises another reason why it would be quixotic
to expect that State Department disapproval for the nuclear tests
of 1998 could effectively translate into India’s denuclearization, or
that we can punish India for those tests without severe costs in both
economic and political, not to mention strategic inﬂuence over India’s
government. Like it or not, India has alternatives to U.S. displeasure
and, while we can impose costs upon New Delhi, they will rebound
upon us and ultimately not prove decisive because others will be
only too happy to enter into the breach.
And the issues involved with the sale of dual-use or more
speciﬁcally military systems to India push these dilemmas to the
fore. The question of arms sales to India sufaces many of the factors
or asymmetries in the bilateral relationship with Washington that
obstruct deepening of this relationship, as well as the immense
potential beneﬁts for both sides that are now clearly visible to
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proponents of a deeper and more intimate bilateral strategic
relationship. India’s military requests, as stated to Washington and
as seen by its other ongoing acquisitions, also reveal the extent of
its strategic ambitions and perceptions, which some ofﬁcials here
might ﬁnd objectionable. Despite the lifting of sanctions, only the
Fireﬁnder radar system has so far been sold to India. Much of the
reason for the obstacles to completing these deals clearly has been
the State Department’s obstruction. These sales and discussions
also highlight the threats India faces, missiles, theater conventional
war, and terrorism, if not some combination of the three or of any
two of these contingencies. But they also show us that India’s full
commitment to being the dominant military player in South Asia
and its determination to acquire the needed military capabilities to
realize that ambition.
However, it is not clear that by doing so, it will achieve peace,
security, or a lasting partnership with America beyond the Bush
administration’s current term. If there is to be a lasting partnership,
the remaining obstacles to it must be cleared away. We have cited
the bureaucratic rivalry between the DoD and State Department, but
those rivalries do not, by any means, exhaust the defects cited in
our bureaucratic structure with regard to Indian policy, as analyzed
by MacDonald.467 India’s anomalous position between USPACOM,
which includes India in its AOR, and USCENTCOM, where it is
absent but Pakistan and Afghanistan are in that command’s AOR,
causes it to be lost in “a kind of ‘strategic ether’ between two
powerful uniﬁed commands.”468 Indians interviewed by MacDonald
criticized this bifurcation in policymaking because India’s interests
regarding Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and the Gulf cannot
be discussed in PACOM since those areas are outside of its AOR, yet
India cannot come to CENTCOM because it is not in CENTCOM’s
AOR. They also uniformly felt that, because PACOM encompasses
so many important Asian governments, India’s interests do not
receive the priority level of attention that they warrant. One highlevel Indian policymaker told MacDonald that,
To understand Indian national interests and India’s potential role in the
region, the United States must view the Indian Ocean as a region, not a
bunch of segments. An institutionalized link between CENTCOM and
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PACOM that allows the United States to understand India’s role across
the region is required. Absent an integrated view of the region, the
relationship will continue to face the communications breakdowns that
occurred after 9/11. Areas of shared concerns, such as terrorism, Islamic
fundamentalism, narco-trafﬁcking, and sea lane protection cascade across
the PACOM and CENTCOM.469

Yet American ofﬁcers argue that it is beneﬁcial that these countries
are separated in the two commands since, otherwise, combatant
commanders could not achieve relationships of trust and conﬁdence
with Indian and Pakistani ofﬁcials. Therefore, they believe the current
structure allows the U.S. military to build cooperative relationships
with both those states irrespective of the current state of relations
between India and Pakistan.470 They also claim that there is sufﬁcient
interaction between the two commands to allow for the creation of
good policy relationships with each state and that Indian complaints
about this division of commands stems from a fundamental
misapprehension of the role of the combatant and uniﬁed commands
in American defense policy.471 Unfortunately, MacDonald’s evidence
of a lack of interaction between these commands, and of Indians’
clear understanding of the nature of U.S. defense policy organization,
and the clear demonstration of the astonishing incoherence in our
national security bureaucracies where India is concerned shows
these claims to be misconceived and not grounded in reality.472
In fact, these disjunctions and gaps in mutual perceptions
that clearly impede effective cooperation testify to the need for
bureaucratic reform with regard to Indian and U.S. policy. That is
to say, both Indian and U.S. leaders need to overcome bureaucratic
impediments to the bilateral relationship. MacDonald’s evidence and
the strategic realities of an increasingly integrated Asiatic strategic
space that are now clear to analysts and ofﬁcials (and not only in the
United States or India) demonstrate how unwarranted, unjustiﬁed,
and counterproductive complacency is about existing structural
relationships. From the U.S. viewpoint, India should already be
regarded, in fact and not just in rhetoric, as a major Asian power
whose vital interests and points of contact with American policy
encompass the entire area from the Gulf to the Strait of Malacca, as
well as global issues like terrorism and nonproliferation.
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CHAPTER 12
TOWARD THE FUTURE:
INDO-PAKISTANI-AMERICAN TIES
AND FUTURE DEFENSE COOPERATION
A successful U.S. policy towards India will ﬁnd a way to balance
our interests and values with India’s interests and values. It also will
maximize the areas of agreement and consonance, while not allowing
disagreements to go beyond that phase and corrode the relationship
as a whole. Given the history of Indo-American relations and the
current gaps between both states, e.g., on Iraq, the two governments’
disparate foreign policy traditions, contemporary political realities in
both countries, and the problems of making coherent policy toward
the other state that exist within both bureaucracies, sustaining
and advancing this partnership will inevitably be a difﬁcult and
persisting challenge to both governments. However, it is well worth
it to us not to become disappointed by the size of the challenge or the
disparities between American and Indian policies and perspectives.
This is because the potential payoffs to us in Asia and beyond from
an enduring partnership are enormous and long-lasting.
A clear-eyed assessment of existing possibilities should be based
on U.S. interests and values. Those interests dictate, ﬁrst of all that
policy work towards the following objectives:
• Winning the war on terrorism: preventing the al-Qaeda
and Taliban networks from operating freely and ultimately
destroying them requires long-term systematic cooperation
with Pakistan’s armed forces, since they alone can conduct
sustained operations in that “theater” and their support is
essential for any operations we might wish to undertake there
as well.
• At the same time, it is also essential to help stabilize the overall
South Asian balance to prevent Pakistan from becoming a
failed or radical Islamic state. That broad aim is essential to
preventing the recurrence of Kashmiri and other terrorist
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activities and the further inﬂammation of Indo-Pakistani
relations. It also is essential to making progress, not just on
reducing tensions that could ultimately trigger a nuclear
exchange in South Asia but on helping Pakistan move towards
greater liberalization and democratization. This requires not
just military assistance but continuing and even increasing
the economic dimension of U.S. foreign policy programs in
South Asia. Moreover, they should include not just India and
Pakistan, but also the neighboring states of Bangladesh, Nepal,
and Sri Lanka, since all of them are menaced by conditions that
could lead to state failure or civil war, and the recruitment of
many more cadres for terrorism and insurgency against their
own governments, India, and the United States.473
• Third, it is essential to act to facilitate the moderation of IndoPakistani tensions so that Pakistan will not feel obliged to
resort to terrorism, or to support violent Islamic extremism.
Doing so also lowers the likelihood for either conventional
or nuclear conﬂict in the region especially as the latter may
grow out of the former. Another factor here is that, since 1999
when both sides became nuclear weapon possessors, there
have been two crises, Kargil and the crisis of 2001-02, that led
to low-level conventional conﬂict between the two armies in
1999 and then to mobilization of the Indian army in 2002. A
third such crisis could easily go beyond those levels, especially
as many in India now profess to hold a doctrine saying that
India’s conventional superiority now allows it to wage a
“limited conventional war,” i.e., a war against Pakistan for
limited objectives using purely conventional means. Whether
or not they are right, Pakistan holds to a doctrine of nuclear
ﬁrst use and the threat of defeat in a conventional war could
tempt its leaders to throw the nuclear dice to forestall such
an outcome. Preventing such conﬂicts is therefore a matter of
the highest urgency. Since neither side now accepts that we
should be actual mediators, we need to adopt instead a role as
facilitator of conﬂict resolution, but do so with clear objectives
and policies in mind as discussed below.474 And, in fact, it is
mainly U.S. pressure on both New Delhi and Islamabad that
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has been the catalyst for both sides to begin what amounts
to a peace process, however fragile, and insecure. While we
should not be negotiators for either or both sides, we must be
facilitators and encouragers of this process.
• Fourth: As the NSS and QDR both proclaim, the administration
has postulated the long-term goal of forging a new balance
of power in Asia on behalf of democratic change and against
any one power’s excessive aggrandizement.475 This obviously
means China, but it does not have to be containment in its
classical sense. A robust partnership with a ﬂourishing and
democratic India whose power is growing will of its own
accord limit China’s ability to alter that balance in Southeast
Asia in ways contrary to our own and India’s interests.
Creation of a pro-democratic balance, as called for in U.S.
policy documents like the NSS and QDR of 2001 is a vital
and shared strategic objective for both states whose relevance
must be kept in view.
Those objectives are clearly consonant with India’s interests, e.g.,
as expressed in the April 2001 agenda stated above. But achieving
them together requires special care and sensitivity since India cannot
be dictated to and will bridle at any such effort. Moreover, it is not an
ally like other NATO members and seeks partnership, not alliance,
with America. Therefore exchanges must take place on the basis of
mutual equality and mutual understanding. So, work in all these
areas to sustain and advance the partnership must take those factors
into account. For instance, any cooperation with Pakistan that is
not explained in advance to India and that is not taken as part of
a broader strategic approach to keep both those states as partners
with us is bound to undermine our relationships with either one or
both of those states. Therefore, as policy moves forward, we must
maintain constant coordination with both governments concerning
our initiatives there, not in order to give one or the other a veto or
blank check, but in order to keep them both within a framework
where common or at least harmonious interests can be advanced
together and by joint action.
The United States needs a strategic perspective on South Asia
that transcends but includes the current war on terrorism where
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Pakistan is the second front. While the foregoing analysis challenges
the standpoint taken by analysts like Norman Friedman, that India
is or was “irrelevant” to the war on terrorism, there is no question
that Pakistan’s support is vital and urgent, even if its considerable
support also is laced with a good deal of backsliding and temporizing
due to the strong position of Islamic fundamentalists in Pakistani
politics and the resonance of the Kashmir issue there.
Today the distinctions between U.S. and Indian perceptions
pertain with particular force to South Asian issues and relationships,
especially Pakistan and the issues involved in the Indo-Pakistani
relationship. Assuming that genuine strategic partnership among
India, Pakistan, and the United States against terrorism and other
future threats is desirable is not necessarily an Indian view. But it
certainly should represent the objective toward which Washington
should strive, since such a partnership also reduces the likelihood
of other potential threats in Asia. Speciﬁcally, such a partnership
reduces China’s incentives and ability to meddle in South Asia’s
troubled waters and opportunities for both Beijing and Islamabad to
continue the reckless policies of proliferation that are now causing
international insecurity across much of Asia, even to the point of
becoming a major problem for China.476 At the same time, progress
towards Indo-Pakistani conﬂict resolution now accords with the
interests of both Russia and China because of the threat they both
perceive from the terrorist virus that has been let loose in South and
Central Asia.477 This partnership also imposes a severe penalty upon
Pakistan for continuing to support terrorism and pressures it to both
combat terrorism actively, as it has done, and to move, however
cautiously and reluctantly, towards a genuine dialogue with India.
However, for America to move steadily and successfully towards
this outcome, it needs to begin with a realistic assessment of the
current situation.
Many Indian analysts now argue that China is the principal rival of
both India and Washington and that Washington needs India to meet
the Chinese and/or Muslim challenges successfully. Consequently,
the United States has a fundamental stake in the growing capability
of India to provide a major counterweight to forces in Asia that are
clearly antagonistic towards American interests. “Washington has
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yet to realize that India can play the role of a major friendly power
only if it is able to secure and preside over a stable and legitimate
order in South Asia.”478
However, the legitimacy of the regional order must precede any
recognition of India’s presiding over it, which would be the natural
outcome, given its power and a three-way partnership with Pakistan
and the United States. That means Pakistan must also agree to a
new regional order and to some sense of the legitimacy of India’s
leading position there. This requires that Pakistan not feel its security
threatened if it is to live in peace with India and acknowledge its
superior regional and continental position. Only the United States
can provide that reassurance and deterrence of both sides needed to
sustain such a regional order.479 Indeed, there is no way for Indian
power to be regionally secure without a prior establishment of both
its legitimacy and a consensus with Pakistan on that basis. Thus
the partnership which we must now build with India and Pakistan
must create its own legitimacy to be recognized by both sides and
be truly effective. At the same time, America’s growing intimacy
with India and Pakistan already has sparked a frank dialogue that
forges consensus rather than simply assumes either that consensus’s
prior existence or that India (or Pakistan) will act according to
our perception of its interests and conform to our interests and
objectives.480
Beginning with this recognition of reality, we can undertake
to forge a real and lasting partnership that will outlast the present
governments in both countries and conform to both states’ deepest
values and strategic interests. For this purpose, both political and
institutional steps are needed here. The political steps comprise both
the vision upon which an enduring and genuine partnership must be
based and the diplomatic precepts that should govern U.S. strategy
and conduct toward India and the agenda of regional security where
India is a player. The institutional steps are concrete actions that the
U.S. Government and its departments should carry out, not just
including speciﬁc policies, e.g., concerning technology transfer, but
also in adapting the institutional structure of government so that it
can maximize the gains that we hope to obtain from cementing a
long-term partnership.
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First, the administration needs to devise a more uniﬁed approach
to India and to the subcontinent as a whole. It is clear that the State
Department and Congress are inclined to worry more about India
as a nuclear state and proliferator than to see it in the regional
context as a strategic partner of the United States. The Pentagon,
on the other hand, sees India mainly through the lens of strategic
partnership and regional security, rather than as a potential threat
by virtue of the nuclear issue and Pakistani provocations. Thus,
there is an organizational and conceptual disjunction affecting policy
toward South Asia throughout the administration, with the State
Department emphasizing the threat from proliferation by both sides
in South Asia and responses drawn from the traditional repertoire
of arms control. DoD, for its part, manifests a skeptical attitude
toward those traditional precepts of arms control and deterrence.
Hence it promotes the transfer of missile defenses to India.481 As long
as the struggle between these two departmental views continues
unabated or unless it is superseded by new paradigms through
which to view the subcontinent, U.S. policy there will fail to achieve
a lasting strategic partnership with either India or Pakistan. That is
because the basis upon which Washington then will approach this
region will be an internally unstable one, and rival bureaucracies
will sabotage each other’s initiatives. To make this argument does
not mean to minimize either the dangers from the situation in South
Asia, or to overlook the real gains that could accrue to both India
and the United States from a partnership seen primarily through the
perspective of common threats facing both states in Asia. Rather,
it is a call for the administration to establish a consensus within
itself and for subsequent administrations to do likewise concerning
what is most important and enduring in this relationship and to
proceed on a bilateral basis from there. Likewise, recent research
has found that the structure that ties together civilian agencies and
regional combatant commanders is seriously defective and in need
of substantial reform.482 These ﬁndings apply across the globe, not
just to India and Pakistan. But they clearly inhibit the formulation
and implementation of truly strategic and well-conceived policies. A
more auspicious basis for addressing the American relationship with
India actually would be to focus upon or emphasize those features
of both states that are held in common, beginning with the fact that
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they are both multi-confessional and ethnic secular democracies.
Second, their vital interests are threatened by Islamic terrorism,
which deliberately has targeted them. These two points, it should
be noted, also may be applied to Israel, which is why some groups
in both countries talk of a kind of triple alliance among those three
states.483
Third, both states share a common interest in constraining the
growth of Chinese power and inﬂuence in Asia, and are opposed to
one of the main instruments of China’s counterpolicy for restraining
their capabilities in Asia; namely, China’s creation of a ring of
proxies to whom it is proliferating technology and systems both of a
conventional and nuclear nature.484
Fourth, they increasingly have compatible, if not convergent,
economic interests, and South Asia is a great ﬁeld for both to
develop.
Fifth, their common interest in democracy, opposition to terrorism,
attempts to forestall and oppose the proliferation of nuclear weapons,
and concern about China’s intentions sufﬁces to create a strong
basis for partnership, even if the economic link between them was
tenuous and would do so even under the present conditions of IndoChinese rapprochement. However, both the Indian and American
governments also need to eliminate barriers to each other’s trade
and investment in their respective countries and create a viable
basis for future transactions involving military weapons systems,
technologies, and dual-use systems.
On the basis of a common opposition to terrorism and emphasis
on democracy, they also can approach Pakistan individually, or
together as the case may be, to induce it to take steps to democratize
its polity; liberalize its social, economic, and religious institutions;
and, in general, ameliorate conditions along the Line of Control.
Therefore, it is urgent that we craft a better and more workable
approach to the question of Pakistan’s role in the anti-terrorist alliance
and in regional security in South Asia. The urgency of preventing a
return to power by terrorists in Afghanistan or the failure of the state
in Pakistan—unquestionably a strategic nightmare for India and not
its desired outcome—impels the administration to see South Asia in
a broader strategic perspective than the war on terrorism. It may not
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be satisfactory to us, but it could well be the case for both India and
the United States that the Musharraf regime is the best one available,
given what Pakistan’s internal political landscape has come to look
like. It already is clear that stability in Central Asia, now a much more
important theater of operations than previously was the case, also is
imperiled by the prospect of destabilization in either Afghanistan
or Pakistan. Those outcomes would enhance terrorist and Jihadi
capabilities in Southeast Asia tremendously as well as in the Middle
East, making the stabilization of South Asia probably just as urgent
a matter of security for those two regions as well. And, of course, as
many have pointed out, a collapse of the regime in Pakistan could
lead to the following “nightmare outcomes”: transfer of nuclear
weapons to Jihadi control or to elements that would allow those
elements to conduct more terrorist actions abroad under protection
of the “extended deterrence” offered by those weapons. Then those
Jihadi elements could resort to nuclear blackmail, if not actual use
of those weapons, and/or to carry out more operations like the 1999
Kargil attacks. All of those possibilities represent nightmare scenarios
for all concerned.
The quest for equilibrium and balance over and above the need to
defeat terrorism, and to realize common interests across Asia, makes
it equally important to overcome, or reverse, or alleviate Indian
perceptions that Pakistan is not much more than China’s instrument
for containing the rise of Indian power, harassing Indian efforts to
break out of the South Asian “ghetto,” and a legitimate outlet for
Chinese proliferation, which can then go on to other, even more
dangerous destinations like Iran and North Korea.485 Washington
must be able to exercise not just a restraining inﬂuence upon Pakistan,
but also become a decisive, if not the decisive, interlocutor for it to
subsume Indo-Chinese and South Asian rivalries in this framework of
equilibrium. There are signs that such an exercise might be possible,
but we cannot underestimate the difﬁculties along the way to such
an amelioration, not to mention a resolution, of existing tensions.
The difﬁculties are clear to observers. As reported by the Far
Eastern Economic Review, Islamic fundamentalism in the Pakistani
army is growing, ofﬁcers have recently been arrested for aiding
al-Qaeda, which operates increasingly with the toleration of the
Army in Pakistan, and the Army until recently has “turned a blind
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eye” to terrorists crossing into Kashmir. This is in addition to two
assassination attempts against Musharraf on December 14 and 25,
2003, which indicated, as he admitted, penetration of the army and
of his inner circle as well.486 This “unreliability” of the Pakistani
armed forces is, or should be, unacceptable for Washington, since
numerous reports testify to the continuing help rendered by these
fundamentalist parties to the Taliban and other terrorist groups
inside Pakistan as they continue to ﬁght the United States. Nor is
it acceptable to New Delhi for obvious reasons. Consequently, it is
not surprising that under U.S. prodding, there have been several
Pakistani offensives into its tribal area to uproot the Taliban, alQaeda, and other terrorists.
These considerations demonstrate a community of interests
between New Delhi and Washington that terrorism in or potentially
supported by Pakistan must be fought resolutely. Yet while American
ofﬁcials publicly extol the support given by Pakistan to us in the war
on terrorism, this only frustrates India more since Indian analysts
believe that this terrorism is orchestrated, or at least tolerated, from
the top of Pakistan’s government and military, and that we are
inclined to play it down in the interests of having Musharraf take on
the Taliban or al-Qaeda.487 Likewise, any hint of arms sales to Pakistan
generates what Dixit called whining, as noted above.488 While Indian
analysts apparently display little hope that Pakistan will desist from
terrorism, Pakistan’s government had maintained well into 2004 the
argument that it proclaimed in 2002 that it has gone as far as it can
and that it is up to India to launch initiatives to resolve outstanding
issues, among them Kashmir.489 However, until now, India clearly
has wanted Pakistan to be put into the dock, arraigned, tried, and
convicted, even though doing so is beyond anyone’s capability. It
is possible that gestures such as the announcement of a nuclear hot
line between India and Pakistan in June 2004 might lead to further
agreements that actually do something about the sponsorship of
anti-Indian terrorism.490 But until now, naturally the result has been
considerable disappointment in America’s failure to break this
modus vivendi and the support of many politically active Pakistanis
for the Jihadi groups operating against both Washington and India’s
interests. As a result, there have been many Indian expressions, even
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from high-ranking ofﬁcials, of frustration with Washington and
anger at its double standards and unwillingness to, as they see it,
fully take Indian interests and desires into account.491
In order for a consensus among India, Pakistan, and the United
States to grow, Pakistan must fully understand that, having called
terrorists into being to serve its own anti-Indian policies, it now ﬁnds
itself threatened by its own creation. Yet it will take years to uproot
the terrorist virus and its deep-rooted causes inside Pakistan, a task
that entails reversing the whole recent trajectory of Pakistani policies,
moving over time towards a solution with India on outstanding
issues; reversing Pakistan’s domestic political course; and moving
towards democratization and economic development, rather than
toward military posturing and incitement of violence in Afghanistan,
Central Asia, and Kashmir.492 Overcoming the myriad threats to
Pakistan must take time and must involve a positive dialogue with
India that may in many respects be unpleasant for India, given its
heavy-handed response to the violence in Kashmir.
Practical steps are needed here urgently, given the stakes
involved. Since it will not be accepted as a mediator and has therefore
shunned this role, Washington ought to facilitate this dialogue and
repeat its activities in the Middle East between Israel and the Arabs.
This kind of dialogue is essential if Pakistan is to stop being a threat
to the regions it inhabits and instead become a factor for stability,
an outcome that is manifestly in India’s interests, as that alone will
allow it to play the broader Asian role it clearly craves. Therefore,
support for such a dialogue and for its positive reinforcement by
mutually satisfactory agreements over time on outstanding issues
large and small is equally manifestly in Washington’s interests. The
question is how to facilitate this process and enhance America’s now
unique interlocutor status with the two South Asian governments
without being trapped in the struggles between them.
Several recent writings by both Indian and American authors
suggest practical steps that can be undertaken to facilitate this
dialogue. First we must continue to realize that the intense U.S.
effort to defuse Indo-Pakistani tensions since 2002 has opened up
space for India and Pakistan to begin to discuss outstanding issues,
including Kashmir, and for Washington to assist them in doing so.
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Now both states have several commercial and security incentives
to enlist Washington on their side as they have done in nuclear
crises. This facilitates Washington’s ability to engage in a process
of helping them to negotiate solutions to outstanding issues over
time.493 Washington enjoys that status as a privileged interlocutor,
especially as both sides have tried repeatedly to entice it to join their
side or accept their view of the numerous recent crises in South Asia.
This pattern of behavior whereby both sides resort to provocative
actions intended to elicit an equally, if not more provocative response
which can then be used to arraign the other side in Washington is all
too frequent an occurrence.494 Indeed, an examination of the recent
crises involving India and Pakistan that revealed the possibility of
escalation, even to the nuclear level, indicates that strong diplomatic
action by Washington was essential to prevent these crises from
escaping control and becoming hot wars.495 As this study also
indicated that both sides “had learned nothing and forgotten nothing”
and were therefore predisposed to play games of chicken with each
other and launch provocative crises, Washington’s role is therefore
vital.496 Given both sides’ nuclear capabilities, such “games” as the
Kargil offensive in 1999 or the use of terrorism and India’s coercive
diplomacy in reply during 2001-02 can bring about precisely the crisis
that nobody professes to want. Thus, in fact, although administration
spokesmen claim that “in every instance, Indian and American
objectives, far from being antithetical are complementary,” this
assertion is not quite true.497 But they can become more convergent
than was previously the case. Even if many Indians, as these ofﬁcials
profess, want Pakistan to achieve a “soft landing,” it is not clear that
Pakistan does or can do so or that this will remain the policy of the
Indian government if Pakistan refuses to meet its initiatives or stop
supporting terrorism against it.498 Therefore a well-organized political
strategy on the administration’s part is needed to bridge the gaps
between both India and Pakistan so that they can reduce tensions
between them, devise an enduring and viable mechanism by which
they can continue to seek to reduce conﬂicts, and both work together
with America in a redeﬁned political environment where all sides
can realize important and possibly even vital interests.
Second, Washington should avoid taking a position on the ﬁnal
outlines of an accord concerning Kashmir or other issues. Rather,
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it should support activities like Track Two and regional dialogues,
encourage foreign investment in both states and Kashmir, tailor its
assistance to democratizing projects, and emphasize that the issue
in Kashmir is primarily a human rights, or democratic, issue. This
avoids getting entangled in each side’s claims, actually maximizes
the interests of all concerned, and facilitates a ﬁnal settlement.499
Third, the framework for a resolution must include the cessation
of Pakistani support for cross-border terrorism and violation of
the current cease-ﬁre; efforts to facilitate conﬂict resolution and
conﬁdence-building between India and Pakistan; and free, fair, and
nonviolent elections to the state assembly on India’s side of Kashmir.
Likewise, as cross-border terrorism diminishes, India can begin to
thin out its deployments at the border.500
Given the intensity and obduracy with which both sides now hold
to their positions, Washington always will come under pressure from
both sides to lean towards one or the other. While it may be true that,
as former Secretary of State Colin Powell has stated, “we probably
have the best relations we have had with India and Pakistan now than
in many, many years,” it is by no means assured that we can maintain
that situation and keep both states in an alliance against Islamic
terrorism without a well-conceived and active policy. Nevertheless,
the return of both parties to composite negotiations (their phrase)
over all the issues that divide them that was announced in January
2004 and the progress, albeit limited, since then, are very much due
to American diplomacy. And this effort must be continued and
reinforced.501 Policy toward India or Pakistan also always will have
to take account of the regional dimension of this relationship and the
impact of our decisions upon the third member of this “triangle.”
Making the need for a more important clear-sighted, yet adroit policy
is the absence of factors of a political or structural nature that could
serve, absent U.S. diplomacy, as mediating forces in Indo-Pakistani
crises. The absence of such forces both reinforces and stems from
both sides’ tendencies to launch and escalate crises suddenly and
heightens the urgency of action to contain those crises, all the while
validating President Clinton’s observation that South Asia, and
especially Kashmir, are the most dangerous places on earth.502
To these considerations, we must add the fact that U.S. concessions
to Pakistan that are not balanced or appear not to be balanced by
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due regard for Indian interests, sensitivities, and perceptions will
cause bitterness in New Delhi, as noted above. So, as long as Indian
policymakers see the same facts we do, they will not accept that
their interests are not to be taken into account. Indeed, from our
standpoint, taking India’s interests into account and not taking it
for granted is what this partnership must be about on a day-to day
basis. Thus Washington must not relax the pressure on Islamabad to
stop supporting terrorism, either in Kashmir or in Afghanistan; to
stop proliferating to other countries, either through governmental
or quasi-private channels; and to ensure the safety of its nuclear
weapons and materials. In return, Washington should do its utmost
to ensure that the negotiations now beginning over Kashmir and
other issues with India move forward.
While ensuring that neither country is blindsided by our moves
toward the other is essential, constructing mechanisms where both
countries and the United States can interact together regularly on
issues of common concern would also be desirable. Such working
groups or Track Two programs can provide much useful basis for
stimulating a mutually beneﬁcial dialogue and for ﬂoating new
initiatives that could ameliorate tensions.503 For example, there is an
urgent need for large-scale infrastructural and environmental projects
in Central Asia, in energy and water conservation to be sure, but not
only there. These projects, which should also include Afghanistan,
would beneﬁt all sides, and certainly Indian and Pakistani business
interests would beneﬁt greatly from them. Joint military training
for local armed forces also could become a possibility if all three
states and the host governments could agree. A U.S. proposal to
guarantee the safety of projects like oil and gas pipelines would
also be beneﬁcial. It would build conﬁdence and shared interests,
reduce Iran’s ability to make trouble in Central Asia, provide those
states with needed outlets to the Indian Ocean, and reduce their
dependence upon Russia’s infrastructure. Track Two dialogues or
working groups could formulate such proposals while ensuring that
the trilateral dialogue goes forward.
This sensitivity needs to be established as well for the bilateral
defense relationship and security cooperation with India. Policy
adjustments within a relatively stable framework are the stuff
of politics, and this is especially to be expected at a time when
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governments change or could change, as is the situation in this bilateral
relationship. Both the Indian and American governments will be
adjusting their relations to each other based on the balance of factors
in the relationship so it is obvious that there will be changes from
the Vajpayee to the Manmohan Singh governments. Nevertheless,
the new government has made clear that it wants to continue the
strategic partnership with Washington. That is clear from the recent
DPG meetings and the result of Foreign Minister K. Natwar Singh’s
visit to Washington in June 2004. Indeed, that was his ﬁrst foreign
visit, symbolizing the priority he and the government attach to the
American connection. Certainly the Bush administration appreciates
this, for key ofﬁcials like Secretary Powell have expressed their
conﬁdence that this relationship will continue largely along previous
lines.504
We can see how this newly modulated relationship is taking
shape from the new government’s initial moves and statements and
Washington’s corresponding actions. Even though the new Indian
government has stated that it will (not surprisingly) pursue an
independent policy in favor of multipolarity in world politics and
against unilateralism, Natwar Singh also stated that relations with
Washington are of “exceptional importance” and should not be
“episodic.” Indeed, India aims to strengthen and deepen those ties.505
As did the previous regime, the new government will seek to deepen
relations with China. But it is unlikely that it will spurn Japan’s recent
public offer to establish a “global partnership” with India to balance
China’s rising power. Indeed, it is already discussing collaboration
on terrorism and defense cooperation with Japan, evidently in the
Indian Ocean’s sea lines of communication.506 Similarly, even though
the regime claims to greatly value its relations with the Islamic world
and is well aware that some 4 million Indians live in the Middle
East and are thus hostage to developments there, it will, we are
told, probably not go further than to condemn certain Israeli actions
rhetorically, e.g., its operations in Gaza in May-June, 2004. So while
there will be a new thrust toward perhaps greater balance between
Israel and the Palestinians and reiteration of support for a Palestinian
state (hardly a novel approach since both Washington and Jerusalem
publicly support such an eventual outcome), the new government “is
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unlikely to do anything that may jeopardize Delhi’s second-largest
arms supplier.”507 Instead, as a former diplomat claims,
The India-Israel relationship has acquired substantive content in the past
which serves the mutual need of both countries. . . . India will carefully
balance its national interest with other considerations before making any
policy changes which I don’t think will happen.508

Plans for intensifying infrastructural linkages connecting India to
Central Asia, especially Afghanistan, and Iran also are going forward
in line with earlier plans.509
Military modernization remains the watchword of the
government, and this will clearly lead it to continue seeking the
most effective ways to upgrade India’s defense industries and
defense capabilities. Therefore, the government is apparently going
to continue mainly along previous lines of foreign acquisitions.510
The package announced in late 2004 and discussed above is further
evidence of movement towards regularizing arms sales to India.
Evidently the BJP government’s support for missile defense in 2002
also helped persuade the administration to support the sale of the
Phalcon to India. And while Washington is ready to increase military
ties, including combined military exercises, the domestic cost of
formally supporting the missile defense program might prove to be
too much of a burden for the Indian government to bear, even though
it has said it will debate it fairly.511 Given the Indian government’s
clear desire to develop this partnership, such tactics might not be the
most productive way to achieve our broad strategic goals, since they
immediately thrust controversial issues that not even all of our allies
accept into the foreground of the agenda.
At the same time, perhaps the most signiﬁcant statement of India’s
defense plans is the release of the semi-classiﬁed Indian Maritime
Doctrine. This doctrine offers real possibilities for enhancing
cooperation with the U.S. Navy against terrorists; forging broader
ties based on sales of naval technologies, weapons, and platforms;
and restraining the growth of Chinese power in the Indian Ocean,
three shared and key strategic goals. The Indian Navy will implement
minimum nuclear deterrence by achieving a real SLBM, probably
from Russia, generate a littoral warfare capability that entails power
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projection ashore, and seek to dominate the Indian Ocean Region
(IOR). The latter objective in particular almost inevitably entails
closer cooperation with the United States, and especially the U.S.
Navy, because India and the Pentagon are clearly animated by a
genuine alarm about the growing capabilities of the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).512
Through force enhancements and acquisitions like the P-3C
Orions and surface vessels bought from Russia, France, etc., the
Indian Navy (IN) will extend its capabilities and reach, enabling it
to undertake new and more distant missions. It will aim to counter
distant and emerging threats; protect Sea Lines of Communications
(SLOC); combat piracy; and, most importantly, dominate the IOR
“choke points, important islands, and vital trade routes.”513 Thus
later in 2004, the IN will start policing the IOR together with the
Singaporean, Thai, and Philippine Navies to check piracy, weapons
smuggling, drug running, and all potential threats to commercial sea
trafﬁc. According to Commander Uday Bashkar, these actions signify
India’s reliability and credibility as an ally to ASEAN members and
to China. To add to its proﬁle, the IN has also stepped up maneuvers
with the U.S., Russian, French, ASEAN members, Iranian, UAE, and
Kuwaiti navies.514 So enhanced naval cooperation with America,
either on a bilateral or on a multilateral basis with Southeast Asian
states and foreign governments’ naval forces, is a real possibility that
is likely to continue if not increase.
Even in Iraq, there is an attempt to build bridges despite the strong
public and parliamentary opposition to the war there. When the UN
passed Resolution 1546 in June 2004, setting the parameters under
UN auspices for the transition to a new government until elections
by January 2005, Natwar Singh indicated that the government would
have to look carefully at the “changed situation.”515 However, this
triggered an explosion at home and indicates the limits that still exist
to this relationship. Although Washington has launched a major
lobbying campaign to get the new government to support its position
in Iraq and the presence of Iraqi troops under the terms of Resolution
1546 and then up to 20,000 troops there, the government’s coalition
partners, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and the Left Front,
have made it clear that any such approval of Washington’s policies
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in Iraq, not to mention dispatch of troops, will lead them to call out
protest marches and demonstrations. Thus the government has had
to temporize and tell Washington that it cannot yet send troops to
Iraq, lest the domestic scene unravel.516
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CHAPTER 13
OVERCOMING THE OBSTACLES
TO A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
This episode, like earlier struggles over Iraq, suggests the obstacles
to deeper partnership and the problems that must be overcome for
it to ﬂourish. As long as the government depends on a coalition
comprising the substantial anti-American left–wing parliamentary
parties in India, it will be constrained in its approach to America
and Washington’s agenda. Nevertheless, it is clearly following in
its predecessor’s footsteps as regards the United States and even
to a signiﬁcant degree, Israel. Still, attempts by Washington to
pressure the government to submit to U.S. policies that are beyond
the coalition’s or the government’s capability to sustain will unduly
burden the relationship and could ultimately drag it down. India’s
domestic politics compel us to tread warily and emphasize those
areas of the bilateral agenda where joint cooperation can take place
smoothly and quickly so that we can then build capital to do the
harder issues together.
Domestic politics will inﬂuence Indian policies of interest to us
in several directions. Foreign and defense policy may have to take
more account of coalition partners and necessarily will become
more consultative and less subject to the governmental ministries’
and the Prime Minister’s exclusive discretion. This could also
entail a probable weakening of the National Security Advisor’s and
the National Security Council’s power. There will be more of the
moralism that is bred in the bone of the Congress Party and possibly
more rhetoric about multipolarity. But it will also be coupled with
Realpolitik when concrete needs are at stake, a combination that
tends to alienate many Americans if not handled carefully.517 On the
other hand, there probably will be continuing pressure from India
to induce us to compel Pakistan to stop supporting terrorism and
negotiate in good faith with New Delhi. So, with proper care, the
relationship can still go forward. Ashwani Kumar, a Congress Party
member of the upper house of the Parliament, displayed this blend
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of moralism and Realpolitik when he told an American audience in
2003 that,
The inescapable logic of the situation supports a purposive engagement
between India and the U.S., consistent with a theory of power that allows
for differences in perspective on some issues. We need to deal candidly
with differences about both means and ends. There is no escape from a
brooding moral dimension to a philosophy of power tailored to foster
international conciliation and peace. Indeed, “without a moral yardstick
constantly applied to action, the possession of power, large or tiny, is
always subject to misuse.” Iraq has shown that present ills triumph over
philosophy. We need to accept that there cannot be a selective war against
terror and that the processes of armed engagement are as important as
the ideals that it is intended to support.518

But candid discussion is not enough, given the constraints
that exist on policymaking now in both capitals; we also need to
do more than just not being disagreeable about differences, while
speaking candidly. We must also constantly and simultaneously
stress commonalities. We must also avoid needless or thoughtless
mistakes that compound an already difﬁcult strategic position
and overcome the obstacles cited above. As we have suggested,
DoD apparently is gradually wresting control of the issue of arms
sales away from the State Department, which still seems intent on
denying India formal recognition or acknowledgment as a nuclear
power. The administration still has not recognized India as such,
possibly fearing that other potential proliferators might be further
emboldened to carry out a nuclear weapons program and thereby
obtain the beneﬁts that would accrue to India from being recognized
as a nuclear power. On the other hand, good policy is rarely one that
is maintained in the face of overwhelming and contradictory facts.
Regardless of the potential deterrent to other proliferators, there
does seem to be something of tilting at windmills in maintaining this
stance rather than at making policy on the basis of existing realities.
Defending an untenable position regarding India and Pakistan in
order allegedly to deter proliferation makes little sense.519 It seems
unlikely that we can achieve our nonproliferation goals by denying
plain facts that State Department ofﬁcials clearly acknowledge,
especially as virtually every bilateral statement raises the point
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that both states oppose nuclear proliferation and that this common
orientation is a factor making for a strategic partnership.520
While going to the extreme of maintaining for New Delhi
essentially an open account at the Pentagon is not desirable, a more
reasonable procedure for screening and evaluating its requests for
weapons systems and technologies also needs to be in place. This
is particularly the case now that Pakistan has been declared a nonNATO ally, placing it symbolically on a par with Israel and South
Korea, and giving it opportunities to receive weapons like the F-16.
This procedure for handling Indian arms sales requests also must be
integrated not only with the commitment to global nonproliferation,
but also to the regional context within which we and New Delhi seek
to operate either jointly or in parallel. This consideration is one more
reason why it is eminently desirable that Washington, New Delhi, and
Islamabad forge a clearer and more permanent working relationship
among themselves. It also suggests a more active dialogue with India
concerning Iran.
Finally, a solid partnership with India helps stabilize Asia beyond
the subcontinent and enlarges the balance within which a rising China
will soon appear. Reports indicate that what one journalist calls “the
outsourcing of global security, with India once again getting the job”
is accelerating under the Bush administration’s leadership. Even
though India is determined to retain its strategic autonomy and not
be excessively dependent on anyone for major political or defense
goods, there is a clear convergence of aims with the United States on
many issues affecting Asian security. K. Santhanam, Director of the
prestigious Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA), cites
security of the oil lanes, the sea lanes of Southeast Asia, and relations
with China as areas where a “natural convergence” of interests is
occurring. 521 Other analysts go farther in their assessments of what
this relationship now means and could mean in the future. For
example, C. Raja Mohan writes that,
For skeptics, the suggestion of an area of peace in Asia remains wishful
thinking. It is in fact rooted in the fact that the much feared cold war
between the United States and China has now been postponed, probably
indeﬁnitely. It is built on the real potential to deepen the economic
integration of Asia. It is founded on the recognition that all the major
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powers in the region face threats—not from the unrealized geopolitical
ambitions of the other but from religious extremism and terrorism
ﬂourishing from many failed and failing states in Asia. The importance
of the changing nature of great power relations in Asia is not abstract. It
offers India a rare opportunity to transform the international relations
of the subcontinent. . . . As the weakest of the great powers, India has
no reason to choose options of aligning with one great power against
another. India must instead focus on intensifying its current multidirectional engagement of all the major powers in the region and become
an indispensable element of the Asian balance of power. A creative Indian
policy must aim at leveraging the rise of China and Japan and the SinoU.S. entente to transform its own security situation in the subcontinent.
India is now in a position to mobilize American, Chinese, and Japanese
power to engineer internal change in Pakistan and nudge it in a direction
of political moderation and regional economic integration.522

It is clear that, while he eschews an alliance with Washington,
he is recommending a strategic partnership to induce Pakistan to
move toward democracy and away from support for terrorism and
insurgency in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Tellis similarly observes
that, not only is there a broad strategic convergence of Indo-American
aims, there also is a clear hierarchy or division of labor between them
concerning the regional priorities each one will face in Asia. Thus,
India certainly will dominate South Asia by virtue of its economic
and military superiority that translates into geopolitical primacy
there. It will be able to dominate its immediate periphery, the smaller
states of the region, and inﬂuence outcomes to some degree in more
outlying but still relatively near areas like Southeast Asia, Central
Asia, and perhaps even the Persian Gulf. Undoubtedly, it will have
something like a veto power over South Asian developments. At
the same time, in those Asian areas of critical signiﬁcance to vital
U.S. interests that would warrant the commitment of U.S. resources,
including force on a unilateral basis if necessary, India will “remain
a peripheral actor.” But as its capabilities grow, so will its inﬂuence,
even if it is limited. And that inﬂuence can add to the advancement
of U.S. and shared interests if relations with New Delhi are managed
adroitly. These areas and issues include: the security of the Persian
Gulf, freedom of navigation in Southeast Asian waters, protection
of Taiwan, and the global, i.e., non-Kashmiri war on terrorism.523 In
these areas, he writes, the enormous disparity in power capabilities
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and resources between Washington and New Delhi will be so stark
as to render Indian preferences entirely irrelevant.524 Yet,
In such issue areas, however, Indian power could be dramatically
magniﬁed if it were to be applied in concert with that of the United
States. In such circumstances, Indian resources could help to ease U.S.
operational burdens, provide the United States with those beneﬁts arising
from more robust international solidarity and, in the process, actually
enhance Indian power in a multiplicity of ways.525

Thus cooperation in those regions would redound substantially to
both states’ beneﬁt. Certainly, we are seeing precisely this kind of
outcome in India’s signiﬁcant assistance to the United States in the
global war on terrorism.
Finally, as Tellis even more tellingly observed above, Indian
power can be most relevant to U.S. policies in the so-called interstices
of Asian geopolitics where India’s capabilities are strongest and ours
are most limited, e.g., in Central Asia, Afghanistan, the Indian Ocean,
and in issue-areas like terrorism, narcotics, and the environment.526
As he did above, Tellis postulates three reasons why this form of the
relationship will not only beneﬁt India but also the United States. This
Indo-American interaction will take place and be felt most directly
where Washington has few vital interests. That should minimize
possible frictions between Washington and New Delhi. Second, as
regards both Asian and global geopolitics, Indo-American interests
are convergent. Third, on many issues of great importance to the
United States—the balance of power in Asia, the security of sea
lanes in the Indian Ocean, WMD proliferation, terrorism, narcotics
trafﬁcking, and the rise of religious and secular extremism—Indian
interests invariably dovetail with those of the United States and as a
result are likely to evoke active Indian support.527
At present, some scholars question if there really are deep-going
and fully shared interests leading to common actions regarding
the policies of India and America in South Asia. Speciﬁcally, it is
by no means certain to all observers that both these governments
have fully congruent or at least parallel interests and perceptions
regarding Indo-Pakistani relations and the local dimensions of the
war on terrorism that would allow them to make the most of their
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relationship with each other. As one assessment of the bilateral
relationship observes,
But unrestrained giddiness about “paradigm shifts” or a strategic
rapprochement between India and the United States is premature. To
the contrary, substantive differences over the nature and goals of IndoAmerican partnership are likely to complicate future relations between the
world’s two largest democracies. A short list of issues where Washington
and New Delhi will ﬁnd it difﬁcult to collaborate would include, Pakistan,
China, Iran, Iraq, the World Trade Organization, and the future of the
global nonproliferation regime. India will continue to prefer a multipolar
world order, whereas the Bush administration, even more than Clinton’s,
is likely to assert U.S. dominance and insist on Washington’s right to act
unilaterally.528

We have already seen this gap between Indo-American
perceptions happening with regard to Iraq and India’s excellent
ties to Iran and its stance on global trade further conﬁrms that there
are real differences with Washington on certain important issues
in world politics. However, it is by no means correct that previous
differences of opinion must be decisive or cannot yield to new
perceptions and policies. The current case of China is an example.
Even if we assume China to be a strategic competitor for both India
and Washington and a major architect of a strategy to tie India down
to being a contested power in South Asia without a more continental
focus in Asia, e.g., by major proliferation to Pakistan, it is by no means
foreordained that containment is or will be the necessary response
of both capitals to China.529 Even as other Asian states, e.g., Japan,
approach India with calls for partnership that are clearly intended to
counter China, India, as we saw above, opposes any idea of a policy
based on containment of China.”530
This point of view coincides with Tellis’ assessment of India’s
elite consensus on China cited above, that India’s sense of possible
threat due to China’s rising power did not mandate a direct
confrontation with China, but rather merely a steady buildup of
its own multidimensional capabilities and resources for regional
competition, which sufﬁces to check China’s ambitions and make
India more worthy of being seen as a genuinely equal strategic
partner of America in Asia.531 Direct confrontation with China is
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thus ruled out in favor of economic-political cooperation and muted
strategic rivalry whenever possible. Thus there is no apparent need
for a formal alliance as long as both partners understand and accept
that the steady rise of India’s power at the current rate of economic
and military growth sufﬁces to check Chinese ambitions in Southeast
and South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Moreover, India’s own steady
and impressive rising power potential demonstrates the power of
the democratic option in Asia and stands in stark contrast to Chinese
authoritarianism, which many fear will inevitably run into a major
domestic crisis.532 In that case, an Indo-American partnership will
be strengthened by the fact of being “an axis of democracy,” not a
purely military alliance whose purpose is containment of China.533
And this is true even if India is in favor or not averse to further U.S.
deployments in the region, or some sort of alliance along the lines of
the so-called Asian NATO comes into being.534 As that alliance has yet
to take shape, it could become like today’s NATO, a crisis manager,
and provider of stability, rather than the Cold War alliance.
Both China’s concerns about this partnership and its efforts to
improve ties with New Delhi work to the advantage of both partners
here because these factors reduce China’s margin for threatening
behavior, create a broader Asiatic balance than would otherwise be
the case, and enhance the U.S. position vis-à-vis those two states,
making it the focus of each side’s effort to gain greater leverage
and traction in Asia.535 Consequently, enhanced bilateral military
partnership and arms sales to India offer Washington another card
to play when needed and provide both states with an ever-present
factor of restraint that acts upon Chinese policy. As long as that
Indian buildup sufﬁces to check or to constrain Chinese strategic
options, helping it constitutes a sound investment for the United
States. In this respect, the overall picture bears out Tellis’ argument
that, as long as India’s buildup of economic and military power
takes place at a moderate but visible and sustainable rate, it will
sufﬁce to restrain Chinese ambitions and serve both Washington
and New Delhi’s interests. At the same time, a discernible rise in
both Indian and American economic and defense presence, as well
as capability, in and around Southeast Asia will also help establish
a continuing balance there and prevent China from deploying its
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rising economic and military power and becoming too great a threat
to the region’s independence. Undoubtedly Chinese analysts and
ofﬁcialdom recognize this possibility and signs of its appearance in
Southeast Asia.536 In other words, to the extent that Indian power
contributes to an overall Asian framework backed up and promoted
by Washington that restrains the projection of Chinese power, it will
contribute to a broader, more comprehensive Asiatic equilibrium that
keeps all powers in play and prevents any one power from making
a bid for regional or continental hegemony. Indeed, Indian analysts
are conﬁdent of such an outcome.537 It should be noted that precisely
such a balance of power is postulated in the U.S. NSS of 2002 as
being a desirable outcome of U.S. policy in Asia. So this concept of
Indo-Chinese relations is in close harmony with American goals
as well.538 Moreover, at least some Indian analysts believe that U.S.
forces in and around Central Asia will not soon be withdrawn, and
that Washington will continue to play the leading role in trying to
moderate India’s troubled relations with Pakistan. Therefore, these
two policies will constrain Chinese options in the area and stabilize
the regional and overall Asian balance by doing so.539 Certainly
Chinese observers have assimilated fully the notion, reiterated by the
Pentagon and the Indian government, that India and America “have
common strategic interests in Asia and even farther regions.”540
Despite the growing amity of bilateral relations with India
and the rhetoric of a complete identity of interests, that is not yet
the case. While we already have made suggestions as to ways to
forge this strategic consensus, it is no less important to “encase”
those proposals within a viable strategic framework. Apart from
bureaucratic obstructions either in Washington or in New Delhi, it
is clear that for an alliance to ﬂourish it has to go beyond shared
enemies and the rhetoric of common values. In other words, if there
truly are shared interests, they must be made real and activating
principles of common policies and actions and embedded in viable
mechanisms for undertaking those actions and shared values that
animate them.
The basis for the continuing vitalization of this partnership would
be to move together toward the creation of a democratic security
community, e.g., as suggested by Henry Nau. Indeed, using this
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aspiration and foundation to continue the building of partnership
with India ﬂows naturally from the administration’s most basic
foreign policy precepts. As President Bush recently stated, “The
work of building democracies in nations that have endured decades
of tyranny is hard. It’s hard work. It will require the kind of sustained
commitment that won the Cold War. We accept that duty. We accept
that duty in our time because our cause is right.”541 The 2002 NSS and
President Bush’s second inaugural speech also make clear that this
is the foundation principle for the administration’s overall national
security policy.542 Furthermore, strengthening of our alliances and
security communities with like-minded democratic states in both
Europe and Asia, even when they disagree with us, invigorates our
overall mutual ties. Thus India has been perturbed by the disunity
of the members of the Atlantic Alliance over Iraq, even if it has not
publicly voiced its apprehensions on this point.543
As Nau describes this security community, its attributes and
advantages are as follows. First of all,
The administration needs a new conceptual framework to integrate
the various elements of its Asian policy. Traditional frameworks pose
policies as alternatives—for example, containment or engagement. The
framework of a democratic security community integrates alternatives.
Unlike traditional concepts, a democratic security community operates
on the basis of common democratic values, not just common foreign
policy interests (alliances) or common international institutions
(collective security arrangements). The community distinguishes clearly
between America’s democratic allies in Asia, such as Japan, South Korea,
Australia, New Zealand, and India (and indirectly Taiwan), and its more
conventional, perhaps temporary, allies or collective security partners in
the war against terror, such as China and Russia.544

Thus, second, our existing anchors to Japan, South Korea, and
Australia remain in place for our overall Asian policy, along with
the ability to avoid the drift of policy either toward a premature
collective security arrangement with China or to classic balance of
power politics. While constructing a framework that can restrain
Chinese power, we at the same time, hopefully along with India,
act to channel that rising power’s growth in constructive directions.
This is because a security community, unlike an alliance, does not
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need an external adversary upon whom to focus. Consequently, both
Washington and New Delhi can then conduct extensive economic and
political relationships with difﬁcult states like China and Pakistan,
and even engage in genuine strategic cooperation with them when
necessary, yet also pressure them to move in directions that are more
congenial to the members of the security community’s interests.545
Yet even if any of the members of this community conducts its own
policy that diverges from that of another or all the other members,
that need not create a rupture or even a crisis within the community.
Meanwhile, the possibility of closer bonds, e.g., an alliance, remains
intact and vital, given the preexisting foundation of shared values,
not just interests.546 In this way, Washington can also place pressure
upon Pakistan, either overtly or discreetly as the case may be, to
move away from support for terrorism. The option of joining this
security community, as happened in Europe, then becomes too
positive a beneﬁt to be traded away lightly. As Washington is already
placing such pressure upon Pakistan, this approach would then
become even more compelling and might create sufﬁcient political
space over time for, ﬁrst, a diminution of the crisis atmosphere in
and around Kashmir and the borders with India and, second, for a
gradual resumption of the dialogue between India and Pakistan that
might then ﬂower into a productive process.
As former Ambassador to Sri Lanka Teresita C. Schaffer writes,
To avoid repeating history, U.S. policymakers must depersonalize policy
toward Pakistan and establish two fundamental bases for engagement:
a long-term democracy agenda designed to strengthen and legitimize
Pakistan’s institutions; and a sustained and realistic approach to working
with both Pakistan and India to deal with and ideally resolve their
enduring, dangerous dispute.547

Nau’s approach also creates a means by which the bureaucratic
rivalry in Washington over how to deal with India might be
overcome. The emphasis on a democratic security community
changes the framework by which we address issues of proliferation
and conﬂict resolution in South Asia. First of all, it places the center of
gravity of U.S. policy in South Asia, and even Central Asia, precisely
where it ought to be, namely, the promotion of pluralistic and more
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developed societies, not because we like them but because states
that move successfully in this direction over time ﬁnd themselves
less encumbered by threats to their internal security that drive both
state failure or belligerent foreign policies. Pakistan is a case in point,
but it is an axiom of security in the Third World that the perception
of the state’s being in danger primarily from internal causes is
a major driver of foreign and defense policies.548 Second, Nau’s
formula creates a policy environment that offers numerous positive
inducements for states to liberalize, if not democratize, because such
policies ease their external (as well as domestic) security challenges.
This is precisely why a new emphasis on socio-economic dimensions
of our overall South Asian policy should be considered strongly by
the administration and Congress.549
Nau’s formulation also thereby places pressure upon Pakistan
to cease and desist from its previous proliferation to North Korea
and Iran by threatening it with meaningful isolation if it continues to
undermine this Asian security community. Likewise, it also allows
us to approach India in terms that are different from the ongoing
bureaucratic debate. We need to accept that India will not renounce
nuclear weapons to suit our moralistic tendencies in foreign policy.
But we can craft an approach to India that subsumes all discussion
of military assistance in any ﬁeld under an approach that is based
upon what we share rather than what divides us. At the same
time, Nau’s approach also moderates fears that Indo-American
partnership or alliance will be explicitly or implicitly nothing more
than a containment scheme directed against China. While these
two states and others might unite to counter excessive or negative
aggrandizement of Chinese power, they also will be creating both
negative and positive incentives for China to act in concert with
their purposes based on concrete shared interests that can then bring
about a change in values over time in Chinese thinking. Chinese
power, though growing, will then be growing in directions that are
nonthreatening to the partners and other Asian states.550
In the context of Nau’s proposed formula, we can also recommend
speciﬁc policies that would strengthen the bonds of partnership
with India, while avoiding the trap of overcommitment and of a too
hastily formed alliance, which would then rest on an incomplete and
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therefore wobbly foundation. As suggested in a 2003 report by the
Council on Foreign Relations but also in some cases going beyond
it, a sound approach to strengthening ties with New Delhi would
require the following speciﬁc policies in the defense and foreign
policy sector (I omit the speciﬁcally economic aspects here that do
not relate to those issues, but they are all worthy of consideration):
• Continuing strong and public support at the highest levels of
government of enhanced bilateral cooperation to emphasize
to bureaucracies and publics in both countries the need for
effective and uniﬁed policymaking by those bureaucracies;
• Maintenance and, as possible, enhancement of ofﬁcial
cooperation and dialogue on political, security, and intelligence
areas;
• Reinstitution of an ofﬁcial dialogue on bilateral and
international economic policy issues; and,
• Negotiation of a bilateral trade agreement to spur expanded
economic ties and thus provide a solid ﬂoor beneath which
the security relationship can never fall.
On its own, the United States should also undertake the following
actions:
• Ease restrictions on cooperation in the civilian satellite sector;
and,
• Treat India as a “friendly” country with regard to the
granting of export licenses of defense equipment and dualuse technologies.
Adopting these two measures as policy has just become more
likely as both sides have agreed to formalize a framework of action
that would enable India to obtain dual-use technologies from the
United States. This agreement would allow India to receive civilian
nuclear, space, and other technologies. This process could also allow
HAL to form agreements with other major defense producers as it
has long wanted to do. India now will also obtain greater access to
Western and American ﬁrms that can provide it with the technologies
for information warfare and C3I systems that it desires. Likewise,
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real possibilities for bilateral cooperation in space also can now be
envisaged. Most of all, this decision goes a considerable distance in
demonstrating to India the seriousness with which the United States
now approaches its ties to New Delhi.551 Other policy steps would also
be of major importance in cementing this relationship and making it
both a productive and enduring one. Again, in following the CFR’s
suggestions but also expanding on them, this study recommends
that the U.S. Government study ways to ﬁt India and Pakistan into
the global nuclear nonproliferation regime without upsetting it and
to make maximum effort to prevent either or both of them from any
further proliferation of WMD technologies or systems. This would
require both India and Pakistan to adopt and enforce more effective
export control regulations and laws.552
These policy recommendations are essential because it is vital
to the success of building a partnership, if not a more intimate
relationship, that both sides treat each other’s interests seriously. As
a retired Indian general told MacDonald,
Indians understand that the United States has sustained interests in the
regions that are part of India’s extended security horizon and that it
will act to protect them. But as an equal partner, we expect increased
consultation about U.S. objectives and intentions in these areas. Without
consultation, we cannot identify areas of convergence and work jointly
with the United States to maintain peace and security in the region.553

In other words, absent a robust, frank, intimate, and enduring
dialogue among equals, no genuine and lasting partnership is
possible. This would not only hurt India; it would hurt America as
well, and make the achievement of many of our vital interests much
more difﬁcult. This emerges clearly from MacDonald’s interviews
with American military personnel.
Generals have observed to her that “Access to India would enable
the U.S. military “to be able to touch the rest of the world” and to
respond rapidly to regional crises.” Likewise, the Air Force would
gain by access to India because that would bring it closer to the
entire area of instability from the Gulf to Southeast Asia including
Central Asia. Moreover, India’s well-developed infrastructure could
assist U.S. power projection forces in many ways.554 A strong and
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viable partnership with India would constitute recognition of the
security situation throughout Asia that is increasingly a seamless
web that embraces all the areas where India is displaying keen, if not
vital, interests and where the United States as well is now militarily
engaged. This notion of increased security interdependence among
all the different regions of Asia, including the Gulf and Central,
South, and Southeast Asia, is now becoming as well a commonplace
of international—not just American—scholarship and analysis.555
Therefore effective policy in support of vital U.S. interests must
acknowledge the transformations taking place on the ground and
respond accordingly.
That response appropriately entails signiﬁcant bureaucratic and
institutional restructuring in order to conduct our overall security
policies in Asia more effectively and, in particular, strengthen the
relationship with India. Indeed, MacDonald’s report found that, “both
the U.S. and Indian systems are poorly organized to build a robust
military relationship that maximizes the strategic beneﬁts for both
sides.”556 In order to overcome both the negative perceptions on both
sides that cloud effective partnership and the resulting suboptimal
policy outcomes, she and this author ﬁnd substantial reasons for
reshaping the institutional framework within which U.S. policy is
conducted. Reorganization or bureaucratic restructuring serves many
purposes besides aiming to effectuate a more uniﬁed and coherent
policy process in regard to India throughout the U.S. Government.
The positive beneﬁts of an intelligent and successful reorganization
go beyond merely eliminating contradictions among departments
and agencies or bureaucratic bottlenecks. Effective reorganization
that creates this uniﬁed approach enhances mutual predictability
for both governments and thus enhances mutual conﬁdence and
trust. Second, changing the bureaucratic mechanisms through which
policy is implemented also changes behavior of those entrusted with
its implementation, and thus their perceptions as well. All these
changes, if accomplished, will produce better policymaking and
implementation and improve the overall quality of the relationship
thanks to the increase in mutual conﬁdence and predictability. The
same conclusion would hold true as well for successful institutional
reorganization on the Indian side.
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But beyond these positive outcomes, such reorganization also
would go far to overcoming the main obstacles to an enhanced
and enduring strategic partnership. We have identiﬁed four major
obstacles that either impede or have impeded the realization of this
partnership. They are the issue of technology transfer, the gap between
the State Department and DoD approaches to India, an incomplete
convergence of strategic interests within a larger context of general
convergence of interests, and last, the fact that India’s anomalous
position between USPACOM, which includes India in its AOR, and
USCENTCOM, where it is absent but Pakistan and Afghanistan are
in that command’s AOR, causes it to be lost between two powerful
uniﬁed commands.”557
In fact, these disjunctions and gaps in mutual perceptions
that clearly impede effective cooperation testify to the need for
bureaucratic reform with regard to Indian and U.S. policy. That is
to say, both Indian and U.S. leaders need to overcome bureaucratic
impediments to the bilateral relationship. MacDonald’s evidence and
the strategic realities of an increasingly integrated Asiatic strategic
space that are now clear to analysts and ofﬁcials (and not only in the
United States or India) demonstrate how unwarranted, unjustiﬁed,
and counterproductive complacency about existing structural
relationships are. From the U.S. viewpoint, India should already be
regarded, in fact and not just in rhetoric, as a major Asian power
whose vital interests and points of contact with American policy
encompass the entire area from the Gulf to the Strait of Malacca as
well as global issues like terrorism and nonproliferation.
Therefore, the most effective way to sustain what has already
been achieved in the bilateral relationship is for the President to order
a review of the way in which our national security structures (and
not just the State and Defense Departments and NSC, but also their
respective subcomponents) are organized to deal with India and Asia
generally. This review should aim to overcome the tensions between
the Pentagon and State Department that are universally recognized
as an impediment to improved ties as well as the inability to see
India and its interests as a whole that plagues the components of
both our military commands in Asia and the Departments of State,
the Pentagon, and the NSC.558 Given the gravity of the consequences
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of this reorganization for all our Asian relationships, this highlevel review should be comprehensive and carefully organized. But
the need for this review is obvious. In order for the United States
to take most effective advantage of the transformation of Asia as a
strategic entity or entities where India plays a large and growing
part, it must reorganize the way it does business with India and Asia
in general. As the world and its strategic realities change, so must
our institutions adapt and change lest they become ineffectual and
obstacles to the realization of our strategic interests. The issue here is
not any one particular reorganization scheme for all those institutions
within and among the U.S. Government’s departments. We are not
advocating any particular line of approach here, and it would be
presumptuous to do so in view of the immense task of such a review.
Rather, we are calling for a fuller understanding of and response to
the strategic transformation that is engulﬁng Asia, India, and our
relations with Asia and India in particular. Once that realization
of the growing strategic importance of India and Asia materializes
and is fully internalized across the national security sector of the
government, the opportunities for cooperation and for an ongoing,
frank, yet respectful, and intimate discussion of strategic issues with
India truly can get off the ground. Absent such a strategic review
and reorganization in both countries, the relationship between
Washington and New Delhi will resemble a spavined horse: it walks,
but it cannot run, and it cannot even walk as quickly as possible.
In order to underscore the breadth of India’s role in the
emerging new Asian strategic order, this monograph has looked
comprehensively at India’s policies and interests across the breadth
of Asia from the Middle East to the Strait of Malacca, and at the
points of contact with the United States in the war on terrorism,
missile defense, and technology transfer (both civil and military). By
doing so, this monograph has aimed to alter perceptions by giving a
deeper sense of the scope of India’s role in Asian and world affairs
and of its genuine and emerging importance to the United States.
The changed realities to which India both responds and contributes
must also evoke in both New Delhi and Washington a series of
ongoing institutional responses to those new realities, so that both
sides can most effectively cooperate with each other. A recent UN
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report on the war on terrorism shows that few states are cooperating
to the fullest degree possible in this war, a ﬁnding that helps explain
why it could well be more protracted and difﬁcult a war than was
even imagined earlier when everyone knew it would be a long and
arduous struggle.559 The Indo-American relationship for a long time
has been plagued by mutual suspicions and misperceptions that
have impeded collaboration between the two largest democracies
in the world, a cooperation that could be decisive in the war on
terrorism and in helping large parts of Asia to achieve more security,
prosperity, and democracy.
The intensity of the threat of terrorism faced by both India and
the United States underscores the stakes involved in this war and
in mastering the general strategic transformations of our time.
Continuation of that history of failed relationships when genuine
partnership is within our grasp and requires the sustained attention
of both the topmost ranks of government in both countries and of
their respective national security bureaucracies to achieve it, would,
given those stakes, be worse than a crime. Indeed, it would be a
profound mistake at the highest level of grand strategy.

169

ENDNOTES
1. See the remarks by Polly Nayak to the Dwight D. Eisenhower National
Security Conference, September 25-26, 2003, Washington, DC, pp. 188, 203.
2. For an assessment of the current state of Indo-American relations, see K.
Alan Kronstadt, India-U.S. Relations, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, Washington,
DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, November 4, 2004.
3. C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy,
New York: Palgrave, 2004, p. 49.
4. This is based upon the author’s conversations with representatives of the
different U.S. military services that comprise the U.S. Paciﬁc Command, Honolulu,
November 7-10, 2004 (henceforth Conversations, USPACOM); and with ofﬁcials
of the Department of Defense in Washington, September 28, 2004 (henceforth
Conversations, Pentagon). See also Ashley J. Tellis, “Lost Tango in Washington,”
Indian Express, November 17, 2004, also available from the Carnegie Endowment
at www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.
5. Russell C. Lefﬁngwell Lecture with Manmohan Singh, Council on Foreign
Relations, New York, September 24, 2004, www.cfr.org. (henceforth Singh Speech);
Seema Sirohi, “Manmohan’s New York Report Card,” Asia Times Online, October
5, 2004, www.atimes.com.
6. Cited in John C. Holzman, “A Golden Opportunity: The Next Steps in U.S.Indian Relations,” Strategic Forum, National Defense University, Washington,
DC, No. 182, July, 2001, p. 1; Ian Storey, “Indo-US Strategic Ties on the Upswing,”
Jane’s Intelligence Review, March 2003, p. 42; “India To Play Prominent Role in USled ‘Asian NATO’,” Press Trust of India, July 18, 2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis;
Nilofar Suhrawardy, “India Reacts Favorably to Bush’s Victory,” www.aljazeerah.
info/News%20archives/2004%29archives/November/4%, November 4, 2004.
7. G. V. C. Naidu, “Whither the Look East Policy: India and Southeast Asia,”
Strategic Analysis, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, April-June, 2004, p. 343.
8. T. V. Parasuram, “Indian Envoy Conﬁdent Strategic Relations Will
Strengthen,” ww.outlookindia.com, November 4, 2004.
9. Suhrawardy, “India Reacts Favorably to Bush’s Victory.”
10. K. P. Vijayalakshmi, quoted in Raj Changappa and Anil Padmamabhan,
“Roll Out the Red Carpet,” India Today, November 15, 2004, p. 59, retrieved from
Lexis-Nexis.
11. Siddarth Srivastava, “A US Offer Delhi Can’t Refuse,” Asia Times Online,
December 2, 2004, www.atimes.com.
12. Conversations, USPACOM; Ashley Tellis, “Seeking Breakthroughs,” Force,
October, 2004, pp. 8-9.
13. C. Raja Mohan, “What If Pakistan Fails? India Isn’t Worried . . . yet,”
Washington Quarterly, Vol. XXVIII, No. 1, Winter 2004-05, p. 117.
171

14. C. Chirstine Fair, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and
India, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2004, pp. 1-2.
15. Ibid., pp. 3-4.
16. Srivastava, “A US Offer Delhi Can’t Refuse.”
17. Ehsan Ahrari, “Pakistan as a ‘Key Non-NATO-Ally,’” Asia Times Online,
March 20, 2004, www.atimes.com; Sultan Shahin, “India Doubting its US ‘Strategic
Partnership,’” Asia Times Online, March 26, 2004, www.atimes.com; Gopal Rathnam
and Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Subcontinental Tightrope: U.S. Nod to Pakistan Angers
India,” Defense News, March 29, 2004, pp. 1, 8; Council on Foreign Relations, “New
Priorities in South Asia: U.S. Policy Toward India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan,”
(Henceforth CFR Report), New York: 2003, accessed on November 18, 2003, pp. 4,
38.
18. Conversations, Pentagon.
19. Ibid.; Conversations, USPACOM.
20. Ibid.
21. Anupam Srivastava, “The Strategic Context of Evolving Indo-US Ties,”
Satish Kumar, ed., India’s National Security: Annual Review 2002, New Delhi: India
Research Press, 2003, pp. 88-114. The manuscript copy of the article was made
available to me by Dr. Srivastava.
22. “China Not in Favor of According Nuclear Status to India, Pak,” Press Trust
of India, June 29, 2004, Retreieved from Lexis-Nexis; Juli A. MacDonald, Indo-U.S.
Military Relationship: Expectations and Perceptions,” Released from the Director,
Net Assessment, Ofﬁce of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC: Booz Allen
Hamilton, 2002, pp. 57-59; Devin T. Hagerty, “US Policy and the Kashmir Dispute:
Prospects for Resolution,” India Review, Vol. II, No. 3, July, 2003, p. 112.
23. C. Raja Mohan, “C. Raja Mohan, “A Paradigm Shift Towards South Asia,”
Washington Quarterly, Vol. XXVI, No. 1, Winter 2002-03, p. 149.
24. MacDonald, pp. 57-59; Mohan, “India and the Bush Doctrine,” The Monitor,
Vol. IX, No. 2, Summer 2003, p. 5.
25. Ibid.
26. MacDonald, p. 59.
27. Arun Sahgal, “India-US Not Quite in Step Yet,” Asia Times Online, August
21, 2003, www.atimes.com.
28. Peter W. Rodman, Uneasy Giant: The Challenges to American Predominance,
Washington, DC: The Nixon Center, 2001, p. 2.
29. Tom Clancy, with General Tony Zinni (Ret.) and Tony Klotz, Battle Ready,
New York: G. P. Putnam’s & Sons, 2004, pp. 323-324.
30. Glenn Kessler and Thomas E. Ricks, “Rice’s NSC Tenure Complicates New
Post,” Washington Post, November 16, 2004, p. 7.

172

31. Walter K. Andersen, “South Asia: A Selective War on Terrorism?” Ashley
J. Tellis and Michael Wills, eds., Strategic Asia 2004-05: Confronting Terrorism in the
Pursuit of Power, Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004, p. 228.
32. Robert M. Hathaway, “The US-India Courtship: From Clinton to Bush,”
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. XXV, No. 4, December, 2002, pp. 21-29; Zbigniew
Brzezinski, The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership, New York: Basic
Books, 2004, pp. 64-65.
33. Dennis Kux, India and the United States: Estranged Democracies: 1941-1991,
Washington, DC: Fort Lesley J. McNair, National Defense University Press, 1992.
34. “Does the US Want to Repeat the Mistake in Iraq That It Committed in
the Case of the Taliban?” Ahmedabad Sandesh, in Gujarati, Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, Near East and South Asia (henceforth FBIS NES), June 14, 2003.
35. Singh, CFR Speech.
36. Ibid.; The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September,
2002 (Henceforth NSS), www.whitehouse.gov.
37. Conversations, USPACOM; Edward Luce and Quentin Peel; “FT Interview
Manmohan Singh,” Financial Times, November 8, 2004, p. 5.
38. Conversations, USPACOM.
39. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Embraces New War Doctrine,” Defense News,
November 8, 2004, p. 14.
40. Robert O. Blake Jr., Charge d’affaires, “U.S. India-Relations: The Making of
a Comprehensive Relationship,” Speech to the Army War College, Indore, India,
August 23, 2004. www.state.gov/p/sa/rls/rm35686 (henceforth Blake Speech).
41. “We Won’t Play the Triangular Game: U.S.” The Hindu, October 22, 2001,
retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
42. Ibid.; Ian Storey, “Indo-US Strategic Ties on the Upswing,” Jane’s Intelligence
Review, March 2003, p. 40; Alan Sipress, “U.S. Seeks to Lift Sanctions on India: Aim
Is To Bolster Military Relations,” Washington Post, August 12, 2001, p. A1.
43. Francine R. Frankel, “Introduction,” Francine R. Frankel and Harry Harding,
eds., The India-China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know, New York:
Columbia University Press, 2004, p. 9.; Jeffrey Record, Bounding the Global War on
Terrorism, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,
PA, 2003.
44. Raghuvanshi, “India Embraces New War Doctrine,” p. 14.
45. October 11, 2004: EU-India Strategic Partnership—Council Conclusions,
www.eu.int/comm/external_relaitons/india/intro/gac.htm.
46. “Russia, USA Compete in India,” Jane’s Intelligence Digest, December 10,
2004, www4.janes.com/subscribe/jid/doc.
47. Ibid.; Moscow, RIA Novosti, November 5, 2004, FBIS SOV November 5,
2004.
173

48. Conversations, USPACOM.
49. Jyoti Malhotra, “Putin, Chirac Favor Changes in NSG Rules,” The Indian
Express Internet Version, FBIS NES June 7, 2003.
50. Stephen F. Burgess, India’s Emerging Security Strategy, Missile Defense and
Arms Control, Colorado Springs: US Air Force Academy Institute for National
Security Studies, Occasional Paper, No. 54, 2004, p. 1.
51. Sir John Thomson, “Policy Paths in South Asia: Intersections Between
Global and Local,” Michael R. Chambers, ed., South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic
Balances and Alliances, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army
War College, 2002, p. 17.
52. Celeste A. Wallander, “Silk Road, Great Game or Soft Underbelly?: The
New US-Russia Relationship and Implications for Eurasia,” Shireen Hunter, ed.,
Strategic Developments in Eurasia After 11 September, London: Frank Cass Publishers,
2004, pp. 97-98.
53. Thomas Donnelly and Vance Serchuk, “A Bigger, Badder Better Army,” The
Weekly Standard, November 22, 2004, reprinted from the website of the American
Enterprise Institute, www.aei.org/news/news/ID.21591/news_detrail.asp.
54. Robert D. Blackwill, “An Action Agenda to Strengthen America’s Alliances
in the Asia-Paciﬁc Region,” Robert D. Blackwill and Paul Dibb, eds., America’s
Asian Alliances, Cambridge, MA; The MIT Press, 2000, p. 129.
55. Ashley J. Tellis, “South Asia,” Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg,
eds., Strategic Asia 2001-02 Power and Purpose, Seattle: National Bureau of Asian
Research, 2002, pp. 262-263.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb,
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004.
61. Nayak, Remarks, p. 203.
62. Talbott.
63. Chennai, The Hindu, in English, FBIS NES, April 11, 2001; Mandavi Mehta
and Teresita Schaeffer, “India and the United States: Security Interests.”
64. Ibid.; South Asia Monitor, NO. 34, June 1, 2001.
65. Amit Gupta, The U.S.-India Relationship: Strategic Partnership or Complementary
Interest, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,
2005.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
174

68. Alan Sipress, “U.S. Seeks to Lift Sanctions on India,” Washington Post,
August 12, 2001, p. 1.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Amit Gupta, The U.S.-India Relationship: Strategic Partnership or Complementary
Interest.
72. Sipress, “U.S. Seeks to Lift Sanctions on India.”
73. Ibid.
74. Samina Ahmed, “The United States and Terrorism in Southwest Asia,”
International Security, Winter 2001-2002, pp. 80-81; Paul Dibb, “The Strategic
Environment in the Asia-Paciﬁc Region,” Blackwill and Dibb, eds., pp. 4, 10.
75. C. Raja Mohan, “We Won’t Play the Triangular Game: U.S.,” The Hindu,
October 22, 2001, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; Testimony of Under-Secretary of
State Richard Armitage to the Commission to Investigate the Attacks of 9-11,
March 24, 2004, www.nytimes.com/2004/03/24/politics/24CND-PTEX.html.
76. “India To Play Prominent Role in US-led ‘Asian NATO’” Press Trust of India,
July 18, 2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; Stephen Blank,” Inherent Dangers in an
‘Asian NATO,’ Asia Times Online, September 19, 2003, www.atimes.com; “Pentagon
Keen To Make India A Strategic Partner,” SAPRA India Bulletin, June 2003, pp. 2728.
77. Cited in John C. Holzman, “A Golden Opportunity: The Next Steps in U.S.Indian Relations,” Strategic Forum, National Defense University, Washington,
DC, No. 182, July, 2001, p. 1; Ian Storey, “Indo-US Strategic Ties on the Upswing,”
Jane’s Intelligence Review, March 2003, p. 42; “India To Play Prominent Role in USled ‘Asian NATO’.”
78. Ibid., p. 40; Jayanthi Iyengar, “NATO: Blueprint for Asian Security,” Asia
Times Online, March 21, 2004; Vivek Raghuvanshi, “U.S., India Discuss Tech
Partnership,” Defense News, March 22, 2004, p. 34; Arun Sahgal, “India-US Not Quite
in Step Yet,” Asia Times Online, August 21, 2003, www.atimes.com; Venu Rajamony,
“Within the Arc of Crisis: India-U.S. Relations Moving From Estrangement to
Convergence,” Journal of International Security Affairs, No. 3, 2003, pp. 71-84; C.
Raja Mohan, “India and the Bush Doctrine,” The Monitor, Vol. IX, No. 2, Summer
2003, p. 3, Idem., “India, U.S. and Gulf Security,” The Hindu, March 29, 2001, www.
indiaserver.com/thehindu/2001/03/29/stories/05292523.
79. Singh, CFR Speech.
80. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Aims To Project Power Across Asia,” Defense
News, November 10, 2003, p. 10; Speech by Shri Brajesh Mishra, National Security
Advisor of India at the Council of Foreign Relations, “India, United States, and
the New World Order: Prospects for Cooperation,” New York, May 7, 2003, p.
23; George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation,
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, Updated Edition, 2001,
175

particularly pp. 438-443; more generally, see Baldev Raj Nayar and T.V. Paul, India
in the World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
81. Raghuvanshi, “India Aims To Project Power Across Asia.”
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.; Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India’s Navy Reaches for Blue Water Goals,”
Defense News, October 27, 2003, p. 19.
85. Ibid.
86. Jammu, The Kashmir Times, in English, July 31, 2001, FBIS NES, August
1, 2001; Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Threats Prompt Indian Navy to Push Upgrades,”
Defense News, January 6, 2003.
87. Ibid.; K. Alan Kronstadt, The Asian Way to Insecurity: India’s Rise and the
Meaning of Increased Power Projection Capabilities in South Asia, Paper Presented to
the 42nd Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Chicago,
Illinois, February 21, 2001, p. 19; Huma Siddiqui, “Naval Cause: Amphibious Force
Along With Marines Proposed,” New Delhi, Financial Express, Internet Version, in
English, June 11, 2003, FBIS NES, June 11, 2003.
88. Ibid.
89. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2002-2003,
London: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 125.
90. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India’s New Naval Ambition,” Defense News, June 7,
2004, pp. 1, 8; Rahul Bedi, “India Outlines Vision of Future Nuclear Navy,” Jane’s
Defence Weekly, www4.janes.com/subscribe/jdw/doc_view.jsp?.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
95. Donald L. Berlin, “Navy Reﬂects India’s Strategic Ambitions,” Asia Times
Online, November 5, 2004, www.atimes.com.
96. Ibid.
97. Ashley J. Tellis, “South Asia,” Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg,
eds., Strategic Asia 2001-02 Power and Purpose, Seattle: National Bureau of Asian
Research, 2002, p. 237.
98. Conversations PACOM; Tellis, “The Changing Political-Military
Environment: South Asia,” pp. 210-216.
99. Ibid., the Indian Defense Report is quoted in John W. Garver, “Asymmetrical
Indian and Chinese Threat Perceptions,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. XXV, No.
4, December, 2002, p. 112; more recently “Indian Defence Minister Says China,

176

New Delhi Share Common Strategic Interests,” BBC Monitoring, January 30, 2003,
retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
49.

100. “India’s Economy: Back to Earth,” The Economist, September 18, 2004, p.

101. Ambassador Farooq Sobhan, “South Asia,” America’s Role in Asia: Asian
Views, San Francisco, CA: Asia Foundation, 2004, pp. 55-83; Stephen Phillip
Cohen, “South Asia,” America’s Role in Asia: American Views, San Francisco, CA:
Asia Foundation, 2004, pp. 77-104.
102. Conversations, USPACOM.
103. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India’s Budget Falls Short of Navy Doctrine,”
Defense News, November 15, 2004, p. 19.
104. Luce and Peel, p. 5; Quentin Peel, “India’s Terms of Engagement,”
Financial Times, November 11, 2004, p. 15.
105 Ibid.
106. Peel, p. 15
107. New, Delhi, The Hindu, November 14, 2004, FBIS NES, November 14,
2004.
108. “Focus; Geopolitics; India and Russia Deepen Energy Cooperation,”
Petroleum Economist, December 3, 2004; “President Putin Approved Participation
of Indian Companies in the Auction for Sale of Yuganskneftgaz,” Vedomosti,
December 8, 2004, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; Valeria Korchagina, “Indian Oil
Company to Bid for Yugansk,” Moscow Times, December 6, 2004.
109. “Pipelines Pondered,” www.asiant.com, November 26, 2003; Prem Shankar
Jha, “The Pipeline to Peace,” www.outlookindia.com, November 30, 2004.
110. V. Sudarshan, “The Next Step on Tiptoes,” Outlook India.com, November
15, 2004.
111. Mohammed Ayoob, “Southwest Asia After the Taliban,” Survival, Vol.
XLIV, No. 1, Spring 2002, pp. 60-65.
112. Moscow, ITAR-TASS¸ in English, January 3, 2001, FBIS SOV, January 3,
2001; Ramtanu Maitra, “India and Russia Have Much to Lose,” Asia Times Online,
November 26, 2003, www.atimes.com; Idem., “Why Courting Russia and Iran Makes
Sense,” Asia Times Online, October 1, 2003, www.atimes.com.
113. John Calabrese, “Indo-Iranian Relations in Transition,” Journal of South
Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. XXV, No. 5, Summer 2002, pp. 60-82; Smita
Gupta, “Threats of Terrorism Bring India, Iran Closer,” The Times of India, April 15,
2001.
114. Calabrese, “Indo-Iranian Relations in Transition,” pp. 60-82; Satyanarayan
Pattanayak, “Oil as a Factor in Indo-Gulf Relations,” Strategic Analysis, June, 2001,
www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_june01pas02.html.

177

115. “Iran Tries to Become Centre of Distribution of Energy to International
Market,” www.TehranTimes.com, June 9, 2002, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; Tehran,
IRNA, in English, January 16, 2003, FBIS NES, January 16, 2003.
116. Jasjit Singh, “Enhancing Peace and Cooperation in West Asia: An Indian
Perspective,” The Emirates Occasional Papers No. 27, Abu Dhabi: The Emirates
Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1998, p. 7.
117. Luce and Peel, p. 5; Peel, “India’s Terms of Engagement,” p. 15.
118. Kronstadt, “India-U.S. Relations,” pp. 12-14; Alan Larson, Under Secretary
of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs, “The American Vision
of U.S.-India Economic Cooperation,” Remarks to the Delegates of the IndoAmerican Chamber of Commerce Economic Summit, Mumbai, September 16,
2004, www.state.gov/e/rls/rm/2004/36345; Ambassador David C. Mulford, “U.S.India Economic Relations,” Remarks to the International Institute of Finance
Program, Mumbai India, November 4, 2004, www.state.gov/p/sa/rls/rm/37789.htm;
Idem., “World-Class Infrastructure: need for a War-Footing in India,” Remarks at
GAIL (India) Limited’s Looking Beyond Lecture Series, New Delhi, November 9,
2004, http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/wwwhipr1109084.html.
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid.
121. Remarks by John B. Taylor, Under Secretary of the Treasury for
International Affairs, World Economic Forum’s India Economic Summit, New
Delhi, India, December 6, 2004, www.usinfo.state.gov.
122. “India’s Many Wars,” Jane’s Foreign Report, December 16, 2004, www4.
janes.com/subscribefrp/doc.
123. Conversations, USPACOM.
124. Ibid.; Rahul Bedi, “Cross-Border Links Strengthen India’s Insurgent
Groups,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, November 1, 2004, ww4.janes.com/subscribe/
jir/doc; “Rebel Strongholds Fall With Burmese Help,” www.asiant.com, November
11, 2004; B. Raman, “Greater Indian Visibility in Its Neighborhood,” South Asia
Analysis Group, No. 1159, November 8, 2004; Indo-Myanmar Security Accord
Targets Militants in India’s Northeast,” SAPRA India Bulletin November, 2004, pp.
15-17.
125. Ibid; John Hill, “Illegal Drugs Trade Thrives in Nepal’s Security Vacuum,”
Jane’s Intelligence Review, August, 2004, www.janes.com/subscribe/jir/doc; Ramtanu
Maitra, “India Takes the Fight to Guerrillas,” Asia Times Online, www.atimes.com,
November 19, 2004; Andrew Prosser, Nuclear Trafﬁcking Routes: Dangerous Trends
in Southern Asia, Center for Defense Information, www.cdi.org, November 22,
2004; “India’s Military Becoming More Active in Sri Lanka,” www.Courcyint.com,
November 15, 2004.
126. Ibid.

178

127. B. P. Khanna and Lalit Sethi,” Different Hemispheres, Common Foe,”
Armed Forces Journal, December, 2004, p. 37.
128. Ibid.
129. Christian Le Miere, “Indian Separatist Groups Face Crackdown,” Jane’s
Intelligence Review, January 1, 2005, www4janes.com/subscribe/jir/doc.
130. Tellis, “South Asia,” pp. 247-250.
131. Ibid., p. 250.
132. Ibid., pp. 247-248; Jennifer Siegel, Endgame: Britain, Russia and the Final
Struggle for Central Asia, Foreword by Paul Kennedy, London and New York: I. B.
Tauris, 2002.
133. Quoted from Walter K. Andersen, “India in Asia: Walking on a Tightrope,”
Asian Survey, December 1979, in S. Nihal Singh, The Yogi and the Bear: A Study of
Indo-Soviet Relations, Riverdale, MD: The Riverdale Company, Inc., 1986, p. 147.
134. Quoted in Ji Guoxing, Asian Paciﬁc SLOC Security: The China Factor,
Canberra: Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre, Working Paper No. 10, April,
2002, p. 36.
135. Mushahid Hussain, “Indian Power Projection in South Asia and the
Regional States’ Reaction,” Hafeez Malik, ed., Dilemmas of National Security and
Cooperation in India and Pakistan, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996, p. 155; C. Raja
Mohan, “Beyond India’s Monroe Doctrine,” The Hindu, January 2, 2003, retrieved
from Lexis-Nexis.
136. Graham P. Chapman, The Geopolitics of South Asia From Early Empires to the
Nuclear Age, 2nd Edition, London, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003, p. 281.
137. Ibid.
138. Ibid, pp. 130-131.
139. Raghuvanshi, “India Aims To Project Power Across Asia,” p. 10.
140. Siegel; Tellis, “South Asia,” pp. 248-253; Jaswant Singh, Defending India,
New Delhi: Macmillan, 1999, pp. 146-147; Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: pp. 204210, 224-236.
141. Ibid., pp. 222-223; Stephen Blank, “India and the Gulf States After Saddam,”
Strategic Insights, Vol. III, No. 4, April, 2004.
142. Holzman, p. 3; Satyanarayan Pattanayak, “Oil As a Factor in Indo-Gulf
Relations,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. XXV, No. 3, June, 2001, ww.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_
june01pas02.
143. Calabrese, pp. 60-82; Smita Gupta, “Threats of Terrorism Bring India, Iran
Closer,” The Times of India, April 15, 2001; Pattanayak.
144. Raghuvanshi, “India Aims To Project Power Across Asia.”
145. S. M. Pourriahi, “Politics and the ‘Pipeline of Peace,” Asia Times Online,
January 21, 2003, www.atimes.com; TS Gopi Rethinaraj, “South Asian Rivalries
179

Obstruct Energy Co-Operation,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, December, 2001, pp.
38-40; Calabrese, “Indo-Iranian Relations in Transition,” pp. 60-82; Maitra, “Why
Courting Russia and Iran Makes Sense,” Asia Times Online, October 1, 2003, www.
atimes.com; “National Security Has Upper Hand in Pipeline Decision,” SAPRA
India Bulletin, July, 2003, p. 21.
146. Rethinaraj; Farah Naaz, “Indo-Iranian Relations 1947-2000, Strategic
Analysis, www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_jan01naf01.html; Naseem Khan, “Vajpayee’s Visit
to Iran: Indo-Iranian Relations and Prospects of Bilateral Cooperation,” Strategic
Analysis, September, 2001, www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_sep01khm01.html.
147. Ibid.; Rethinaraj, pp. 38-40; Calabrese, pp. 60-82.
148. Ibid.; Naseem Khan, “Vajpayee’s Visit to Iran.”
149. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Two Allies Negotiate Defense Aid Deals,” Defense
News, May 24, 2004, p. 10.
150. Deba Mohanty, “‘No’ To Troops for Iraq: An Indian Story,” Military
Technology, Nos. 8-9, 2003, p. 4.
151. Siddarth Srivastava, “Indian Firms Fight Back for $10BN Iraq ‘Prize,’”
Asia Times Online, December 13, 2003, www.atimes.com.
152. Siddarth Srivastava, “India Queues Up for Iraqi Spoils,” Asia Times Online,
February 3, 2005, www.atimes.com.
153. Ibid.; Mohanty.
154. Norman Friedman, Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America’s New Way of War,
Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press, p. 142; Rahul Bedi, “US Closes In On South
Asia’s Strategic Jewel,” Asia Times Online, January 6, 2003, www.atimes.com; Idem.,
“U.S. Tightens Security Presence in Indian Ocean,” InterPress Service, January 5,
2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
155. C. Uday Bhaskar, “Bush Victory Ensures Continuity in U.S.-India Strategic
Relations, http://www.idsa-india.org?CUBArticle 3.htm, accessed from the Institute
for Strategic and Defence Analysis, December 15, 2004.
156. M. K. Bhadrakumar, “India Shifts Gear on Iraq Policy,” Asia Times
Online, www.atimes.com, December 7, 2004; Srivastava, “India Queues UP for Iraqi
Spoils.”
157. Michael T. Klare, “Essay: The Bush-Cheney Strategy: Implications for U.S.
Foreign and Military Policy,” New York University Journal of International Law and
Politics, Vol. IIIVI, Nos. 2/3, Winter/Spring 2004, pp. 395-423.
158. Chapman, p. 267.
159. Norman Friedman, Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America’s New Way of War,
Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2003, pp. 157-250.
160. Istanbul Summit Communiqué: Issued by the Heads of State and
Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Istanbul,

180

June 28-29, 2004, www.Nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm (henceforth Istanbul
Initiative); Muthiah Alagappa, “Introduction: Predictability and Stability Despite
Challenges,” Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Order: Instrumental and
Normative Features, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, p. 26; Radu Tudor,
“Black Sea Emerges as Strategic Hub Following NATO Expansion,” Jane’s
Intelligence Review, August, 2004, www4.janes.com/subscribe/jir/doc_view.jsp?K2Doc;
Recep Tayip Erdogan, “A Broad View of the ‘Broader Middle East’,” Russia in
Global Affairs, Vol. II, No. 3, July-September, 2004, pp. 130-133, Erdogan is the
Prime Minister of Turkey.
161. Sir John Thomson, “Policy Paths in South Asia: Intersections Between
Global and Local,” Michael R. Chambers, ed., South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic
Balances and Alliances, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army
War College, 2002, pp. 17-18.
162. Rajan Menon, “The New Great Game in Central Asia,” Survival, Vol. XLV,
No. 2, Summer 2003, p. 201.
163. Kanwal Sibal, “Meeting Emerging Security Challenges,” Indian Foreign
Secretary Kanwal Sibal’s Address at the Carnegie Endowment, February 4, 2003,
www.ceip.org/ﬁles/nonprolif/templates/events.
164. Paul Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power And the
Second Nuclear Age, New York: Perennial Publishers, 2000, pp. 2-3.
165. Robert D. Blackwill, “An Action Agenda to Strengthen America’s Alliances
in the Asia-Paciﬁc Region,” Robert D. Blackwill and Paul Dibb, eds., America’s
Asian Alliances, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000, pp. 125-127.
166. Stephen Blank, “India’s Rising Proﬁle in Central Asia,” Comparative
Strategy, Vol. XXII, No. 2, April-June, 2003, pp. 139-157.
167. Indranil Bannerjie, “Introduction,” Indranil Bannerjie, ed., India and
Central Asia, Northolt, Middlesex, UK: Brunel Academic Publishers, Ltd., 2004,
pp.xi-xii.
168. Ibid.
169. Ibid., pp. xv-xvi.
170. Jyotsna Bakshi, “Russia’s Post-Pokhran Dilemma,” Strategic Analysis, Vol.
XXII, No. 5, August 1998, p. 721, quoted in Jerome M. Conley, Indo-Russian Military
and Nuclear Cooperation: Implications for the United States, INSS Occasional Paper
No. 31, Proliferation Series, USAF Institute for National Security Studies, USAF
Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado, 2000, pp. 24-25.
171. John Garver, “The Security Dilemma in Sino-Indian Relations,” India
Review, Vol. I, No. 4, October, 2002, pp. 17-21; Ahmad Faruqui, Rethinking the
National Security of Pakistan: The Price of Strategic Myopia, Burlington, VT: Ashgate
Publishing Company, 2003; T. S. Gopi Rethinaraj, “China’s Energy and Regional
Security Perspectives,” Defense Analysis, Vol. XIX, No. 4, December 2003, p. 386;
Lahore Daily Times, Internet Version, August 2, 2003, FBIS SOV, August 2, 2003.

181

172. Sumit Ganguly, “India’s Alliances 2020,” Michael R. Chambers, ed., South
Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002, pp. 370-376; S. Enders Wimbush,
“India’s Perspective,” Central Intelligence Agency, Russia in the International
System: A Conference Report, June 1, 2001, www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/conference_reports/
russia_conf.html, p. 31.
173. James Clad, “Convergent Chinese and Indian Perceptions on the Global
Order,” Frankel and Harding, eds., pp. 271-276.
174. Ashley Tellis, “China and India in Asia,” Ibid., pp. 134-177.
175. “China for Anti-Terror Front with India, Pak,” News Insight, July 12,
2004, www.indiarects.com/nati2.asp?recno=2718; Atul Aneja, “China May Share
Intelligence on J&K, Northeast,” The Hindu, January 25, 2002, www.hinduonnet.
com/thehindu/2002/01/25/stories/2002012505050100.
176. Bates Gill and Matthew Oresman, China’s New Journey to the West: China’s
Emergence in Central Asia and Implications for U.S. Interests, Washington: Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 2003, pp. 8-14.
177. Tellis, “China and India in Asia,” pp. 153, 155; Francine R. Frankel,
“Introduction,” Frankel and Harding, p. 7.
178. Martin Walker, “U.S., India Discuss ‘Asian NATO’,” UPI, May 29, 2003;
“India To Play Prominent Role in U.S.-led ‘Asian NATO,’” Press Trust of India, July
18, 2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
179. Jim Hoagland, “Staying On in Central Asia,” Washington Post, January
20, 2002, p. B7; New Delhi, The Indian Express Internet Version, in English, July 8,
2002, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Near East and South Asia (henceforth FBIS
NES), July 8, 2002.
180. Juli A. MacDonald, “Rethinking India and Pakistan’s Regional Intent,”
NBR Analysis, Vol. XIV, No. 4, November, 2003, pp. 7-8.
181. Ibid.
182. New Delhi, Hindustan Times Internet Version, in English, September 13,
2000, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Central Eurasia, (Henceforth FBIS SOV),
September 13, 2000; Igor Khripunov and Anupam Srivastava, “Contending with
the “Bear-ish” Arms Market: U.S.-Indian Strategic Cooperation and Russia, Gary
K. Bertsch, Seema Gahlaut, and Anupam Srivastava, eds., Engaging India: U.S.
Strategic Relations with the World’s Largest Democracy, London and New York:
Routledge, 1999, pp. 245-246; Ross Munro, “China, India, and Central Asia,” Jed
C. Snyder, ed., After Empire: The Emerging Geopolitics of Central Asia, Fort Leslie
McNair, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995, pp. 132-133.
183. Bagila Bukharbayeva, “India seeks Increased Engagement in Central
Asia,” Associated Press, November 6, 2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

182

184. Kishore C. Dash, “The Challenge of Regionalism in South Asia,”
International Politics, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 2, June 2001, pp. 216-217; Mohan, Crossing
the Rubicon, pp. 217-224.
185. Brigadier Vijai K. Nair, VSM, Ph.D., “Challenges for the Years Ahead: An
Indian Perspective,” Paper Presented to the Annual National Defense University
Asian-Paciﬁc Symposium, Honolulu, March, 2001, www.ndu.edu/iNSS/symposia/
paciﬁc2001/nairpaper.htm.
186. Bukharbayeva, “India seeks Increased Engagement in Central Asia.”
187. Dash, pp. 216-217.
188. Richard Pomfret, The Economies of Central Asia, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1995, p. 155; Munro, pp. 132-133.
189. Ibid.
190. Shankkar and Shishir Gupta, “Energy: Striking it Rich,” India Today,
November 18, 2002, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; Meena Singh Roy, “India’s
Interests in Central Asia,” Strategic Analysis, March, 2001, www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/
sa_mar01rom01.html, Cited in Holzman, p. 3; Satyanarayan Pattanayak, “Oil As a
Factor in Indo-Gulf Relations.”
191. Ibid.
192. I. K. Gujral, A Foreign Policy for India, New Delhi: External Publicity
Division, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1998, p. 135; Maya
Chadda, “Indo-Russian Relations in the Post-Cold War Era,” Hafeez Malik, ed.,
The Roles of the United States, Russia, and China in the New World Order, New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1998, p. 119; S. P. Gupta, “India’s Increasing Eastern Orientation
in Trade and Investment: Context and Challenges,” in Sandy Gordon and Stephen
Henningham, eds., India Looks East: An Emerging Power and its Asia-Paciﬁc Neighbors,
Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, No. 111, Canberra: Strategic and Defence
Studies Centre, Research School of Paciﬁc and Asian Studies, the Australian
National University, 1995, pp. 83-87; Teresita C. Schaffer, “A Changing India,”
Chambers, ed., p. 50; Vijay L. Kelkar, “South Asia in 2020: Economic Outlook,”
Chambers, ed., p. 87.
193. Gujral, pp. 181-191; Kelkar, p. 87.
194. Starr is cited in National Intelligence Council, Central Asia and the South
Caucasus: Reorientations, Internal Transitions, Strategic Dynamics, Washington, DC,
2000, p. 41.
195. “ONGC Arm Seeks Nod for Stake in Overseas Fields,” Financial Times
Information, February 20, 2002, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
196. Harsh V. Pant, “India and Iran: An ‘Axis in the Making’,” Asian Survey,
Vol. XLIV, No. 3, May-June 2004, p. 375; Roy, (2001); Shankkar and Shishir Gupta,
M. Ashraf Haidari, “No Security, No Trans-Afghan Pipeline,” www.afghanmafazine.
com2004_07/articles/pipeline; Adnan Vatansever, “Prospects for Building the TransAfghan Pipeline and Its Implications,” PNN, Paper No. PNNL-14550, 2003.
183

197. Ibid, Mark Berniker, “Trans-Afghan Pipeline Project Moving Forward,
Faces Risks,” www.eurasianet.org, December 19, 2002; Brigadier General (Ret.) M.
Sakhawat Hussain, “Behind the U.S. Diplomatic initiative in South Asia,” The
Independent, June 19, 2002, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
198. Ibid.
199. “Gazprom Capitalizes on Insecurity,” Indigo Publications Intelligence
Online, December 5, 2002, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; Vladimir Radyuhin,
“Russia Revives Gas Proposal,” The Hindu, August 7, 2002, www.hnduonnet.com/
stories/200280703531200.htm; Igor S. Ivanov, The New Russian Diplomacy, Foreword
by Henry A. Kissinger, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002, p. 123;
Moscow, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, in Russian, FBIS SOV, October 4, 2000; Elizabeth
Roche, “Indo-Russian Trade Vital for Momentum in Relations: Analysis,” Agence
France Presse, December 1, 2002, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
200. Ibid.
201. Poonam Mann, “Fighting Terrorism: India and Central Asia,” Strategic
Analysis, February, 2001, www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_feb01map01.html; Roy.
202. This is based on conversations with S. Frederick Starr, Director of the
Central Asia Caucasus, Institute of Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC;
Starr.
203. See, for example, Islamabad, The News Internet Version, in English, July 13,
2003, FBIS SOV, July 13, 2003.
204. “Russian Paper Says Minister Trubnikov’s Talks Mark ‘New Shift’ in
Russia-U.S. Ties,” Kommersant, July 29, 2002, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
205. Stephen Blank, “Central Asia, South Asia, and Asian Security,” Eurasian
Studies, Vol. II, No. 3, 1995, pp. 19-22; John W. Garver, “The Future of the SinoPakistani Entente Cordiale,” Chambers, ed., pp. 397-401, 429-436.
206. Rahul Bedi, “Indian Base in Tajikistan ‘Quietly Operational’,” Irish Times,
August 22, 2002, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; Shaikh Azizur Rahman, “India Strikes
for Oil and Gas With Military Base in Tajikistan,” Washington Times, September 2,
2002, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; John Hassell, “An Update on the Great Game:
Power Plays in the Graveyard of Empire,” San Diego Union-Tribune, September 1,
2002 p. G-5, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; “India has Acknowledged Establishing
an Air Base in Tajikistan,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 26, 2002, p.
19; “High-Level Tajikistan Defence Delegation Meets Fernandes,” The Press Trust
of India, December 2, 2002, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; Stephen Blank, “India’s
Rising Proﬁle in Central Asia,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. XXII, No. 3, 2003; pp. 150151; Kumar Amitav Chaliha, “India Moves on Central Asia,” Asia Times Online,
October 16, 2003, www.atimes.com; “India Planning to Join Shanghai Cooperative
Organization,” ITAR-TASS News Agency, Moscow, October 29, 2002, retrieved
from Lexis-Nexis.
207. Dushanbe, Tajik Television First Channel in Russian, August 5, 2003, FBIS
SOV, August 5, 2003.
184

208. Jane’s Intelligence Digest, December 13, 2002, www4.janes.com/search97cgi/
s97_cgi; Douglas Frantz, “Around the World, Hints of Afghanistans to Come,”
New York Times, May 26, 2002, Section 4, p. 5.
209. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Eyes Markets Abroad,” Defense News, May
20-26, 2002, p. 36; Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Indian Munitions Plants Fear Sales Losses,
Seek Exports,” Defense News, January 14-20, 2002, p. 10; Nadeem Iqbal, “Pakistan’s
Arms Industry Aims High,” Asia Times Online, October 4, 2002; Anil Sharma,
“Indian Drive to Increase Arms Exports,” Asia Times Online, November 6, 2002.
210. Ibid.; Defense Industry Globalization: A Compendium of Papers Presented
at a Conference on “Defense Industry Globalization,” Washington, DC, November
16, 2001, Atlantic Council of the United States, 2002; Raghuvanshi, “India Opens
Arms Factories to Foreign Investors,” p. 4; “India Furthers Strategic Goals by
Reaching out to Arms Markets,” www.stratfor.com, October 29, 2002.
211. Ibid.
212. Ibid.
213. Ibid.
214. MacDonald, “Rethinking India and Pakistan’s Regional Intent,” p. 20.
215. John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth
Century, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001; John W. Garver, The ChinaIndia-U.S. Triangle: Strategic Relations in the Post Cold War Era, Seattle; NBR Asia,
NBR Analysis, Vol. XIII, No. 5, 2002.
216. C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: pp. 204-210, 224-236.
217. Indo-Myanmar Security Accord Targets Militants in India’s Northeast,”
pp. 15-17; John Hill, “Illegal Drugs Trade Thrives in Nepal’s Security Vacuum”;
Ramtanu Maitra, “India Takes the Fight to Guerrillas.”
218. Stephen Blank, “Australia Joins U.S. Strategic Revolution,” Asia Times
Online, August 2, 2003, www.atimes.com; Gregor Ferguson, “Australia Extends Its
Maritime Security Zone,” Defense News, January 3, 2005, p. 14.
219. Justine A. Rosenthal, “Southeast Asia: Archipelago of Afghanistans,”
Orbis, Vol. XLVII, No. 3, Summer 2003, p. 493.
220. R. K. Radhakrishnan, “Australian Navy Looking for Ties With India,”
Global News Wire, World News Connection, June 11, 2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis;
“India, Indonesia Begin Joint Naval Patrols,” Agence France Presse, September 4,
2002, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
221. Catharin Dalpino, “Southeast Asia,” Michael Armacost and J. Stapleton
Roy, eds., America’s Role in Asia: American Views, San Francisco: The Asia foundation,
2004, pp. 53-75.
222. Ambassador Tommy Koh, “Southeast Asia,” America’s Role in Asia: Asian
Views, San Francisco: The Asia Foundation, 2004, p. 36.

185

223. “SE Asian Leaders Want More Tie-Ups With China, India,” The Straits
Times Interactive, November 29, 2004, http: straitstimes.asia1.com.sg.sub/topstories/
story 0,5562, 287653,00html?; “Asian Leaders Urge Region to Look Towards China,
India,” The Statesman, November 28, 2004, www.thestatesman.net/page.news.php?clid
=12&theme=usress=1&id=61403.
224. Devidas Gupta, “India, ASEAN to Enhance Economic Cooperation,” Outlook
India.com, November 30, 2004, www.outlookindia.com/pti_news.asp?id=264526.
225. Koh, pp. 36-53; Dalpino, pp. 53-75.
226. Koh, p. 43.
227. Tellis, “The Changing Political-Military Environment: South Asia,” pp.
210-216; Sahgal, “India-US Not Quite in Step Yet.”
228. Ibid.; Garver, “Asymmetrical Indian and Chinese Threat Perceptions,”
p. 112; more recently, “Indian Defence Minister Says China, New Delhi Share
Common Strategic Interests”; “China Willing to Strengthen Military Ties With
India,” Outlook India.com, December 27, 2004.
229. “India To Play Prominent Role in US-led ‘Asian NATO’.” Indeed, the
Chinese media, and particularly the military media, have expressed concern about
this cooperation almost since its inception. See Beijing, Jiefangun BAO Internet
Version, in Chinese, February 24, 2002, Foreign Broadcast Information Service China
(henceforth FBIS CHI), February 24, 2002; Zhang Guihong, “US Security Policy
Towards South Asia After September 11 and its Implications for China: A Chinese
Perspective,” Strategic Analysis, April-June, 2003, www.idsa-india.org/SA200302/
APR-JUN01; “The Hindu-Editorial: Ties With Big Powers,” The Hindu, February 26,
2001, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; Beijing, Liaowang, in Chinese, FBIS CHI, May
13, 2002.
230. Ibid.; Jing-Dong Yuan, “India’s Rise After Pokhran II: Chinese Analyses
and Assessments,” Asian Survey, Vol. XLI, No. 6, 2001, pp. 978-1001.
231. Pranay Sharma, “Beijing Boost to Delhi UN Role,” The Telegraph, Calcutta,
October
21,
2004.www.telegraphindia.com/104102/asp/nation/story;
Siddarth
Srivastava, “Beijing Boosts Delhi’s Bid for UN Council,” Asia Times Online, www.
atimes.com, November 1, 2004.
232. John W. Garver, The China-India-U.S. Triangle: Strategic Relations in the
Post-Cold War Era, National Bureau of Research Asia, Vol. XIII, No. 5, 2002; JingDong Yuan, “India’s Rise After Pokhran II,” pp. 978-1001; Tellis, “China and India
in Asia,” pp. 139-142; Susan L. Shirk, “One-Sided Rivalry: China’s Perceptions and
Policies Toward India,” Frankel and Harding, eds., pp. 75-96.
233. “China Willing to Strengthen Military Ties With India”; Anna Greenspan,
“The Great Reverse—Part III, Yale Global Online, wwww.yaleglobal.yale.edu,
September 8, 2004; “China Welcomes Prospect of ‘Long-Term’ Partnership
With India,” Radio Australia, May 24, 2004, http: www.abc.net.au/ra/newstories/
RANewsStories_11114005.htm; Urvashi Dev Rawal, “The India-Russia-China Axis:
An Uncertain Future,” SAPRA India Bulletin, May 2004, pp. 4-6.
186

234. Tellis, “The Changing Political-Military Environment: South Asia,” pp.
203-210; Mohammed Ayoob, “South Asia’s Dangers and U.S. Foreign Policy,”
Orbis, Vol. XLV, No. 1, Winter 2001, pp. 128-133.
235. “China Welcomes Prospect of ‘Long-Term’ Partnership With India,”
May 24, 2004; Urvashi Dev Rawal, “The India-Russia-China Axis: An Uncertain
Future,” pp. 4-6.
236. Garver, “Asymmetrical Indian and Chinese Threat Perceptions,” p. 112.
237. “India Has a Comparative Advantage Over China,” Financial Express,
September 30, 2004, www.ﬁnancialexpress.com/fe_full_story.php?content_id=70134;
Yoichi Funabashi, “India and Japan: A New Strategic Afﬁnity,” USI Journal, AprilJune, 2004, www.usioﬁndia.org/article_apr_jun04_3.htm.
238. Testimony of Rollie Lal to the Commission on U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review, December 4, 2003, www.rand.org; George Perkovich, “Is India a Major
Power?” Washington Quarterly, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, Winter 2004, p. 133; Zalmay
Khalizad, David T. Orletsky, Jonathan D. Pollack, Kevin Pollpeter, Angel M.
Rabassa, David A. Shalapak, Abram N. Shulsky, and Ashley J. Tellis, The United
States and Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture, Santa Monica, CA:
Rand Corporation, 2001, p. 24; Tellis, “South Asia,” pp. 244, 261.
239. Nair, “Challenges for the Years Ahead: An Indian Perspective”; Mohan,
Crosing the Rubicon, pp. 204-236; Jajsit Singh, “Peace and Cooperation in West Asia:
An Indian Perspective,” Sandy Gordon and Stephen Henningham, eds., India Looks
East: An Emerging Power and its Asia-Paciﬁc Neighbors, Canberra Papers on Strategy
and Defence, No. 111, Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research
School of Paciﬁc and Asian Studies, the Australian National University, 1995, p.
57.
240. Landry Haryo Subianto, “ASEAN and the East Asian Cooperation:
Searching for a Balanced Relationship,” The Indonesian Quarterly, Vol. XXXI, No. 1,
First Quarter, 2003, p. 9.
241. Prasun K. Sengupta, “Globalization of Security and Its Regional
Implications,” Asian Defence Yearbook, Kuala Lumpur: Asian Defence Journal, 2001,
p. 8; “India’s ASEAN Strategy,” Jane’s Intelligence Digest, October 17, 2003, www4.
janes.com/subscribe/jic/doc.
242. Nair, “Challenges for the Years Ahead: An Indian Perspective.”
243. Donald Berlin, “Navy Reﬂects India’s Strategic Ambitions,” Asia Times
Online, November 6, 2004, www.atimes.com.
244. Ibid.
245. Steven J. Forsberg, “Is a China-India Naval Alliance Posible?” Proceedings
of the U.S. Naval Institute, March, 2002, pp. 71-72; “China’s Brazen Myanmar
Move,” Asia Times Online, August 21, 2003, www.atimes.com; John W. Garver, “The
Gestalt of the Sino-Indian Relationship,” Carolyn W. Pumphrey, ed., The Rise of
China in Asia: Security Implications, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,

187

U.S. Army War College, 2002, pp. 279-281; Donald L. Berlin, “The Indian Ocean
and the Second Nuclear Age,” Orbis, Vol. XLVIII, No. 1, Winter 2004, pp. 59-61;
Tellis, “China and India in Asia,” pp. 134-177.
246. Mark W. Frazier, “Quiet Competition and the Future of Sino-Indian
Relations,” Frankel and Harding, ed., p. 300.
247. Robert M. Hathaway, “The US-India Courtship: From Clinton to Bush,”
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. XXV, No. 4, December, 2002, pp. 21-29.
248. Federal News Service, Remarks by Secretary of State Colin Powell, Topic:
U.S.-China Relations, College Station: Texas A&M University, November 5, 2003.
249. Sahgal, “India-US Not Quite in Step Yet.”
250. Frazier, p. 316.
251. Parag Khanna, “The Axis of Democracy Revisited,” In the National Interest,
September 12, 2003.
252. “India To Play Prominent Role in US-led ‘Asian NATO’”; “Pentagon Keen
To Make India A Strategic Partner,” pp. 27-28.
253. Garver, The China-India-U.S. Triangle: Strategic Relations in the Post-Cold
War Era; Jing-Dong Yuan, “India’s Rise After Pokhran II,” pp. 978-1001; Tellis,
“China and India in Asia,” pp. 139-142; Susan L. Shirk, “One-Sided Rivalry:
China’s Perceptions and Policies Toward India,” pp. 75-96.
254. Ibid.; Garver, “The Future of the Sino-Pakistani Entente Cordiale,” pp.
397-401, 429-436.
255. Ibid.
256. Beijing, Renmin Ribao Internet Version, in Chinese, August 17, 2001, FBIS
NES, August 17, 2001
257. Tellis, “The Changing Political-Military Environment,” pp. 210-216.
258. NSS.
259. Tellis, “The Changing Political-Military Environment,” pp. 210-216.
260. Beijing, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, in Chinese, March 20, 2002, FBIS CHI, March
20, 2002.
261. Tellis, “China and India in Asia,” p. 141.
262. Garver, The China-India-U.S. Triangle; Jing-Dong Yuan, pp. 978-1001; Tellis,
“China and India in Asia,” pp. 139-142, 174; Shirk, “One-Sided Rivalry: China’s
Perceptions and Policies Toward India,” pp. 75-96.
263. Ibid.; Garver, “The Future of the Sino-Pakistani Entente Cordiale,” pp.
397-401, 429-436.
264. Tellis, “China and India in Asia,” p. 163.
265. Garver, The China-India-U.S. Triangle; Garver, “The Future of the SinoPakistani Entente Cordiale,” pp. 397-401, 429-436; Jing-Dong Yuan, pp. 978-1001;
188

Tellis, “China and India in Asia,” pp. 139-142; Shirk, “One-Sided Rivalry: China’s
Perceptions and Policies Toward India,” pp. 75-96.
266. Sheldon W. Simon, “Southeast Asia: Back to the Future,” Tellis and Wills,
eds., p. 286.
267. Forsberg, pp. 71-72; Garver, “The Gestalt of the Sino-Indian Relationship,”
pp. 279-281; Ehsan Ahrari, “Strategic Moves in Southern Asia,” Far Eastern
Economic Review, June 28, 2001, Ahamd Farroqui, “China Card Could Yet Trump
Musharraf,” Asia Times Online, May 25, 2002, www.atimes.com.
268. Tellis, “China and India in Asia,” p. 141.
269. Sahgal, “India: The World’s Parade Ground”; “India’s ASEAN
Strategy.”
270. Subianto, p. 9.
271. Tellis, “China and India in Asia,” p. 166.
272. MacDonald, p. 10; Nair., “Challenges for the Years Ahead: An Indian
Perspective,” Jasjit Singh, ““Peace and Cooperation in West Asia: An Indian
Perspective,” p. 57.
273. MacDonald, pp. 41, 51.
274. Ibid.
275. Douglas Streusand, “Geopolitics Versus Globalization,” Captain Sam J.
Tangredi (USN), ed., Globalization and Maritime Power, Washington, DC: National
Defense University Press, Fort Lesley J. McNair, 2003, p. 52.
276. MacDonald, p. 51.
277. Ibid., p. 41.
278. Ibid.
279. Berlin, pp. 59-61; Vivek Raghunvanshi, “India Bulks Up Eastern Island
Military Bases,” Defense News, December 15, 2003, p. 12.
280. Ibid.
281. Faizal Yahya, “India and Southeast Asia: Revisited,” Contemporary
Southeast Asia, Vol. XXV, No. 1, April, 2003, p. 91; Ian Storey and Carlyle A. Thayer,
“Cam Ranh Bay: Past Imperfect: Future Conditional,” Contemporary Southeast Asia,
Vol. XXIII, No. 3, 2001. pp. 467-469.
282. Ibid.
283. Quoted in Ibid., from Micol Brooke, “India Courts Vietnam With Arms
and Nuclear Technology,” Asia-Paciﬁc Defence Reporter, August-September 2000,
p. 20.
284. New Delhi, Financial Express Internet Version, in English, June 11, 2003,
FBIS NES, June 11, 2003; C. Raja Mohan, “India’s New Naval Doctrine,” The Hindu,
April 29, 2004, www.thehindu.com/2004/04/29/stories/2004042904801100.htm.

189

285. “Admiral Sushil Kumar, “The Indian Navy is a Stabilizing Force in the
Region,” www.Rediff.com, February 16, 2001; Commodore R. S. Vasan, “Indian
Maritime Doctrine,” Observer Research Foundation, July 17, 2004, www.observerindia.
comchapters/discussion/ds040717.htm; Rahul Bedi, “A New Doctrine for the Navy,”
Frontline, July 3-16, 2004, www.ﬂonnet.com/ﬂ12114/stories/20040716002104600.htm.
286. Funabashi; “Ambitious Plans of India Navy,” Hindustan Times, April
24, 2000, quoted in Victor M. Gobarev, “India as a World Power: Changing
Washington’s Myopic Policy,” Policy Analysis, No. 381, Heritage Foundation,
September 11, 2000, p. 7; R. S. Yadav, “Changing India-Japan Relations in the PostCold War Era,” India Quarterly, Vol. LVIII, No. 2, April-June, 2002, pp. 191-207;
Sengupta, p. 88.
287. Ibid.; Yann-Huei Song, “Actions Taken by the Three Main “Outsiders”
in the South China Sea Region in the Year 2000,” Peace Forum Papers, www.dsis.
org.tw/peaceforum/papers/2001-02APS0102001e.htm; Rahul Bedi, “India Opens Up
Traijing Bases to Singapore,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 19, 2004, p. 16.
288. Yahya, p. 84.
289. Ibid., pp. 79-103.
290. Sengupta, p. 12.
291. Anthony Davis, “Thailand Strengthens Security Ties with Israel,”
Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 1, 2005, www.4.janes.com/subscribe/jir/doc_view.
jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/mags; Vladimir Radyuhin, “India To Gain From
Russian Jet Deal With Malaysia,” The Hindu, May 22, 2003, www.hinduonnet.com/
stories/2003052205701200.htm.
292. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India’s HAL Eager for Aviation Ventures,” Defense
News, November 17, 2003, p. 3; Idem., “India Strives for Missile-Building Hub,”
Defense News, February 24, 2003, p. 34.
293. Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, pp. 438-443.
294. Conversations at USPACOM, November, 2004.
295. Harold Kennedy, “Air Force Forging Alliances in Paciﬁc Region,” National
Defense, March, 2004, p. 31.
296. Conversations with DoD ofﬁcials, September, 2004.
297. Federal Document Clearing House, “Donald H. Rumsfeld Holds Defense
Department Regular News Brieﬁng,” August 5, 2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
298 Rajamony, p. 75; Mohan, “India and the Bush Doctrine,” The Monitor, Vol.
IX, No. 2, Summer 2003, p. 3; James Morrison, “India Express,” Washington Times,
December 11, 2002, p. 15.
299. Ibid.
300. Morrison, p. 15.
301. Rahul Bedi, “U.S., India Building Bridges,” Jane’s Defnce Weekly, November
28, 2001, p. 23.
190

302. “Joint Statement of the India-U.S. Defense Policy Group,” December 4,
2001, India News, No. 1, 2002, pp. 7-8.
303. Ibid.; Rajamony, pp. 75-76.
304. “Joint Statement of the India-U.S. Defense Policy Group,” December 4,
2001.
305. “India, U.S. Hold Anti-Terrorism Talks With Focus on South Asia,” Agence
France Presse, January 21, 2002, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
306. “India, U.S. To Hold High-Level Defense Talks,” South Asia Monitor, May
31, 2004.
307. “India, U.S. Increase Defense, Anti-Terror Links,” Washington Times June
5, 2004, http://ebird.aﬁs.osd.mil/ebﬁles/e20040605292577.html.
308. “Press Release Issued by the Ministry of External Affairs on the India-U.S.
Cyberterrorism Initiative,” April 30, 2002, India News, No. 3, 2002, p. 19.
309. Storey, p. 195.
310. Rahul Bedi, “India Uncovers Militant Bases in Kashmir,” Jane’s
Intelligence Review, August, 2003, pp. 46-47; “Kashmir Paper Notes US, UK Policy
Changes,” Daily Excelsior Web Site, Jammu, January 18, 2003, retrieved from
Lexis-Nexis; B. Muralidhar Reddy, “U.S. Envoy’s Remarks Raise Eyebrows in
Pak.,” The Hindu, January 25, 2003, www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2003/01/25/
stories/2003012507951200.htm.
311. New Delhi, The Indian Express Internet Version, in English, January 13, 2003,
FBIS NES, January 13, 2003; “Kashmir Inﬁltration “down 60%-AWA 3 December
2004,” Aiant.com, www.asiant.com/arl/arl/5021.asp December 9, 2004.
312. Conversations, USPACOM, November 7-10, 2004.
313. “Meeting of the India-US Defense Policy Group, August 7, 2003,” India
News, August 15, 2003, pp. 10, 34; Department of Defense, “Joint Statement on U.S.India Defense Policy Group,” August 8, 2003, www.defenselink.mil/releases/2003/
nr20030808-0331.html.
314. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Militaries Meet As Indian-U.S. Relations Warm,”
Defense News, November 4-10, 2002, p. 21.
315. “Visit of Chief of India’s Naval Staff Admiral Madhvendra Singh to the
U.S.,” September 17, 2002, India News, No. 3, 2002, p. 11.
316. Ibid.; Vivek Raghuvanshi,” U.S., Indian Navies Finish Major Exercises in
the Arabian Sea,” Defense News, October 13, 2003, p. 24; Conversations, USPACOM,
November, 2004.
317. Raghuvanshi, “Militaries Meet As Indian-U.S. Relations Warm,” p. 21.
318. “Indian, U.S. Forces Hold Joint Exercises, The Associated Press, July 7,
2003.
319. Storey, p. 42.

191

320. “Meeting of the India-US Defense Policy Group, August 7, 2003,” pp.
10, 34; Department of Defense, “Joint Statement on U.S.-India Defense Policy
Group.”
321. Storey, p. 42.
322. Andrew Koch and Alon Ben-David, “US, India Agree Future Defence
Co-Operation, Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 20, 2003, www.ebird.dtic.mil/Aug2003/
s20030820209953.html; Major James Law, USAF, and Master Sergeant Michael
Farris, USAF, “Cope India: Building IAF-USAF Interoperability,” Asia-Paciﬁc
Defense Forum, Summer 2003, pp. 4-11; Colonel Steven B. Sboto, USA, “Balance
Iroquois 2003-01: Indian-U.S. Troops Train to Combat Terrorism,” Asia-Paciﬁc
Defense Forum, Summer 2003, pp. 22-27; Vivek Raghunvanshi, “India, U.S.
Complete Exercise,” Defense News, September 29, 2003, p. 18; Siddarth Srivastava,
“India’s Top Guns Head for the US,” Asia Times Online, June 24, 2004, www.atimes.
com.
323. “U.S. Warned It Could Lose Air Supremacy,” www.cnn.com, June 23,
2004.
324. C. R. Jayachandran, “India May Lead Asian Version of NATO,” The Times
of India, July 20, 2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
325. P. S. Suryanarayana, “U.S. Move to Co-Opt India Attacked in China,” The
Hindu, July 20, 2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
326. Conversations with Indian experts, Tel-Aviv, February 2004, and with Dr.
Madhav Malapat, Washington, DC, July 22, 2004.
327. Walker, “U.S., India Discuss ‘Asian NATO’,” UPI, May 29, 2003.
328. Raghuvanshi, “India Aims To Project Power Across Asia.”
329. Walker.
330. “India May Allow U.S. Access to Military Bases: Jaswant,” The News, June
23, 2001, www.jang.com/pk/thenews/jun2001-daily/23-06/2001/main/main1.htm.
331. Rahul Bedi, “US Closes In On South Asia’s Strategic Jewel,” Asia Times
Online, January 6, 2003. www.atimes.com; Idem., “U.S. Tightens Security Presence in
Indian Ocean, InterPress Service, January 5, 2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
332. Ibid.
333. Ibid.
334. QDR.
335. Federal Document Clearing House, “Testimony by Peter T. R. Brookes,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Paciﬁc Affairs,” House
Resources Committee, July 17, 2002.
336. Statement to the House Committee on International Relations by Peter
Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, June 26,
2003, www.house.gov/internationalrelations/108/rod0626.

192

337. Ibid.
338. Ibid.
339. Shahin, “US Won’t Take India’s ‘NO’ for an Answer.”
340. Chindand Rajghatta, “US Presses India on Iraq, Seeks Military Bases,” The
Economic Times of India, June 10, 2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
341. Joseph Cirincione, “The Asian Nuclear Reaction Chain,” Foreign Policy,
Spring 2000; pp. 120-137; Brahma Chellaney, “New Delhi’s Dilemma,” Washington
Quarterly, Vol. XXIII, No. 3, Summer 2000, pp. 145-154; Michael Krepon and Chris
Gagne, eds., The Impact of U.S. Ballistic Missile Defenses on Southern Asia, Stimson
Center Report, No. 46, July, 2002.
342. Ibid.
343. Chellaney, “New Delhi’s Dilemma,” p. 150.
344. Space-Based Laser Programme, www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/sbl, cited
in Ibid.
345. Scott Baldauf, “India Rises as Strategic U.S. Ally,” Christian Science Monitor,
January 26, 2004; Indranil Bannerjie, “India’s Militarization,” SAPRA India Bulletin,
November, 2003, p. 2.
346. Ashley Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent
and Ready Arsenal, Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2001, p. 21.
347. Ibid., pp. 24-39.
348. Ibid, p. 24.
349. Celia W. Dugger, “Rare Praise From India on U.S. Defense,” New York
Times, May 6, 2001; C. Raja Mohan, “India Welcomes Bush Plans for Cuts in NArsenal,” The Hindu, May 3, 2001, both retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
350. Chennai, The Hindu, in English, May 9, 2001, FBIS NES, May 9, 2001;
Mumbai, The Times of India Internet Version, in English, May 4, 2001, FBIS NES;
Colonel Gurmeet Kanwal, “Strategic Implications of U.S. Missile Defense,” U.S.I.
Journal, Vol. CXXXI, No. 546, October-December, 2001, pp. 487-494.
351. C. Raja Mohan, “India and the U.S.-Russian Alliance,” The Hindu,
November 8, 2001, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
352. C. Raja Mohan, “Vajpayee, Bush May Explore Tie-Up in Missile Defense,”
The Hindu, September 22, 2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
353. Ibid.
354. “US Keen to Involve India in Missile Shield Programme: Experts,” Press
Trust of India, September 19, 2002, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
355. David Ruppe, “India: Washington Considers Allowing Transfer of the
Arrow Interceptor,” Global Security Newswire, July 30, 2003; Andrew Feickert
and K. Alan Kronstadt, Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South Asia,
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, October 17, 2003, p. 14.
193

356. Ibid., pp. 25-29; Richard Speier, “Arrows for India?” Washington Institute
for Near East Policy, Policywatch No. 785, September 3, 2003, www.ciaonet.org/pbei/
winep/policy_2003/2003_785.
357. Ibid; Gopal Ratnam and Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Patriot Threatens Indo-Pak
Balance,” Defense News, October 13, 2003, pp. 1, 8; V. K. Raghunathan, “US Won’t
Stop Radar Sale to India,” The Straits Times, June 7, 2003, reterieved from LexisNexis.
358. Sridhar Krishnaswami, “India, U.S. To Step Up Defence Cooperation,” The
Hindu, Aguust 9, 2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; “India, U.S. Conclude Defence
Talks, Rumsfeld Makes Unscheduled Appearance,” BBC Monitoring, August 8,
2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
359. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Offers Compromises To Join U.S. Missile
Defense,” Defense News, September 29, 2003, p. 2.
360. Ibid.
361. Sultan Shahin, “India Sticks With Iran, For Now,” Asia Times Online,
September 19, 2003, www.atimes.com; “Watershed in India-Israel Relations,” Jane’s
Intelligence Digest, September 17, 2003, www4.janes.com/subscribe/jic/doc.
362. Ratnam and Raghuvanshi, pp. 1, 8.
363. Ruppe, “India: Washington Considers Allowing Transfer of the Arrow
Interceptor.”
364. C. Raja Mohan, “India and the Bush Doctrine,” p. 5.
365. Amrit Dhillon, “US Ban on Technology Sales to India Lifted; ‘Milestone’
Agreement Covers Nuclear Cooperation, Space, and Missile Defense,” South China
Morning Post, December 19, 2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
366. Federal Document Clearing House, “Statement by the President,” January
12, 2004, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
367. Baldauf, “India Rises as Strategic U.S. Ally”; Ashish Kumar Sen; Seema
Sirohi, “India Takes What It Can,” Asia Times Online, Janaury 21, 2004, www.
atimes.com; Edward Luce, “Premier of India Hails ‘Strategic’ U.S. Alliance,”
Financial Times, London Edition, January 14, 2004, p. 1, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis;
Christopher Marquis, “U.S. May Widen Technology Contacts With India,” New
York Times, Janaury 13, 2004, p. A12; Peter Slevin, “U.S. to Send India Nuclear,
Space Technology: New Delhi Pledges to Pursue Peaceful Purposes and Help
Block Spread of Weapons,” Washington Post, January 13, 2004.
368. MacDonald, pp. 94-95.
369. Gopal Ratnam and Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Patriot Threatens Indo-Pak
Balance,” Defense News, October 13, 2003, pp. 1, 8.
370. “Present Indo-US Military Cooperation Level is Unprecedented: Myers,”
Press Trust of India, February 17, 2002, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

194

371. For example, Neelam Matthews, “Courting India: French and Israeli
Teams Follow Up on Variety of Military, Civil Programs,” Aviation Week & Space
Technology, January 10, 2005, p. 61; Richard A. Bitzinger, “Globalization in the PostCold War Defense Industry: Challenges and Opportunities,” Ann R. Markusen
and Sean S. Costigan, eds., Arming the Future: A Defense Industry for the 21st Century,
New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999, pp. 305-333.
372. MacDonald, pp. 93-104.
373. Ibid.
374. Ibid.
375. Conversations, USPACOM.
376. Conversations with Indian experts, Tel-Aviv, February, 2004.
377. MacDonald, pp. 93-98.
378. Kronstadt, “India-U.S. Relations, pp. 14-15.
379. Ibid.; Amit Gupta, The U.S.-India Relationship: Strategic Partnership or
Complementary Interest, Forthcoming.
380. “Commerce’s Juster Outlines Next Steps in Strategic Partnership with
India,” U.S. Consulate Mumbai, Press Releases, April 5, 2004, http://Mumbai.
usconsulate.gov/wwwwashnews1565.html.
381. Ibid.
382. Gupta, The U.S.-India Relationship: Strategic Partnership or Complementary
Interest, Forthcoming; Kronstadt, “India-U.S. Relations,” p. 15.
383. Ibid.
384. Harbakash Singh Nanda, “India, U.S. Further Strategic Ties,” UPI,
October 23, 2004, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; Kenneth I. Juster, “A New Strategic
Partnership for the U.S. and India,” Asian Wall Street Journal, October 1, 2004.
385. Tellis, “Lost Tango in Washington.”
386. Ibid.
387. Ibid.
388. MacDonald, pp. 93-98.
389. “Meeting of the India-US Defense Policy Group,” p. 34; Joint Statement
on U.S.-India Defense Policy Group.
390. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India, U.S. Find Middle Ground for P-3C Orions,”
Defense News, May 31, 2004, p. 28.
391. Jyoti Malhotra, “India After JN Dixit,” Asia Times Online, www.atimes.com,
January 11, 2005.
392. “US Seeks ‘Stronger’ Ties with India,” www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_
asia/4079455.stnm, December 9, 2004.

195

393. Siddarth Srivastava, “AA U.S. Offer Delhi Can’t Refuse,” Asia Times
Online, www.atimes.com, December 2, 2004.
394. Ibid.
395. “Israel Fine-Tuning Phalcon Radar for India: Air Force,” Agence France
Presse, October 1, 2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
396. Timothy D. Hoyt, “India: The Regional Hegemon,” Timothy D. Hoyt,
Military Industry and Regional Power: India, Iraq, and Israel Taylor & Francis,
Forthcoming 2004 or 2005, pp. 123-155, cited by kind acknowledgement of the
author; Damon Bristow, “‘Globalisation’ Versus ‘Self Reliance’ in India’s Defence
Industry: Can the Conﬂict Be Resolved?” The Atlantic Council of the United
States: Defense Industry Globalization, A Compendium of Papers Presented at a
Conference on “Defense Industry Globalization, Washington, DC: November 16,
2001, pp. 103-120.
397. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India’s New Air chief Pushes Indigeneous Materiel
Purchases,” Defense News, January 17, 2005, p. 18.
398. Ibid.; Bedi, “U.S. India Building Bridges,” p. 23.
399. Kaushik Kapisthalam, “India’s Arjun Shows Value of Indigenous
Industry,” Defense News, January 10, 2005, p. 29.
400. Ibid.
401. Hoyt, India: “The Regional Hegemon,” pp. 123-155.
402. Raghuvanshi, “India Aims To Project Power Across Asia,” p. 10.
403. “India May Export Missile, Ofﬁcial Says, Global Security Network, January
18, 2005, www.nti.org/d_newsire/issues/2005_1_18.htm#A94AFA73.
404. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Eyes markets Abroad,” Defense News, May
20-26, 2002, p. 36; Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Indian Munitions Plants Fear Sales Losses,
Seek Exports,” Defense News, January 14-20, 2002, p. 10; Nadeem Iqbal, Anil
Sharma.
405. Ibid., Defense Industry Globalization, “India Furthers Strategic Goals By
Reaching Out to Arms Markets,” www.stratfor.com, October 29, 2002.
406. Ibid.
407. Ibid.
408. Blank, “The Arming of Central Asia,” Asia Times Online, August 24, 2002,
www.atimes.com.
409. Raghuvanshi, “Indian Navy Drafts Plan for Industry-Military
Relationship,” p. 12; Muscal, “Indian Defense Industry Delegation Promotes
Cooperation”; Raghuvanshi, “India’s HAL Eager for Aviation Ventures,” p. 3.
410. Ibid. Raghuvanshi, “India Strives for Missile-Building Hub,” Defense News,
February 24, 2003, p. 34.

196

411. Hoyt, “India: The Regional Hegemon,” pp. 123-155; Bristow,
“‘Globalisation’ Versus ‘Self Reliance’ in India’s Defence Industry: Can the Conﬂict
Be Resolved?” pp. 103-120.
412. Ibid.
413. Bjorn Hagelin, Mark Bromley, and Simon T. Wezeman, “International
Arms Transfers,” SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament, and International
Security, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 459.
414. Raghuvanshi, “Indian Navy Drafts Plan for Industry-Military
Relationship,” p. 12; Muscal, “Indian Defense Industry Delegation Promotes
Cooperation”; Raghuvanshi, “India’s HAL Eager for Aviation Ventures,” p. 3.
415. New Delhi, The Indian Express, Internet Version, in English, April 24, 2002,
FBIS SOV, April 24, 2002.
416. “Sukhoi-30s Develop Technical Snags,” SAPRA India Bulletin, September,
2003, p. 28; Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Grounds Fleet of Sukhoi Fighters,” Defense
News, September 15, 2003, p. 66.
417. Ibid.
418. Ibid., “New Challenges to Indian-Russian Defense Ties,” Jamestown
Monitor, March 25, 2002; Vivek Raghuvanshi, “No Arms Sales in Russian-Indian
Accord,” Defense News, December 9-15, 2002, p. 12; New Delhi, The Asian Age, in
English, April 5, 2001, FBIS NES, April 5, 2001; Subhash Kapila, “India-Russia
Strategic Cooperation: Time to Move Away,” South Asia Analysis Group Papers
No, 144, 2002, www.saag.org/paper2_paper144.html; Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Indian
Ministry Puts Russian Arms Manufacturers on Notice,” Defense News, November
24, 2003, p. 11.
419. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Indian Navy Drafts Plan for Industry-Military
Relationship,” Defense News, December 15, 2003, p. 12; Tal Muscal, “Indian Defense
Industry Delegation Promotes Cooperation,” Jerusalem Post, November, 25, 2003;
Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India’s HAL Eager for Aviation Ventures,” Defense News,
November 17, 2003, p. 3; Sanu Kainikara, “Changing the Balance of Power,” AsiaPaciﬁc Defense Reporter, February, 2004, p. 52; Timothy D. Hoyt, “Israeli Defense
Industry: The Other Side of Globalization,” The Atlantic Council of the United
States: Defense Industry Globalization, A Compendium of Papers Presented at a
Conference on “Defense Industry Globalization,” Washington, DC, November 16,
2001, pp. 193-207.
420. Kapisthalam, p. 29.
421. For information on the Russian defense industry, see Julian Cooper, “The
Arms Industries of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Belarus,” SIPRI Yearbook,
2004, pp. 438-439.
422. Stephen Blank, “Russian Defense Industry in an Age of Globalization,”
Defense Industry Globalization : A Compendium of Papers Presented at a
Conference on: “Defense Industry Globalization,” Washington, DC, November 16,

197

2001, Atlantic Council of the United States, pp. 60-65; New Delhi, The Asian Age,
in English, May 4, 2002, FBIS SOV, May 4, 2002; New Delhi, The Indian Express,
Internet Version, in English, April 24, 2002, FBIS SOV, April 24, 2002; Mumbai, The
Times of India Internet Version, February 6, 2002, FBIS SOV, February 6, 2002.
423. Ibid.; “New Air Defense for India Will Unnerve Beijing,” www.stratfor.com,
June 21. 2001.
424. “Potential for Cooperation with India is Nearly Exhausted,” Current Digest
of the Post-Soviet Press (henceforth CDPP), Vol. LIII, No. 35, September 26, 2001, p.
17; B. M. Jain, “India and Russia: Reassessing the Time-Tested Ties,” Paciﬁc Affairs,
Vol. LXXVI, No. 3, Fall 2003, pp. 382-386.
425. Hagelin, Bromley, and Wezeman, pp. 453-455.
426. Harbaksh Singh Nanda, “India to Say Goodbye to Russian MiGs,” UPI,
July 17, 2004.
427. Sibal.
428. Mishra, Speech by Shri Brajesh Mishra, National Security Advisor of India
at the Council of Foreign Relations, “India, United States, and the New World
Order: Prospects for Cooperation,” New York, May 7, 2003, p. 23.
429. Harsh V. Pant, “India-Israel Partnership: Convergence and Constraints,”
Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. VIII, No. 6, December,
2004, http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2004/issue4/jv8no4a6.html.
430. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Israel May Become India’s Top Source,” Defense
News, March 10, 2003; p. 34. Indeed, some think Israel may already be the leading
exporter to India, Amy Waldman, “The Bond Between India and Israel Grows, New
York Times, September 7, 2003, www.nytimes.com/2003/09/07/internatinl/asia/07INDI.
htm; Edward Luce and Harvey Morris, “India and Israel Ready to Consummate
Secret Affair,” Financial Times, September 4, 2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis;
Amnon Barzilai, “Looking Out for Number One,” Ha’Aretz, July 12, 2004, www.
haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml.
431. Ramtanu Maitra, “India’s Phalcon: Long-Range Problems,” Asia Times
Online, www.atimes.com March 20, 2004.
432. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Indian Navy Drafts Plan for Industry-Military
Relationship”; Muscal, “Indian Defense Industry Delegation Promotes
Cooperation”; Raghuvanshi, “India’s HAL Eager for Aviation Ventures.”
433. Barbara Opall-Rome and Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Seeks Israeli Spy
Staellite Imagery,” Defense News, September 22, 2003, p. 6.
434. Barbara Opall-Rome and Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Eyes Foreign
Missiles,” Defense News, September 22, 2003, pp. 1, 8.
435. Rahul Bedi, “India Courts Missile Help from Israel,” Jane’s Defence Weekly,
October 1, 2003.

198

436. Ibid.; Rahul Bedi, “India Negotiates Defence Packages with Israel,” Jane’s
Defence Weekly, October 2, 2002, p. 12; Rahul Bedi, “New Delhi Near to Closing
Barak Deal,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 3, 2003, www4.janes.com/subscribe/
jdw/doc_view.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/jamesdata/mags.
437. Ibid.
438. Ashok K. Mehta, “Indo-Israeli Give and Take,” Global New Wire, World
News Connection, September 10, 2003; “Rana Latif “Indo-Israel Nexus to Harm
Pakistan, Says Gul,” Global News Wire, World News Connection, September 23, 2003;
Rahul Datta, “Indo-Israeli Military Exercise Coming Up,” Global News Wire, World
News Connection, September 23, 2003, all retreived from Lexis-Nexis.
439. Ramtanu Maitra, “India’s Phalcon: Long-Range Problems,” Asia Times
Online, www.atimes.com, March 20, 2004.
440. Ibid.
441. MacDonald.
442. Ashley Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent
and Ready Arsenal, Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2001, p. 86n.
443. Vivek Raghunvahi, “India Outlines Defense Needs as U.S. Sanctions
End,” Defense News, November 12-18, 2001, p. 34.
444. USINFO.State.Gov, “U.S., Indian High Technology Will Beneﬁt Through
Cooperation,” Augst 8, 2003, http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html; Gopal
Ratnam, “India, U.S. Work To Restore Trust, Ties,” Defense News, November 3,
2003, pp. 1, 8.
445. Ibid.
446. Raghuvanshi, “India’s Navy Reaches for Blue Water Goals, p. 19.
447. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “ India’s New Government Rethinks Acquisitions,”
Defense News, December 13, 2004, p. 22.
448. Ibid.
449. “India, U.S. Likely To Clear Sale of P-3 Orions,” Aerospace Daily, June
12, 2003; Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Awaits U.S. Commitments,” Defense News,
November 22, 2004, p. 14.
450. John S. Wolf, Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation, Alternate
Representative of the United States of America, Third Session of the Preparatory
Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, New York, New York, May 4, 2004, http://www.state.gov/t/np/
rls/rm/32293.htm.
451. Stephen F. Burgess, Is Arms Control Really Dead?: The United States, India,
and Pakistan, Paper Presented to the Annual Convention of the American Political
Science Association, Philadelphia, PA, August 30, 2003, pp. 25-26, and the sources
cited therein.

199

452. Richard Haass, “The United States and India: A Transfomred Relationship,”
Remarks to the Confederation of Indian Industry, January 7, 2003, www.state.gov.
453. Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture, p. 22.
454. Ibid., pp. 26-29.
455. Ibid.
456. B. Muralidhar Reddy, “U.S. Envoy’s Remarks Raise Eyebrows in
Pak.,” The Hindu, January 25, 2003, www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2003/01/25/
stories/2003012507951200.htm.
457. “China Not in Favor of According Nuclear Status to India, Pak,” Press
Trust of India, June 29, 2004, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; MacDonald, pp. 57-59;
Devin T. Hagerty, “US Policy and the Kashmir Dispute: Propsects for Resoltuion,”
India Review, Vol. II, No. 3, July, 2003, p. 112.
458. “A Paradigm Shift Towards South Asia,” p. 149.
459. MacDonald, pp. 57-59; Mohan, “India and the Bush Doctrine,” p. 5.
460. Ibid.
461. MacDonald, p. 59.
462. Sahgal, “India-US Not Quite in Step Yet.”
463. Sibal.
464. A. Ganguly, “India Hails Technology Pact with US,” Asia Times Online,
March 7, 2003, www.atimes.com.
465. Jon B. Wolfsthal and Rose Gottemoeller, “Israel, India, and Pakistan:
Regional Security and Politics are the Solution, Not the NPT,” www.pircenter.org/
conf2003/data.
466. Ramtanu Maitra, “Russia Floats Novel Nuclear Idea for India,” Asia Times
Online, www.atimes.com, December 3, 2003; Anwar Iqbal, “U.S.: India, Pakistan Will
Retain Nukes,” UPI, June 17, 2004, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
467. MacDonald, pp. 119-132.
468. Ibid.
469. Ibid.
470. Burgess, pp. 25-26.
471. MacDonald.
472. Ibid.
473. Stephen Phillip Cohen, “South Asia,” pp. 77-104.
474. Devin T. Hagerty, “US Policy and the Kashmir Dispute: Prospects for
Resolution,” India Review, Vol. II, No. 3, July 2003, pp. 89-116; “Army Chief Warns
Pak Against N-strike: ‘We are Ready for Full-Scale War’,” The Tribune, January 12,
2002.

200

475. NSS; QDR.
476. “Testimony of Paula A. DeSutter, Assistant Secretary of State for
Veriﬁcation and Compliance to the U.S.-China Commission, July 24, 2003, www.
uscc.gove/tesut.htm; Mohan Malik, “The Proliferation Axis: Beijing-IslamabadPyongyang,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XV, No. 1, Spring 2003, pp.
57-100.
477. Norman Friedman, Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America’s New Way of War,
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, p. 142; Moscow, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, in Russian,
June 25, 2003, FBIS SOV, June 25, 2003, Beijing Review Internet Version, FBIS SOV
February 7, 2002.
478. Ayoob, “South Asia’s Dangers and U.S. Foreign Policy,” p. 133.
479. Michael Howard, “Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the
1980s,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. LXI, No. 2, Winter 1982-83, pp. 309-324, employed this
analytical point with regard to Europe, but it also holds for South Asia.
480. Amy Waldman, “Indians in Deal with Pakistanis for Peace Talks,” New
York Times, January 7, 2004, p. A1.
481. Burgess, pp. 25-26; “Missile Defense Brieﬁng Report, No. 124, American
Foreign Policy Council, November 3, 2003, www.afpc.org; “India: Washington
Considers Allowing Transfer of Arrow Interceptor,” www.nti.org/dnewswire/
issues/2002/730, July 30, 2002.
482. Colonel Howard D. Belote, USAF, “Proconsuls, Pretenders, or
Professionals? The Political Role of Regional Combatant Commanders,” Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition, Washington, DC: Fort Lesley
J. McNair, National Defense University Press, 2004, pp. 1-19, and the sources cited
therein.
483. Ilan Berman, “Israel, India, and Turkey: Triple Entente?” Middle East
Quarterly, Fall 2002, pp. 33-40; K. Gajendra Singh, “India Wooing Turkey and Israel
Adds Up,” Asia Times Online, October 1, 2003, www.atimes.com; Huma Siddqui,
“US-Israel-India Meet on Terroism Being Planned,” Financial Express, June 16,
2003, www.ﬁnancialexpress.com/fe_full_story.php?content_id=36310.
484. Mohan Malik, pp. 57-100; Justin Bernier, “China’s Strategic Proxies,”
Orbis, Vol. XLVII, No. 4, Fall 2003, pp. 629-643; T. V. Paul, “Chinese-Pakistani
Nuclear/Missile Ties and Balance of Power Politics,” The Nonproliferation Review,
Vol. X, No. 2, Summer 2003, pp. 21-29.
485. Ibid.
486. Ahmed Rashid, “Danger Mounts for Embattled General,” Far Eastern
Economic Review, January 8, 2004, pp. 12-16; Seema Sirohi, “Pakistan Squarely
Behind U.S. Shield,” Asia Times Online, November 11, 2003, www.atimes.com.
487. Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, “India’s Response to Terorrism After 13 December
2001,” Conﬂict, Security, and Development, Vol. III, No. 2, August, 2003, pp. 278280.
201

488. Malhotra, “India After JN Dixit.”
489. Steve Coll, “Between India and Pakistan, A Changing Role for the U.S.,”
The Washington Post, May 26, 2002, p. B01.
490. Neelesh Misra, “India, Pakistan to Establish Nuclear Hot Line to Lower
Risk of Nuclear Flare-up,” Associated Press Worldstream, June 20, 2004, retrieved
from Lexis-Nexis.
491. Sultan Shahin, “India Doubting its U.S. ‘Strategic Partnership’,” however,
this sentiment developed quite soon after September 11. For example, see “India
Fumes as West Urges Kashmir Restraint,” Reuters, Hindustan Times, October 10,
2001. For more recent assessments, see Zhang Guihong, “US Security Policy
Towards South Asia”; C. Raja Mohan, “A Paradigm Shift Towards South Asia,”
Washington Quarterly, Vol. XXVI, No. 1, Winter 2002-03, pp. 145-46; New Delhi,
Outlook, in English, FBIS NES, December 23, 2002; “US Is Weak If It Cannot Rein
In Pakistan Terror: Indian PM,” Agence France Presse, March 3, 2003; Lancaster;
Perkovich, “Is India a Major Power,” pp. 140-142.
492. CFR Report, pp. 7-11; C. Raja Mohan, “A Paradigm Shift,” p. 148;
“Testimony of Stephen P. Cohen, Frank Wisner, and Michael Krepon,” Hearing
of Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Pakistan and India, January 28, 2004,
retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
493. Mohan, “A Paradigm Shift,” p. 150; Hagerty, pp. 89-91, 112.
494. Feroz Hassan Khan, “The Independence-Dependence Paradox: Stability
Dilemmas in South Asia,” Arms Control Today, October, 2003, www.armscontrol.
org/act/2003_10Khan_10; Rajesh M. Basrur, “Are South Asian Nuclear Politics
Different?” Discussion Paper, The Stimson Center, May 5, 2003, pp. 11-17, www.
stimsoncenter.org.
495. Ibid.
496. Ibid.; P. R. Chari, “Nuclear Crisis, Escalation Control, and Deterrence in
South Asia,” Working Paper, Version 1.0, Washington, DC: The Stimson Center,
2003, pp. 22-28.
497. Sahgal, “India-US Not Quite in Step Yet.”
498. Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Pakistan-India: Same Game, New Rules,” Asia
Times Online, www.atimes.com, November 26, 2003; Nayar and Paul, p. 85; Jonah
Blank, “Kashmir: All Tactics and No Strategy,” Sumit Ganguly, ed., The Kashmir
Question: Retrospect and Prospect, London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 2003, pp.199-201;
“Banned Pakistani Ultra Outﬁts Back in Business,” Business Standard, September
11, 2003.
499. Hagerty, pp. 89-116; Mohan, “A Paradigm Shift,” pp. 149-151; Cohen,
Wisner, Krepon, “Testimony”; Irm Haleem, “Micro Target, Micro Impact: The
Resolution of the Kashmir conﬂict as a Key to Shrinking Al-Qaeda’s International
Terrorist Network,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. XVI, No. 1, Spring 2004,
pp. 37-41.

202

500. Ibid.
501. Waldman, “Indians in Deal with Pakistanis for Peace Talks,” p. A1.
502. Timothy D. Hoyt, “Politics, Proximity, and Paranoia: The Evolution of
Kashmir as a Nuclear Flashpoint,” Sumit Ganguly, ed., The Kashmir Question:
Retrospect and Prospect, London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 2003, pp. 117-144; Jonah
Blank, pp. 199-201.
503. Such conferences of academics and experts discussing issues of mutual
concern in an unofﬁcial capacity in a series of non-binding and unofﬁcial fora has
been very productive in stimulating international dialogue on East Asian security
issues. And while they have not worked so well on the Middle East, that is not
due to any inherent defect in the concept as such. Moreover, such conferences,
albeit not under any formal track two auspices, already are taking place here and
abroad.
504. “Powell Conﬁdent of Close Ties With New Indian Government,” South
Asia Monitor, June 2, 2004.
505. “India Will Deepen Ties with US, Talks With China To Continue: Natwar
Singh,” South Asia Monitor, May 22, 2004; “Relations with U.S. Should Not Be
‘Episodic’: Natwar Singh,” South Asian Monitor, May 24, 2004; “India to Carry
Forward Ties With US: Natwar Singh,” South Asian Monitor, May 25, 2004.
506. “Japan To Establish Global Partnership with India,” South Asia Monitor,
May 26, 2004; “India, Japan Discuss Terrorism, Defense Cooperation,” South Asia
Monitor, May 26, 2004; “India, Japan Should keep Watch Over China,” www.
webindia123.com/news/showdetails.asp?id=63330&cat=Asia.
507. Raman, “New Indian Govt. & National Security: Likely Policies—Part IV;
Barzilai, “Looking Out for Number One”; “India Values Ties With Islamic World,”
South Asia Monitor, May 24, 2004; Y.P. Rajesh, “India to Balance Ties with Israel,
Palestinians,” South Asia Monitor, May 27, 2004; Elizabeth Roche, “New Indian
government Will Avoid Upsetting Ties With Israel,” Agence France Presse, May 30,
2004, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
508. Roche.
509. “Indian Military Unveils Planned Road Linking Afghanistan and Iran,”
South Asia Monitor, May 6, 2004.
510. Neelam Mathews, “New Lyrics, Same Tune,” Aviation Week & Space
Technology, May 31, 2004, p. 36; “India: Defense Spending and Normalization,”
www.stratfor.com, July 10, 2004; “India’s New Government Pledges to Modernize
Armed Forces,” South Asia Monitor, May 26, 2004; Vivek Raghuvanshi, “New
Indian Boss Vows Scrutiny,” Defense News, May 31, 2004, p. 28.
511. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Indo-U.S. Defense Relations May Hinge on Missile
Defense,” Defense News, June 21, 2004, p. 26; Sultan Shahin, “India and the Interim
Mess in Iraq,” Asia Times Online, June 8, 2004, www.atimes.com.

203

512. FY 2004 Report to Congress on Chinese Military Power, Washington,
DC: Department of Defense, May, 28, 2004, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/
d20040528PRC.pdf; Raghuvanshi, “India’s New Naval Ambition,” pp. 1, 8; Bedi,
“India Outlines Vision of Future Nuclear Navy.”
513. Ibid.; Raghuvanshi, “India’s New Naval Ambition,” pp. 1, 8.
514. Ibid.
515. “Powell-Natwar Talks: India to Look Again on Sending Troops to
Iraq,” deepikaglobal.com, June 12, 2004, www.deepikaglobal.conm/archives/ENG4_sib.
asp?newsdate=06/12/2004&ccode=E.
516. Srivastava, “India’s Top Guns Head for the US”; Shahin, “India and the
Interim Mess in Iraq.”
517. That is because our own muscular combination of Realpolitik and
moralism can be and often is no less irksome to other governments.
518. Ashwani Kumar, “Indo-U.S. Relations: The Logic and Philosophy of a
Purposive Engagement,” Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International
Studies, 2003, p. 13.
519. Ryu Jin, “US Offers 5-Point Proposal To N. Korea,” Korea Times, July 13,
2004; “India-US Strategy Needed on WMD: Blackwill,” The Press Trust of India,
November 27, 2002, retreived from Lexis-Nexis; Blackwill, Kolkata Speech; Sultan
Shahin, “US, India Talk Nuclear Technology Transfer,” Asia Times Online, October
8, 2003, www.atimes.com.
520. Ibid.
521. Baldauf, “India Rises as Strategic U.S. Ally.”
522. C. Raja Mohan, “Asian Balance and the Subcontinent,” The Hindu,
December 18, 2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
523. Tellis, “South Asia,” pp. 262-263.
524. Ibid.
525. Ibid., p. 263.
526. Ibid.
527. Ibid.
528. Hathaway, “The US-India Courtship: From Clinton to Bush,” p. 29.
529. Ibid., pp. 21-25.
530. Sahgal, “India-US Not Quite in Step Yet.”
531. Scott Baldauf, “US and China Dance With India,” Christian Science Monitor,
April 19, 2001; Nirmal Ghosh, “India Seeks Balance In Ties With China,” The Straits
Times, Singapore, April 14, 2001, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; Tellis, “The Changing
Political-Military Environment,” pp. 210-216.

204

261.

532. Perkovich, “Is India a Major Power?” p. 133; Tellis, “South Asia,” pp. 244,

533. Parag Khanna, “The Axis of Democracy Revisited,” In the National Interest,
September 12, 2003.
534. “India To Play Prominent Role in US-led ‘Asian NATO’”; “Pentagon Keen
to make India a Strategic Partner” pp. 27-28.
535. Garver, The China-India-U.S. Triangle; Garver, “The Future of the SinoPakistani Entente Cordiale,” pp. 397-401, 429-436; Jing-Dong Yuan, pp. 978-1001.
536. Beijing, Renmin Ribao Internet Version, in Chinese, FBIS NES, August 17,
2001.
537 Tellis, “The Changing Political-Military Environment,” pp. 210-216.
538. NSS.
539. Tellis, ”The Changing Political-Military Environment,” pp. 210-216.
540. Beijing, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, in Chinese, FBIS CHI, March 20, 2002.
541. “President Meets with U.S. Military Personnel at Fort Polk, Louisiana,”
February 17, 2004, www.whitehouse.gov; Henry R. Nau, “Alliances or Security
Community in Asia: Which Way Is Bush Heading?” Hathaway and Lee, eds., pp.
131-142.
542. NSS; http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html.
543. Therese Delpech, “Transatlantic Relations After the War in Iraq,”
Connections, Vol. V, November, 2003.
544. Nau, pp. 137-138.
545. Ibid., pp. 138-150.
546. Ibid.
547. Teresita C. Shaffer, “U.S. Inﬂuence on Pakistan: Can Partners Have
Divergent Priorities?” Washington Quarterly, Vol. XXVI, No. 1, Winter 2002-03, p.
170, 181-183.
548. Mohammad Ayoob, “From Regional System to Regional Society:
Exploring Key Variables in the Construction of Regional Order,” Australian Journal
of International Affairs, Vol. LIII, No. 3, 1999, pp. 247-260; “Inequality and Theorizing
in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern Realism,” International Studies
Review, Vol. IV, No. 3, 2002, pp. 127-148, and the works cited therein.
549. Cohen, pp. 53-74; Sobhan, pp. 55-83.
550. This, of course, is a peaceful method (though with force not invisible) of
achieving the favorable balance of power that the NSS and the QDR both discuss.
551. CFR Report, pp. 1-35; Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India, U.S. Boost Technology
Ties,” Defense News, December 1, 2003, p. 29.

205

552. Thomson, p. 17; Hoagland, p. B19.
553. MacDonald, p. xxvii.
554. Sahgal, “India-US Not Quite in Step Yet.”
555. Thomson, p. 17. For other sources stating this point, see Stephen Blank,
After Two Wars: Reﬂections on the American Strategic Revolution in Central Asia, Carlisle
Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, forthcoming
2005.
556. MacDonald, pp. 119-120.
557. Ibid.
558. Ibid.
559. For example, “Al-Qaeda Inﬂuence Spreads,” Jane’s Intelligence Digest,
December 5, 2003, www4.janes.com/subscribe/jic/doc.

206

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
STEPHEN J. BLANK has served as the Strategic Studies Institute’s
expert on the Soviet bloc and the post-Soviet world since 1989. Prior
to that he was Associate Professor of Soviet Studies at the Center for
Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, Maxwell Air Force
Base, and taught at the University of Texas, San Antonio, and at the
University of California, Riverside. Dr. Blank is the editor of Imperial
Decline: Russia’s Changing Position in Asia, coeditor of Soviet Military
and the Future, and author of The Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin’s
Commissariat of Nationalities, 1917-1924. He has also written many
articles and conference papers on Russian, the Commonwealth
of Independent States, and Eastern European security issues. Dr.
Blank’s current research deals with weapons proliferation and the
revolution in military affairs, and energy and security in Eurasia. His
most recent SSI publications include “The Foundations of Russian
Strategic Power and Capabilities,” in Beyond Nunn-Lugar: Curbing the
Next Wave of Weapons Proliferation Threats from Russia, edited by Henry
D. Sokolski and Thomas Riisager, April 2002, and The Transatlantic
Security Agenda: A Conference Report and Analysis, December 2001. Dr.
Blank holds a B.A. in History from the University of Pennsylvania,
and a M.A. and Ph.D. in History from the University of Chicago.

207

